Zeni v. Anderson
397 Mich. 117, 243 N.W.2d 270 (1976)
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Rule of Law:
The violation of a penal statute in a negligence action establishes a rebuttable presumption of negligence, not negligence per se. Additionally, the doctrine of last clear chance, as defined by the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 479 and 480, allows a contributorily negligent plaintiff to recover if the defendant knew or should have known of the plaintiff's peril and had the last opportunity to avoid the harm.
Facts:
- On a snowy morning in March 1969, plaintiff Eleanor Zeni, a registered nurse, was walking to work at Northern Michigan University.
- Instead of using a snow-covered and icy sidewalk where she had previously fallen, Zeni walked along a well-used pedestrian snowpath on the road, with her back to oncoming traffic.
- Defendant Karen Anderson, a college student, was driving on the same street. An eyewitness testified that Anderson's windshield was clouded.
- Anderson's vehicle struck Zeni from behind, causing serious injuries, including an intracerebral subdural hematoma and retrograde amnesia, which prevented Zeni from recalling the accident.
- Anderson contended Zeni was contributorily negligent for violating a Michigan statute that required pedestrians to use provided sidewalks or, if not practicable, to walk on the left side of the highway facing traffic.
- Testimony at trial indicated that it was common for nurses to use the roadway in winter and that a university security officer considered it safer than the sidewalk.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiff Eleanor Zeni sued Defendant Karen Anderson for negligence in a Michigan state trial court.
- The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, specifically finding the defendant 'guilty of subsequent negligence' and awarding $30,000 in damages.
- Defendant Anderson, as appellant, appealed the verdict to the Michigan Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and remanded for a new trial, holding that the standard jury instruction on last clear chance (subsequent negligence) was legally deficient.
- Plaintiff Zeni, as appellant, was granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Michigan.
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Issue:
Does the last clear chance doctrine permit a contributorily negligent plaintiff to recover for injuries if the defendant, after knowing or having reason to know of the plaintiff's peril, fails to use an existing opportunity to avoid the harm, even if the plaintiff's negligence may be concurrent?
Opinions:
Majority - Williams, J.
Yes. A contributorily negligent plaintiff may recover under the last clear chance doctrine if the defendant had the final opportunity to prevent the harm. The court clarifies that a statutory violation creates a prima facie case of negligence which can be rebutted by a legally sufficient excuse, such as the impracticality of compliance. The court abandons the confusing terminology of 'subsequent' and 'concurrent' negligence and formally adopts the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 479 (Helpless Plaintiff) and 480 (Inattentive Plaintiff) as the governing standard for the last clear chance doctrine. This modern approach focuses on whether the defendant knew or should have known of the plaintiff's peril and had an existing opportunity to avert the injury, thereby mitigating the harshness of the traditional contributory negligence bar. Although the trial court used an older, now-abolished jury instruction, its instructions on proximate cause effectively guided the jury correctly, so the verdict is affirmed.
Dissenting - Lindemer, J.
No. The doctrine of last clear chance is inapplicable because the plaintiff's negligence had not terminated before the defendant's negligence occurred. The evidence clearly shows that Zeni's negligence—walking in the road with her back to traffic—was concurrent with Anderson's negligence. The doctrine of subsequent negligence requires the plaintiff's negligence to have ceased. Therefore, the instruction should not have been given, and this case is an inappropriate vehicle for adopting the Restatement approach, which is a change that should be left to the legislature.
Dissenting - Coleman, J.
No. The jury instructions were legally insufficient under the law as it existed at the time of trial. The trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury that the doctrine of subsequent negligence does not apply where the negligence of both parties is concurrent and proximately causes the plaintiff's injury. The jury was not fully informed of the relevant legal factors. While the majority's adoption of the Restatement may be a positive development, such a significant change in legal doctrine should not be made hastily and without input from the bench and bar. The Court of Appeals correctly identified the instructional error, and the case should be remanded for a new trial.
Analysis:
This landmark decision significantly modernized Michigan's negligence law in two ways. First, it formally adopted the rebuttable presumption standard for statutory violations, replacing the inflexible and often harsh negligence per se doctrine and allowing juries to consider reasonable excuses for non-compliance. Second, it replaced the state's confusing 'subsequent negligence' case law with the clearer, more functional last clear chance framework from the Restatement (Second) of Torts. This adoption, distinguishing between 'helpless' and 'inattentive' plaintiffs, provided a more structured and equitable analysis for cases involving contributory negligence, focusing the inquiry on which party truly had the final opportunity to prevent the harm.
