Young Through Young v. Dfw Corp.
184 Ariz. 187, 187 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 58, 908 P.2d 1 (1995)
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Rule of Law:
A statute that alters a common law cause of action violates a state's constitutional anti-abrogation clause if it does not provide a reasonable alternative for recovery and effectively deprives a foreseeable class of victims of a judicial remedy.
Facts:
- Jennifer Jacobi attended an office party at Keegan’s Grill and Taproom.
- Over a four-hour period, Jacobi consumed numerous alcoholic beverages, equivalent to at least six standard drinks, including two shots of alcohol.
- Employees at Keegan's and most of Jacobi's coworkers testified that she did not exhibit obvious signs of intoxication, such as staggering or slurred speech.
- A bartender on duty testified that he would not expect a woman of Jacobi's size to consume that much alcohol without becoming intoxicated.
- After leaving Keegan's, Jacobi drove her vehicle and struck Janeen Young’s car head-on.
- The collision resulted in severe injuries to Janeen Young.
- More than an hour after the collision, a test revealed Jacobi’s blood alcohol concentration was .20 percent.
Procedural Posture:
- Janeen Young and her parents sued DFW Corporation (d/b/a Keegan’s Grill and Taproom) in an Arizona trial court for negligence.
- Prior to trial, the defendant, Keegan's, moved to limit the plaintiff's cause of action to the statutory claim under A.R.S. § 4-311, arguing it was the exclusive remedy.
- The trial court granted the motion, precluding Young from arguing a general negligence theory, and instructed the jury based only on the statutory definition of 'obviously intoxicated'.
- The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, Keegan's.
- The plaintiff, Young, as the appellant, appealed the judgment to the Arizona Court of Appeals, the intermediate appellate court.
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Issue:
Does A.R.S. § 4-312(B), by limiting a tavern owner's liability exclusively to situations where a patron was served while 'obviously intoxicated,' unconstitutionally abrogate the general negligence cause of action for dram shop liability in violation of Article 18, Section 6 of the Arizona Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - Druke, Chief Judge
Yes, A.R.S. § 4-312(B) unconstitutionally abrogates the general negligence cause of action. Under the 'reasonable alternatives' test established in Barrio v. San Manuel Div. Hosp., the legislature may regulate a cause of action, but it cannot effectively deprive a claimant of the ability to bring an action. By limiting liability to the narrow statutory definition of 'obviously intoxicated' (requiring 'significantly uncoordinated physical action or significant physical dysfunction'), the law eliminates the common law negligence claim recognized in Ontiveros v. Borak for an entire class of plaintiffs. This class includes those injured by patrons who a licensee knew or should have known were intoxicated based on the quantity of alcohol consumed, even if they did not display overt physical impairment. Because the statute deprives this foreseeable class of victims of a judicial remedy, it is an unconstitutional abrogation, not a permissible regulation.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms the strength of Arizona's constitutional anti-abrogation clause, setting a high bar for legislative tort reform. It clarifies that a statute cannot redefine the elements of a common law cause of action so narrowly that it forecloses liability for a predictable set of wrongful conduct, thereby leaving a class of injured persons without a remedy. The ruling solidifies the 'reasonable alternatives' test as the key analytical framework, signaling to the legislature that any modification of common law rights must preserve a meaningful path to recovery for victims. The case will serve as a significant precedent in challenging future laws that restrict common law tort claims in Arizona.
