Zachary M. Oxley v. Larry Ray Lumpkins
2025 Ark. 98 (2025)
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Rule of Law:
In a custody dispute between a fit, natural parent and a nonrelative, there is a dispositive presumption that custody should be awarded to the natural parent. This presumption can only be rebutted by an express finding that the natural parent is unfit, and it overrides the traditional requirement for the parent to prove a material change in circumstances.
Facts:
- Zachary Oxley and Tiffani Davis are the natural parents of Minor Child 1 (MC1), born in June 2011.
- Davis ceased contact with Oxley in September 2011, and Oxley had only sporadic contact with MC1 for several years.
- Davis began a relationship with Larry Lumpkins's daughter (or so he thought) and later, during Davis's divorce from another man, Lumpkins, who is not biologically related to MC1, was granted custody.
- DNA testing confirmed that Oxley is MC1's natural father and that Lumpkins has no biological relationship to either MC1 or her mother.
- After an initial custody order was in place, Lumpkins began denying Oxley his court-ordered visitation with MC1, starting in March 2020.
- During visitations, Oxley and his wife observed persistent hygiene issues with MC1, including untreated head lice, body odor, and inadequate clothing, and reported Lumpkins for neglect.
Procedural Posture:
- During divorce proceedings between Tiffani Davis and her husband, Larry Lumpkins intervened seeking custody of MC1.
- In February 2017, the Lonoke County Circuit Court granted temporary custody of MC1 to Lumpkins.
- Zachary Oxley intervened in the divorce case in March 2017 to establish his paternity of MC1, which was adjudicated by the court in July 2017.
- In October 2018, the circuit court awarded primary custody of MC1 to Lumpkins based on his in loco parentis status and granted Oxley visitation. Oxley did not appeal this order.
- In June 2020, Oxley filed a petition in the circuit court to modify custody.
- The circuit court denied Oxley's petition to modify custody but expanded his visitation rights.
- Oxley (appellant) appealed the circuit court's decision to the Arkansas Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lower court's ruling.
- Oxley (appellant) then petitioned the Supreme Court of Arkansas for review of the Court of Appeals decision, which the court granted.
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Issue:
In a custody modification dispute between a fit, natural parent and a nonrelative, does the constitutional presumption favoring the natural parent's right to custody require the court to award custody to the parent, unless the parent is proven unfit?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Cody Hiland
Yes. The constitutional presumption favoring a fit, natural parent's right to custody is dispositive in a dispute with a nonrelative and requires the court to award custody to the parent unless they are proven unfit. The court reasoned that the traditional two-step analysis for custody modification—requiring proof of a material change in circumstances before considering the child's best interest—does not apply in this unique context. Citing Troxel v. Granville, the court affirmed that a fit parent possesses a fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of their child. This creates a strong presumption that can only be rebutted by an express finding of unfitness. Because Lumpkins, the nonrelative custodian, failed to prove that Oxley was an unfit parent, the analysis should have ended there, and Oxley was entitled to custody as a matter of law.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part - Justice Rhonda K. Wood
Yes, but the majority's reasoning is flawed and creates dangerous precedent. Justice Wood agreed that Oxley should be awarded custody but dissented from the majority's creation of two new bright-line rules. First, she argued that eliminating the 'material change of circumstances' requirement for natural parents invites instability and endless re-litigation, which harms children. Second, she contended that making parental 'unfitness' the only way to rebut the natural-parent presumption is too rigid and ignores the child's best interests, especially in cases where a nonparent has been a stable, long-term caregiver. Justice Wood advocated for a standard that allows the presumption to be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that awarding custody to the parent would not be in the child's best interest, aligning Arkansas with the majority of other states.
Analysis:
This decision significantly strengthens the constitutional rights of natural parents in Arkansas custody disputes against nonrelatives. It creates a new, streamlined standard for these specific cases by removing the 'material change of circumstances' hurdle that typically applies in modification proceedings. The ruling elevates the fit-parent presumption to a nearly absolute right against nonrelatives, making it far more difficult for individuals like grandparents or stepparents to obtain or retain custody over a fit biological parent. The dissent highlights the potential negative consequences of this rigid 'biology-trumps-all' approach, warning that it may undervalue a child's need for stability and emotional bonds with established non-parent caregivers.
