Zsigo v. Hurley Medical Center
475 Mich. 215, 716 N.W.2d 220 (2006)
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Rule of Law:
An employer is not vicariously liable for an employee's intentional tort committed outside the scope of employment under the theory that the employee was 'aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.' Michigan law declines to adopt this exception as articulated in the Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 219(2)(d).
Facts:
- On July 9, 1998, plaintiff Zsigo was brought to the emergency department at Hurley Medical Center while suffering a manic depressive episode.
- Due to her belligerent behavior, hospital staff placed Zsigo in restraints in a treatment room.
- A nursing assistant, Lorenzo Powell, was assigned to clean the room where Zsigo was restrained.
- Zsigo was left alone in the room with Powell.
- While alone with Powell, Zsigo made sexually explicit remarks, testifying later that she initially hoped to get him to leave but then thought he was powerful and might release her.
- Powell engaged in digital and oral sex with Zsigo while she was still in restraints.
- Powell left the room without releasing her from the restraints.
- Three days later, Zsigo reported the sexual assault to a social worker.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiff Zsigo sued defendant Hurley Medical Center in state trial court, alleging vicarious liability for assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
- The trial court denied Hurley Medical Center's motion for summary disposition.
- The trial court also denied Hurley Medical Center's motion for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff's case.
- A jury returned a verdict in favor of Zsigo, and the trial court entered a judgment for $1,147,247.42.
- Hurley Medical Center, as appellant, appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded for entry of dismissal, finding the hospital was not liable.
- Zsigo, as appellant, was granted leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does Michigan law recognize the 'aided by the agency relation' exception found in Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 219(2)(d), making an employer vicariously liable for an employee's intentional tort committed outside the scope of employment?
Opinions:
Majority - Weaver, J.
No. Michigan law does not recognize the 'aided by the agency relation' exception to the general rule of employer nonliability for torts committed by an employee outside the scope of employment. The court clarified that its prior reference to Restatement § 219(2)(d) in Champion v Nation Wide Security, Inc. was limited to the specific context of quid pro quo sexual harassment under the Michigan Civil Rights Act and did not constitute a general adoption of the exception for common law torts. The court declines to adopt the exception because it is overly broad and would effectively 'swallow the rule' of respondeat superior nonliability. Adopting the exception would subject employers to a form of strict liability, as nearly any intentional tort committed in the workplace could be framed as being 'aided by the existence of the agency relation' simply due to proximity and contact. The court reasoned that this strays too far from traditional agency principles and that existing remedies, such as claims for negligent hiring and supervision, adequately address employer fault.
Dissenting - Kelly, J.
Yes. The court should explicitly adopt Restatement § 219(2)(d) and hold employers vicariously liable when an employee's tort is aided by the agency relationship. The dissent argued that the majority's fear of the exception 'swallowing the rule' is unfounded, as the court could adopt a narrow interpretation that avoids imposing strict liability. It proposed a balancing test from Doe v. Forrest, considering three factors: 1) the opportunity created by the agency relationship, 2) the victim's powerlessness, and 3) the employer's opportunity to prevent the harm. The dissent reasoned that the employer is in the best position to control the authority it grants and should be responsible when that authority is abused to harm a powerless third party, like the restrained patient in this case. The majority's refusal to adopt the exception leaves vulnerable victims without a remedy against the entity that placed the tortfeasor in a position of power.
Concurring - Young, J.
No. Concurring with the majority's holding and reasoning, this opinion was written separately to question the validity of the Champion decision itself. The concurrence argues that even in Champion, the supervisor's sexual assault was accomplished through brute force, not by any 'supervisory power' conferred by the employer, making the application of agency principles in that case questionable. It characterizes Champion as an 'inexplicable exception' in Michigan jurisprudence.
Analysis:
This decision definitively rejects the 'aided by the agency relation' theory of vicarious liability for common law torts in Michigan, clarifying the state's adherence to a traditional and narrower view of respondeat superior. By refusing to adopt Restatement § 219(2)(d), the court prevents an expansion of employer liability that many other jurisdictions have embraced, especially in cases involving employees with special authority over vulnerable individuals. The ruling solidifies that, outside specific statutory schemes like civil rights laws, a plaintiff seeking to hold an employer liable for an employee's intentional tort must prove the act was within the scope of employment or that the employer was independently negligent, such as in its hiring or supervision.
