Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas
596 U.S. 685 (2022)
Rule of Law:
The Ysleta del Sur and Alabama and Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas Restoration Act bans as a matter of federal law on tribal lands only those gaming activities that are absolutely prohibited by the laws of the State of Texas, distinguishing between prohibitory and regulatory state laws.
Facts:
- In 1968, Congress recognized the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo as an Indian tribe and assigned its trust responsibilities for the Tribe to Texas.
- In 1983, Texas renounced its trust responsibilities, asserting inconsistency with its Constitution, and expressed opposition to new federal trust legislation that did not permit the State to apply its own gaming laws on tribal lands.
- In February 1987, the Supreme Court decided California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, holding that Public Law 280 allowed states to enforce only "prohibitory" (not "regulatory") state gaming laws on tribal lands, classifying California's bingo laws as regulatory.
- In August 1987, Congress adopted the Ysleta del Sur and Alabama and Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas Restoration Act, restoring the Tribe's federal trust status and prohibiting "[a]ll gaming activities which are prohibited by the laws of the State of Texas" on the reservation, while also stating it did not grant Texas "civil or criminal regulatory jurisdiction."
- In 1988, Congress adopted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), establishing rules for different classes of games, including class II games (like bingo) permitted in states that allow such gaming for any purpose by any person, and class III games (like blackjack) requiring tribal/state compacts.
- The Ysleta del Sur Pueblo later began offering bingo, including "electronic bingo" machines, viewing it as a class II game for which no state permission was required under IGRA so long as Texas permitted the game to be played on some terms by some persons.
- Texas then sought to shut down the Tribe's bingo operations, arguing that the Restoration Act displaced IGRA and required the Tribe to follow all of the State’s gaming laws on tribal lands.
Procedural Posture:
- The Ysleta del Sur Pueblo sought to negotiate a compact with Texas to offer class III games pursuant to IGRA, but Texas refused to come to the table, leading to federal litigation.
- A federal District Court initially granted summary judgment for the Tribe, holding that Texas violated IGRA by failing to negotiate in good faith.
- The Fifth Circuit reversed this District Court ruling in Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas (Ysleta I), holding that the Restoration Act superseded IGRA and that all of "Texas’ gaming laws and regulations" would "operate as surrogate federal law on the Tribe’s reservation."
- After the Tribe began offering bingo, Texas sought to shut down these operations; the District Court, finding itself bound by Ysleta I, sided with Texas and enjoined the Tribe’s bingo operations, but stayed the injunction pending appeal, suggesting that Ysleta I might be reconsidered.
- On appeal, the Fifth Circuit "re-reaffirm[ed]" Ysleta I, holding that the Tribe’s bingo operations were impermissible because they did not conform to Texas’s bingo regulations.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari after the Solicitor General urged reconsideration of the Fifth Circuit's interpretation.
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Issue:
Is the Ysleta del Sur and Alabama and Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas Restoration Act's prohibition of "gaming activities which are prohibited by the laws of the State of Texas" limited to activities absolutely banned by Texas law, or does it incorporate all state gaming regulations, including those for otherwise permitted games?
Opinions:
Majority - Gorsuch, J.
