Zuni Public School District No. 89 v. Department of Education
127 S. Ct. 1534 (2007)
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Rule of Law:
When a federal statute contains technical, ambiguous language, a federal agency's long-standing, reasonable interpretation of that language is entitled to judicial deference, particularly when supported by the statute's history, context, and underlying purpose.
Facts:
- The federal Impact Aid Act provides financial assistance to local school districts affected by a federal presence.
- The Act allows a State to reduce its own aid to districts receiving federal impact aid, but only if the State has a program that 'equalizes expenditures' among its school districts.
- The test for equalization requires the Secretary of Education to compare the highest- and lowest-spending districts after disregarding outlier districts 'with per-pupil expenditures... above the 95th percentile or below the 5th percentile of such expenditures.'
- For three decades, the Secretary of Education promulgated and used a regulation that calculated these percentiles by ranking districts by per-pupil spending but identifying the 95th and 5th percentile cutoff points based on the cumulative number of students in those districts (a student-weighted method).
- The Department of Education applied this student-weighted method to New Mexico's school aid program for fiscal year 2000.
- Using the student-weighted method, the Department excluded 23 districts and certified New Mexico's program as equalized.
- Zuni Public School District and Gallup-McKinley County Public School District argued the statute required a method based purely on the number of districts, which would have excluded only 10 districts and resulted in a finding that New Mexico's program was not equalized.
Procedural Posture:
- Zuni Public School District and Gallup-McKinley County Public School District challenged the Department of Education's finding before a Department Administrative Law Judge.
- The Administrative Law Judge rejected Zuni's challenge to the regulations.
- The Secretary of Education affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's decision.
- Zuni sought review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
- A three-judge panel of the Tenth Circuit affirmed the Secretary's determination by a 2-1 vote.
- The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit granted a hearing en banc, vacating the panel decision.
- The en banc Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the Secretary’s decision by an evenly divided 6-6 vote.
- The Supreme Court of the United States granted Zuni's petition for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does the Impact Aid Act's instruction to 'disregard' school districts 'with per-pupil expenditures . . . above the 95th percentile or below the 5th percentile of such expenditures' unambiguously foreclose the Secretary of Education from using a calculation method that considers the number of pupils in each district to determine the percentiles?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Breyer
No. The statutory language does not foreclose the Secretary's method; rather, it is ambiguous and permits the Secretary’s reasonable interpretation. The phrase 'percentile of such expenditures' does not specify the 'population' to be distributed for the calculation (e.g., school districts, students, or schools). Given this textual ambiguity, under Chevron deference, the Court must uphold the agency's interpretation if it is reasonable. The Secretary’s interpretation is reasonable because it aligns with the statute’s purpose of excluding statistical outliers, avoids the absurd results that could arise under a district-only method in states with varied district sizes, and reflects a long-standing agency practice that Congress implicitly adopted when it enacted the current statutory text, which was originally drafted by the Secretary.
Dissenting - Justice Scalia
Yes. The statutory language is plain and unambiguously forecloses the Secretary's method. The statute instructs the Secretary to 'disregard local educational agencies with' certain per-pupil expenditures, making the agencies themselves the only relevant population for the percentile calculation. The majority's theory that individual pupils each have a 'per-pupil expenditure' defies normal English usage and is 'sheer applesauce.' The Court improperly elevates perceived legislative intent and policy preferences over clear statutory text, reviving the discredited 'spirit of the law' approach and disregarding the Court's duty to enforce the law as written.
Dissenting - Justice Souter
Yes. While Congress likely intended for the Secretary to continue using the pre-existing methodology, the statutory language is unambiguous and, for the reasons stated in Part I of Justice Scalia's dissent, does not authorize that methodology.
Concurring - Justice Stevens
I concur in the judgment. This is a rare case where a literal application of the statute would produce a result 'demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.' The legislative history is 'pellucidly clear' that Congress intended to adopt the Secretary's long-standing rule. In such cases, the drafters' clear intention, ascertained through traditional tools of statutory construction like legislative history, must control over a strict, literal reading of a confusing statutory text.
Concurring - Justice Kennedy
I concur in the judgment. The Court correctly finds the statute's plain language ambiguous and properly defers to the agency's reasonable interpretation under the Chevron framework. However, the Court's opinion improperly inverts Chevron's logical progression by analyzing policy concerns and legislative history before analyzing the statutory text itself. This approach risks creating the impression that judicial interpretation is being shaped by agency policy concerns rather than the traditional tools of statutory construction.
Analysis:
This case is a significant application of the Chevron deference doctrine, affirming that agencies have broad discretion to interpret ambiguous technical terms within their governing statutes. The decision highlights the deep methodological split between textualist and purposivist approaches to statutory interpretation, with the majority favoring a holistic analysis of text, purpose, and history to find ambiguity. By upholding the agency's long-standing, student-weighted calculation, the Court reinforced the power of administrative agencies to fill statutory gaps and resolve complex policy details, making it harder to challenge established agency regulations on purely textual grounds.
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