Yun Hee So v. Sook Ja Shin

Majority - Suzukawa, J.

No, conduct by a health care provider undertaken for the provider's personal benefit, rather than for the purpose of delivering health care, does not constitute 'professional negligence' subject to the one-year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5. The court reasoned that 'professional negligence' requires the negligent act to occur 'in the rendering of professional services,' meaning it must be directly related to and an ordinary part of medical services, provided by the health care provider acting in its capacity as such. The plaintiff alleged Dr. Shin's actions were intended to persuade So not to report the incident, thus acting for Dr. Shin's own benefit and not for the patient's medical care. Citing Atienza v. Taub, the court distinguished misconduct not aimed at treatment from professional negligence. Therefore, the negligence claim against Dr. Shin and the vicarious liability claim against the medical group and hospital were not time-barred by section 340.5's one-year limit for professional negligence, and the two-year ordinary negligence statute of limitations applied, making the August 2010 filing timely. Yes, a hospital's alleged direct negligence in hiring and retaining an unfit doctor, and failing to safeguard an incapacitated patient, is considered 'professional negligence' under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5. The court reasoned that competent selection and review of medical staff, and providing inpatient care with reasonable diligence in safeguarding patients, are professional services for which a hospital is licensed. Therefore, plaintiff's direct negligence claim against the hospital was properly dismissed as time-barred under the one-year professional negligence statute of limitations. No, a plaintiff can adequately plead assault and battery if the alleged offensive contact occurs post-procedure and is not consented to, even if initial consent was given for the medical procedure. The court explained that while consent to surgery includes postoperative care, not all postoperative contact constitutes care. The complaint alleged Dr. Shin interacted with So to defend her competence and prevent a report, not to provide medical care, and that So expressly told Dr. Shin to get away from her. Citing Kaplan v. Mamelak, the court held that whether alleged conduct was within the scope of a patient's consent is a factual question, not suitable for decision on demurrer. No, allegations of a health care provider's aggressive and intimidating behavior towards a vulnerable patient in a recovery room, involving graphic medical materials and attempts to silence the patient, are sufficient to plead 'extreme and outrageous conduct' for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court stated that there is no bright-line standard for 'outrageous conduct,' making it usually a question of fact. Analogizing to Bundren v. Superior Court, where a hospital's debt collection practices towards a vulnerable patient were found potentially outrageous, the court concluded that a reasonable juror could find Dr. Shin's actions (forcing a recently miscarried patient to view fetal remains, while angry and attempting to silence her) to be extreme and outrageous, especially given So's vulnerable state in the recovery room.