Zant v. Stephens
462 U.S. 862 (1983)
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Rule of Law:
In a state where statutory aggravating circumstances serve only to narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty, a death sentence need not be vacated if one of several aggravating circumstances found by the jury is later held to be constitutionally invalid, provided that at least one other valid aggravating circumstance remains and the evidence underlying the invalid circumstance was otherwise admissible.
Facts:
- On August 19, 1974, while serving sentences for burglary and awaiting trial for escape, respondent Stephens escaped from a county jail in Georgia.
- Over the next two days, Stephens committed several additional crimes, including auto thefts, burglaries, and an armed robbery.
- On August 21, 1974, Roy Asbell interrupted Stephens and an accomplice as they were burglarizing Asbell's son's home.
- Stephens and his accomplice beat and robbed Asbell.
- They then drove Asbell in his own vehicle to a neighboring county.
- There, Stephens and his accomplice murdered Asbell by shooting him twice in the ear at point-blank range.
- At the time of the murder, Stephens' prior criminal record included convictions for armed robbery, burglary, and another count of murder.
Procedural Posture:
- In January 1975, a jury in a Georgia trial court convicted Stephens of murder and sentenced him to death, finding three statutory aggravating circumstances.
- Stephens appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia.
- While the appeal was pending, the Georgia Supreme Court, in an unrelated case (Arnold v. State), ruled that one of the aggravating circumstances found in Stephens' case was unconstitutionally vague.
- The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Stephens's death sentence on direct appeal, holding that the two remaining valid aggravating circumstances were sufficient to support the sentence.
- Stephens's state habeas corpus petition was denied by the trial court, and that denial was affirmed by the Georgia Supreme Court.
- Stephens filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the U.S. District Court, which denied relief.
- Stephens, as petitioner-appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals reversed, vacating the death sentence on the grounds that the jury's consideration of an unconstitutional aggravating circumstance rendered the sentence invalid.
- Zant, the warden and respondent-appellee, petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does a death sentence imposed under Georgia's capital sentencing scheme violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments if one of the three statutory aggravating circumstances found by the jury is subsequently declared unconstitutionally vague, while two other valid aggravating circumstances remain?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Stevens
No, the death sentence does not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Under Georgia's capital sentencing scheme, the invalidation of one statutory aggravating circumstance does not constitutionally impair a death sentence that is supported by other valid aggravating circumstances. The Court reasoned that Georgia's system is a 'narrowing' scheme, not a 'weighing' scheme. The constitutional function of aggravating circumstances is to narrow the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty. Once the jury finds at least one valid aggravating circumstance, it has performed this narrowing function, and the defendant is eligible for death. The jury then makes a separate, individualized determination based on all the evidence, not a formal balancing of statutory factors. The Court distinguished this case from precedents like Stromberg v. California, because the invalid circumstance here was not based on constitutionally protected conduct and the evidence supporting it—Stephens's prior criminal record—was fully admissible at the sentencing phase anyway. Therefore, the instruction on the vague circumstance had an 'inconsequential impact' on the jury's decision and did not introduce an element of caprice or arbitrariness into the proceeding, especially given the safeguard of mandatory appellate review by the Georgia Supreme Court.
Dissenting - Justice Marshall
Yes, the death sentence violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The dissent argued that the majority's 'threshold' theory of aggravating circumstances was a post-hoc rationalization that was never explained to the actual jury. The jury instructions highlighted the importance of all statutory aggravating factors, leading a reasonable juror to weigh them in the final sentencing decision. There is no way to know if the jury would have imposed a death sentence without the influence of the unconstitutional factor. Furthermore, the majority's theory, if actually instructed to a jury, would be unconstitutional under Furman v. Georgia because it would leave the jury with 'standardless discretion' after the eligibility threshold is met, which is precisely what the Court has consistently forbidden in capital cases.
Concurring - Justice Rehnquist
No, the death sentence should be upheld. This concurrence agrees with the majority's judgment but offers a different analysis. The rule from Stromberg v. California is inapplicable because, unlike a general verdict with an unknown basis, the jury here made specific findings on three separate aggravating circumstances, two of which were valid. Furthermore, the logic of Street v. New York, which deals with verdicts potentially based on a mix of protected and unprotected conduct, does not apply because Stephens's prior criminal history is not constitutionally protected activity. An error regarding one of many factors in a broad, individualized sentencing determination is fundamentally different and less likely to be prejudicial than an error in the specific elements defining a crime.
Concurrence - Justice White
No, the death sentence is constitutional. This concurrence draws an analogy to the established rule in non-capital cases where a general sentence on a multi-count indictment is upheld so long as one count is valid and supports the sentence (Claassen v. United States). The logic of those cases should apply here, meaning there is no Stromberg problem. Even if the evidence supporting the invalid circumstance had been constitutionally inadmissible, the sentence would be reviewed for harmless error rather than subjected to a per se rule of reversal.
Analysis:
This case establishes a critical distinction between capital sentencing schemes that require jurors to 'weigh' aggravating versus mitigating factors and those, like Georgia's, that use aggravating factors merely to 'narrow' the class of death-eligible defendants. For 'narrowing' states, Zant holds that the subsequent invalidation of one aggravating circumstance is not fatal to a death sentence if other valid circumstances remain and the underlying evidence was properly before the jury. This decision limits the application of the Stromberg rule in the capital sentencing context and provides a framework for appellate courts to find certain sentencing errors to be harmless. It reinforces the principle that not every procedural imperfection, even in a capital case, amounts to a constitutional violation requiring reversal.
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