No, the Restoration Act does not subject the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo to all of Texas's gaming laws and regulations; it only bans as a matter of federal law on tribal lands those gaming activities that are absolutely prohibited by Texas law. The Court interprets §107 of the Restoration Act, particularly its dichotomy between "prohibition" and "regulation," to mean that only gaming activities Texas completely forbids are banned on tribal lands. The plain meaning of "prohibit" means to "forbid," "prevent," or "make impossible," while "regulate" means to "fix the time, amount, degree, or rate according to rules." Texas's bingo laws regulate, rather than prohibit, bingo, as the state allows the game under certain conditions (e.g., for charitable purposes). Adopting Texas's "broad" interpretation, where laws regulating gaming become laws prohibiting gaming, would render the statute's language indeterminate, violate the rule against giving one word a meaning so broad it assumes another statutory term's meaning (Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.), and render subsection (b) (denying state regulatory jurisdiction) and subsection (c) (granting federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over violations) superfluous (Corley v. United States). The Court emphasizes the timing of the Restoration Act's passage—six months after California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians. In Cabazon, the Court interpreted Public Law 280 to mean that only "prohibitory" state gaming laws could apply on tribal lands, not "regulatory" ones, and specifically held that California's bingo laws (materially identical to Texas's) were regulatory. Congress is presumed to be aware of relevant precedents (Ryan v. Valencia Gonzales), and Cabazon was the defining precedent on tribal gaming at the time. This interpretation is reinforced by other contemporaneous statutes (like those for the Wampanoag and Catawba Tribes) where Congress explicitly subjected tribes to laws that "prohibit or regulate" gaming, demonstrating it knew how to grant broad regulatory jurisdiction when intended. The Court dismisses Texas's argument about the tribal resolution referenced in §107(a), noting the Act states it was "enacted in accordance with" the resolution, not that it incorporated the resolution, and that the resolution itself opposed the application of state gaming law as an infringement on self-government. The Court also rejects policy arguments about "unworkability," stating it is Congress's role to set policy, and noting that the prohibitory/regulatory framework has been applied under Public Law 280 for decades and IGRA.
Dissenting - Roberts, C. J.
Yes, the Restoration Act requires the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo to follow all of Texas's gaming laws and regulations on tribal lands, because "all gaming activities which are prohibited by the laws of the State of Texas" encompasses gaming that does not comply with the state's regulatory framework. Chief Justice Roberts argues that a "straightforward reading of the statute’s text" means "all" gaming activities prohibited by Texas laws are prohibited on the reservation. Congress could have used narrower language if it intended to ban only entire types of games. The dissent emphasizes that §107(a) was "enacted in accordance with the tribe’s request in Tribal Resolution No. T.C.–02–86." This resolution requested a ban on "all gaming, gambling, lottery, or bingo, as defined by the laws and administrative regulations of the State of Texas," indicating an intent to incorporate the full breadth of Texas's gaming framework, including regulations. The dissent criticizes the majority for relying on Cabazon when Congress already explicitly incorporated the Public Law 280 framework in §105(f) of the Restoration Act. If §105(f) already covered prohibitory gaming, then §107(a) would be superfluous under the majority's reading, violating the canon against surplusage. The history of the Act shows §107 was meant to go further than §105(f) because gaming was the main sticking point in negotiations for federal trust status. The dissent also points out that §107(a) mentions "civil and criminal penalties" and the tribal resolution references "administrative regulations," suggesting a broader application than just "criminal/prohibitory" laws. The dissent explains that §107(b) (no state regulatory jurisdiction) and §107(c) (exclusive federal jurisdiction for enforcement) are not rendered meaningless by this interpretation; rather, they clarify that Texas's substantive gaming laws apply as federal law, but the enforcement mechanism is through federal courts via injunctions, not direct state regulatory action or state court proceedings. This was a concession to the Tribe regarding enforcement, while the substance of the ban was broad.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the scope of gaming restrictions on the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo reservation, overturning a longstanding Fifth Circuit precedent. By unequivocally adopting the Cabazon prohibitory/regulatory distinction for the Restoration Act, the Supreme Court limits Texas's ability to enforce its state gaming regulations on tribal lands through surrogate federal law. The ruling potentially paves the way for the Tribe to offer class II games, like bingo, subject to federal (including IGRA) and tribal regulation, even if not compliant with Texas's specific charitable bingo rules, so long as Texas permits some form of the game. This case highlights the importance of precise statutory language in defining tribal sovereignty and state jurisdiction, especially when Congress legislates with a backdrop of established tribal law precedents. It may encourage other tribes under similar specific statutes to re-evaluate the scope of state law application.
