Ylst, Warden v. Nunnemaker
501 U.S. 797 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
When a state court has issued a reasoned judgment rejecting a federal claim on state procedural grounds, a subsequent unexplained order from a state court upholding that judgment is presumed to rest on the same procedural grounds, not on the merits of the federal claim.
Facts:
- In 1975, Robert Nunnemaker was tried for murder in California state court.
- At his trial, Nunnemaker raised a defense of diminished capacity and introduced psychiatric testimony.
- In response, the State introduced its own psychiatric testimony based on a custodial interview with Nunnemaker.
- Nunnemaker's trial attorney did not object to the State's psychiatric testimony.
- The jury subsequently found Nunnemaker guilty of murder.
Procedural Posture:
- Nunnemaker appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal, raising for the first time a Miranda claim and an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
- The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, rejecting the Miranda claim on the state procedural ground that the objection was not raised at trial.
- The California Supreme Court denied discretionary review in 1978.
- Years later, Nunnemaker filed a series of state habeas corpus petitions in California's Superior Court, Court of Appeal, and Supreme Court; all were denied.
- The final state petition, filed in the California Supreme Court, was denied in 1988 without an opinion or citation (a 'silent denial').
- Nunnemaker then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California.
- The District Court denied the petition, finding the Miranda claim was barred by the state procedural default established on direct appeal.
- Nunnemaker (appellant) appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, with Ylst (appellee) representing the state.
- The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the California Supreme Court's silent denial of the last state habeas petition lifted the procedural bar, allowing federal review of the merits.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted Ylst's petition for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does a later, unexplained state court order denying a prisoner's claim lift a procedural bar that was explicitly imposed by an earlier, reasoned state court judgment on the same claim?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Scalia
No. A later, unexplained state court order rejecting a claim does not lift a procedural bar that was explicitly imposed by a prior, reasoned state court judgment. The Court establishes a presumption that when there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, any later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim are presumed to rest upon the same ground. Federal courts should 'look through' the unexplained order to the last reasoned state court opinion to determine the basis for the decision. In this case, the last reasoned opinion from the California Court of Appeal explicitly imposed a procedural default. The subsequent silent denials by the California Supreme Court are presumed to uphold that procedural bar, not to have silently forgiven it and decided the merits of the underlying Miranda claim. This presumption can be rebutted, but only by strong evidence showing the later court actually reached the merits.
Concurring - Justice White
Yes, I agree with the Court's opinion and judgment. The presumption established by the Court is appropriate because the Ninth Circuit did not find, as a matter of California law, that a silent denial of a habeas petition constitutes a ruling on the merits. Had the state law been clear on that point, the presumption would have been rebutted. Since the state court's order was ambiguous, the 'look-through' presumption correctly applies. The opinion's quotation from Coleman v. Thompson should not be read to restrict the reach of the Harris v. Reed presumption in its proper context.
Dissenting - Justice Blackmun
No. For the reasons articulated in the dissenting opinion in Coleman v. Thompson, I would not apply this presumption and would allow the federal court to hear the claim.
Analysis:
This decision establishes the important 'look-through' doctrine for federal courts conducting habeas corpus review. It clarifies that a silent or summary denial from a state court does not, by itself, remove a pre-existing and clearly articulated state procedural bar. This significantly shifts the landscape of habeas litigation by placing a heavy burden on the petitioner to provide 'strong evidence' that a silent state court intended to forgive a procedural default. The ruling prioritizes finality and comity with state courts over federal review of the merits, making it more difficult for petitioners to have their federal claims heard if they have committed a procedural error in state proceedings.
