Zurcher v. Stanford Daily
436 U.S. 547 (1978)
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Rule of Law:
The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the issuance of a search warrant for property on which there is probable cause to believe that fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of a crime are located, even if the owner or possessor of that property is not reasonably suspected of complicity in the crime being investigated.
Facts:
- On April 9, 1971, demonstrators occupied the administrative offices of Stanford University Hospital.
- Police were called to remove the demonstrators. As police forced their way into a barricaded hallway, a group of demonstrators attacked nine officers with sticks and clubs, injuring them all.
- The attacking demonstrators were not all identified by the police, but one officer saw at least one person photographing the assault.
- Two days later, the Stanford Daily, a student newspaper, published a special edition with articles and photographs of the protest and clash.
- The byline on the photographs indicated that a Daily staff member had been at the location where the assault on the nine officers occurred.
- Based on this information, the Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office obtained a search warrant for the Daily’s offices to find negatives, film, and pictures that could identify the assailants.
- The warrant affidavit contained no allegation that members of the Daily staff were involved in any unlawful acts at the hospital.
- Four police officers executed the warrant, searching the Daily's photographic labs, filing cabinets, desks, and wastepaper baskets, but did not remove any materials.
Procedural Posture:
- The Stanford Daily and members of its staff sued Palo Alto police officers, the district attorney, and others in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California.
- The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging the search violated their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
- The District Court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, holding that the Fourth Amendment forbids a warrant to search a third party not suspected of a crime unless a subpoena duces tecum is shown to be impracticable.
- The District Court also held that where the third party is a newspaper, a warrant is permissible only where there is a clear showing that materials will be destroyed and a restraining order would be futile.
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court in a per curiam opinion.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibit law enforcement from obtaining a warrant to search the property of a third party not suspected of criminal activity for evidence of a crime?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice White
No. A State is not prevented by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments from issuing a warrant to search for evidence simply because the owner or possessor of the place to be searched is not reasonably suspected of criminal involvement. The critical element for a reasonable search is not the culpability of the property owner, but rather the probable cause to believe that the specific 'things' to be searched for and seized are located on the property. The Fourth Amendment's text does not suggest a third-party search is impermissible, as search warrants are directed at places and things, not persons. Furthermore, the First Amendment does not create a special privilege for the press that would require law enforcement to use a subpoena duces tecum instead of a search warrant; the standard warrant requirements of probable cause, particularity, and reasonableness, when applied with 'scrupulous exactitude,' afford sufficient protection.
Concurring - Justice Powell
No. The Fourth Amendment contains no constitutional basis for creating a special procedural exception for the press. However, a magistrate asked to issue a warrant for the search of press offices can and should take cognizance of the independent values protected by the First Amendment when weighing the reasonableness and particularity requirements of the warrant. The standard Fourth Amendment framework is sufficient to protect these interests without creating a per se rule that forbids searches of press entities so long as a subpoena could be used.
Dissenting - Justice Stewart
Yes. The search of a newspaper office infringes upon the First Amendment's guarantee of a free press. Police searches physically disrupt newsroom operations and, more seriously, threaten the confidentiality of sources, which is essential for newsgathering. The fear of unannounced raids will have a deterrent effect on the availability of confidential news sources, diminishing the flow of information to the public. A subpoena duces tecum would serve the state's interest in obtaining evidence just as effectively without the chilling effect on First Amendment freedoms, as it provides an opportunity for an adversary hearing before any materials are seized.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
Yes. The search was unreasonable because the warrant was not supported by an adequate showing of probable cause. For an unannounced search of an innocent third party's private files, the Fourth Amendment requires more than just probable cause to believe the files contain relevant evidence. The only justification for bypassing less intrusive means like a subpoena is the fear that the third party would destroy or conceal the evidence if given notice. Therefore, the warrant application must set forth facts showing probable cause to believe that the custodian of the evidence would disregard a subpoena, and without such a showing, the warrant is invalid.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarified the scope of the Fourth Amendment by holding that the standard for a search warrant focuses on the location of the evidence, not the status of the property owner. It explicitly rejected the idea that a less intrusive method, like a subpoena, must be used when searching the premises of an innocent third party. The ruling's refusal to create a special privilege for the press under the First Amendment was particularly impactful, subjecting news organizations to the same search procedures as any other entity. In direct response to this case, Congress passed the Privacy Protection Act of 1980, which provides statutory protection against searches and seizures of journalistic work product, effectively overriding the Court's holding as it applies to the press.
