Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A.
481 U.S. 787 (1987)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Using its supervisory power over the federal courts, the Supreme Court held that counsel for a private party that is the beneficiary of a court order may not be appointed to prosecute a criminal contempt action for an alleged violation of that order.
Facts:
- Louis Vuitton, S. A., a French leather goods manufacturer, sued Sol Klayminc and his family-owned businesses for manufacturing imitation Vuitton goods.
- In July 1982, the parties entered a settlement agreement in which the Klaymincs consented to a permanent injunction prohibiting them from manufacturing or selling counterfeit Vuitton products.
- In early 1983, Vuitton retained an investigation firm to conduct an undercover 'sting' operation to see if the Klaymincs were violating the injunction.
- Posing as interested buyers of counterfeit goods, undercover investigators met with petitioner Nathan Helfand.
- Helfand arranged discussions between the investigators and the Klaymincs about investing in a Haitian factory to manufacture counterfeit Vuitton goods.
- Sol Klayminc signed documents describing the counterfeit operation and provided sample counterfeit Vuitton bags to the investigators.
Procedural Posture:
- Following a prior lawsuit, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York entered a permanent injunction against Sol Klayminc and his businesses, prohibiting them from infringing on Louis Vuitton's trademark.
- Vuitton's attorneys requested that the District Court appoint them as special counsel to prosecute a criminal contempt action against the Klaymincs for violating the injunction.
- The District Court granted the request, appointing Vuitton's attorneys to represent the United States in the investigation and prosecution.
- After a jury trial, Sol Klayminc was convicted of criminal contempt, and the other petitioners were convicted of aiding and abetting.
- The petitioners appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, arguing that the appointment of interested prosecutors was improper.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the District Court did not err in appointing the private attorneys.
- The petitioners were granted a writ of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
May a federal district court appoint the counsel for a private party who is the beneficiary of a court order to prosecute a criminal contempt action for a violation of that order?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Brennan
No. A court may not appoint counsel for an interested party to prosecute a criminal contempt action. While courts possess inherent authority to initiate contempt proceedings and appoint private counsel to prosecute them, this power must be exercised with restraint. A prosecutor has a unique duty to seek justice, not merely to convict, and must be disinterested. Appointing an attorney who also represents the beneficiary of the violated court order creates an inherent conflict of interest between the attorney's duty to their private client and the public's interest in the impartial administration of justice. This appointment creates an appearance of impropriety and undermines confidence in the criminal justice system. Such an error is fundamental and not subject to harmless-error analysis, requiring automatic reversal of the conviction.
Concurring - Justice Blackmun
Yes, the convictions should be reversed. The practice of appointing an interested party’s counsel to prosecute for criminal contempt is not only improper under the Court's supervisory power, but is a violation of constitutional due process. Due process requires a disinterested prosecutor whose sole responsibility is to serve the public and seek justice, unencumbered by loyalty to a private client.
Concurring - Justice Scalia
No, the court may not make such an appointment, but for a more fundamental reason than the majority provides. The prosecution of crimes, including contempt of court for violating a judgment, is an executive power under the Constitution, not a judicial power. Federal courts lack the constitutional authority to initiate such prosecutions or appoint prosecutors; this power is vested exclusively in the Executive Branch. Therefore, the District Court's appointments were void from the outset.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Justice Powell
No, the appointment was an abuse of discretion, but the conviction should not be automatically reversed. While it is improper to appoint an interested private lawyer to prosecute a criminal contempt charge due to the potential for a conflict of interest, this error is not of constitutional dimension. Therefore, it should be subject to a harmless-error analysis. The case should be remanded to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the improper appointment actually prejudiced the defendants.
Dissenting - Justice White
Yes, the appointment was permissible. Although it is preferable for courts to first refer contempt matters to the U.S. Attorney, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b) was intended to authorize the longstanding practice of appointing attorneys for interested parties. There was no constitutional error or denial of due process in the appointments made in this case, and the convictions should be affirmed.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a bright-line, prophylactic rule for all federal courts, prohibiting the appointment of a private litigant's counsel as a special prosecutor in a related criminal contempt case. By grounding the decision in its supervisory power, the Court created a mandatory procedural rule rather than a constitutional one, avoiding a broader constitutional holding. The most significant impact of the ruling is its classification of this error as 'fundamental,' meaning it is not subject to harmless-error analysis and requires automatic reversal, thereby providing a strong deterrent against such appointments and prioritizing the appearance of impartiality in the justice system.
