Yurick v. Superior Court
1989 Cal. App. LEXIS 376, 209 Cal. App. 3d 1116, 257 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1989)
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Rule of Law:
A civil action under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) cannot be maintained for claims or against parties not alleged in a prior administrative charge, unless the judicial allegations are "like or reasonably related to" the administrative charge. For intentional infliction of emotional distress, conduct must be "so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community," with mere insults generally not meeting this standard.
Facts:
- Mary Antonetti was employed in the purchasing department of Oroville Hospital as an assistant to the department manager.
- On May 23, 1985, Antonetti filed an administrative charge with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) alleging unlawful gender discrimination against Oroville Hospital, specifically that she was denied equal pay for equal work because of her gender.
- In March 1986, approximately 10 months after Antonetti filed her administrative charge, Donald Yurick became Antonetti’s supervisor.
- Between March and June 1986, Yurick, knowing Antonetti was more than 40 years old, repeatedly told her at the workplace in the presence of others that anyone over 40 was senile, and specifically called Antonetti "senile and a liar."
- Antonetti did not complain to anyone at Oroville Hospital about Yurick's comments and did not amend her administrative charge to include allegations of age harassment or retaliation.
- In June 1986, Antonetti was terminated from her employment.
Procedural Posture:
- Mary Antonetti (plaintiff) filed a complaint in superior court against Oroville Hospital and Donald Yurick, among other defendants, alleging gender discrimination, unlawful retaliation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, wrongful discharge, and age harassment.
- Donald Yurick filed a motion for summary judgment in superior court, contending that Antonetti failed to exhaust administrative remedies for the age harassment claim and that his conduct was not outrageous as a matter of law for the emotional distress claim.
- The superior court denied Yurick's motion for summary judgment in its entirety.
- Donald Yurick (petitioner) sought a writ of mandate from the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, directing the superior court (respondent) to vacate its order denying his summary judgment motion and to grant the motion.
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Issue:
1. Does a plaintiff fail to exhaust administrative remedies under FEHA by bringing a judicial claim for age harassment against a new supervisor when her administrative charge alleged only gender discrimination against her employer, and the administrative charge was not amended to include the new claims or party? 2. Do a supervisor's repeated statements that "anyone over forty is senile" and calling the plaintiff "senile and a liar," even if offensive, constitute "extreme and outrageous conduct" sufficient to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress?
Opinions:
Majority - Puglia, P.J.
1. Yes, Mary Antonetti failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to the age harassment claim against Donald Yurick because her initial administrative charge only alleged gender discrimination against Oroville Hospital and was not "like or reasonably related to" the age harassment claim, nor was it amended to include these new allegations or name Yurick. The court held that the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) requires claimants to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a civil action. Adopting the federal Title VII standard, the court applied the "like or reasonably related to" test to determine the scope of a judicial complaint compared to the administrative charge. Antonetti's administrative charge, filed nearly a year before Yurick became her supervisor, alleged only gender discrimination against the hospital and did not mention age harassment, retaliation, or Yurick. The court found no "pattern or practice" of discrimination or continuous retaliation alleged in the initial charge, nor was it amended. Permitting the age harassment claim would undermine FEHA’s policy of resolving disputes through conciliation. 2. No, Donald Yurick's statements, though offensive, do not constitute "extreme and outrageous conduct" sufficient to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court reiterated that "outrageous conduct" must be "so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community." Mere insulting language, without more, does not typically meet this standard. While abuse of a position of power can contribute to outrageousness, Antonetti provided no specific details connecting Yurick's remarks to an abuse of his supervisory position or the employment context beyond a coworker being present. Furthermore, Antonetti herself characterized Yurick’s comments as "not so bad as to what could come out of Mr. Yurick's mouth," suggesting they were consistent with his generally offensive demeanor rather than an egregious departure. The court distinguished this case from precedents involving racial epithets followed by abrupt termination, or false accusations of felonies, which presented more severe forms of conduct.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the administrative exhaustion requirements under FEHA, mandating that plaintiffs identify all types of discrimination and all alleged perpetrators in their administrative complaints or amendments. It reinforces the principle that judicial complaints must bear a close relationship to the initial administrative charge, preventing parties from bypassing the conciliation process. Furthermore, the decision sets a high bar for intentional infliction of emotional distress claims in the employment context, particularly those based on verbal conduct. It indicates that offensive and uncivil remarks, even from a supervisor, may not suffice unless they are demonstrably "extreme and outrageous," linked to severe abuse of power, or part of a broader pattern of egregious behavior, thereby limiting common law tort remedies for routine workplace rudeness.
