Zoe Spencer v. Virginia State University
919 F.3d 199 (2019)
Rule of Law:
To establish a prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act in an academic setting, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the comparator's work is 'virtually identical' in skill, effort, and responsibility, not merely broadly generalizable as teaching; furthermore, a pay differential based on a valid 'factor other than sex,' such as a salary retention policy for former administrators, defeats claims under both the Equal Pay Act and Title VII.
Facts:
- Zoe Spencer worked as a sociology professor at Virginia State University earning a salary of approximately $70,000 per year.
- Two male employees, Dr. Michael Shackleford and Dr. Cortez Dial, previously served as administrators at the University before transitioning to roles as full professors.
- Upon their move to faculty positions, the University set Shackleford and Dial's salaries at over $100,000 each, utilizing a '9/12ths' practice that calculated their new pay as 75% of their higher administrator salaries.
- Shackleford and Dial taught in different departments than Spencer and instructed primarily graduate-level courses, whereas Spencer taught mostly undergraduates.
- The male professors also supervised doctoral dissertations and worked different weekly hours compared to Spencer.
- Spencer identified Shackleford and Dial as her primary comparators for the alleged pay disparity.
Procedural Posture:
- Spencer filed a lawsuit against Virginia State University and its former president in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia alleging violations of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII.
- Following discovery, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the University defendants.
- Spencer appealed the judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a female university professor establish actionable wage discrimination under the Equal Pay Act or Title VII by comparing her salary to that of male professors in different departments who are paid more based on a university policy that prorates their previous administrative salaries?
Opinions:
Majority - Richardson
No. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment because Spencer failed to show that her work was equal to that of her comparators and could not rebut the University's legitimate, non-discriminatory explanation for the pay disparity. The court reasoned that under the Equal Pay Act, jobs must be 'virtually identical,' not just comparable in value. The court rejected the argument that all professors perform equal work simply because they share tasks like grading and lecturing, noting that 'professors are not interchangeable like widgets.' Specifically, the comparators worked in different departments, taught at different levels (graduate vs. undergraduate), and had different responsibilities regarding dissertation supervision. Furthermore, the University established an affirmative defense by showing the pay difference was based on a 'factor other than sex': the policy of paying former administrators 9/12ths of their prior salary. Regarding Title VII, the court found Spencer failed to show she was 'similarly situated in all respects' to the men and failed to prove the University's adherence to its salary formula was a pretext for discrimination.
Analysis:
This decision significantly reinforces the difficulty of establishing wage discrimination claims within the context of higher education. By explicitly rejecting the notion that all professorial roles are 'equal work' based on shared general duties (teaching, grading), the court defers to the specific nuances of academic departments, market forces, and job responsibilities. Additionally, the ruling clarifies that employers may rely on salary formulas derived from prior roles (such as the 9/12ths administrative retention policy) as a valid 'factor other than sex,' even if the application of that policy might be considered imprudent or generous, provided it is not applied in a sexually discriminatory manner.
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