Yates v. United States
1957 U.S. LEXIS 133, 355 U.S. 66, 2 L. Ed. 2d 95 (1957)
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Rule of Law:
A witness's refusal to answer multiple questions all relating to a single subject of inquiry, after the witness has clearly "carved out" an area of refusal, constitutes only a single, continuing criminal contempt, not multiple separate contempts for each question.
Facts:
- Petitioner Yates, a high-ranking officer of the Communist Party of California, was a defendant in a Smith Act conspiracy trial.
- Yates took the stand to testify in her own defense.
- On June 26, 1952, during cross-examination, Yates refused to answer four questions about the Communist membership of other individuals.
- She stated her refusal was because she would not be an informer and cause harm to others, thereby defining an area of non-cooperation.
- On June 30, 1952, the cross-examination continued, and prosecutors asked Yates 11 more questions which called for her to identify nine other people as Communists.
- Yates again refused to answer these 11 questions, consistent with her previously stated position of not wanting to cause harm to the individuals named.
Procedural Posture:
- Yates and her co-defendants were convicted of conspiracy to violate the Smith Act in U.S. District Court.
- During her trial testimony, on June 30, 1952, Yates refused to answer 11 questions.
- The District Court summarily adjudged Yates guilty of 11 separate criminal contempts.
- The court imposed 11 concurrent sentences of one year each.
- Yates, as appellant, appealed the contempt convictions to the U.S. Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals, as appellee, affirmed the District Court's judgment.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' decision.
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Issue:
Does a witness's repeated refusal to answer multiple questions, all falling within a single, previously defined area of inquiry, constitute a single, continuing contempt or multiple, separate contempts punishable individually?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Clark
No, a witness's repeated refusal to answer questions within a single, defined area of inquiry constitutes only a single, continuing contempt. While a witness cannot pick and choose which questions to answer, the prosecution cannot multiply contempts by asking repeated questions on a subject a witness has already refused to address. Once Yates 'carved out an area of refusal' on June 26, her subsequent refusals on June 30 fell within those boundaries and were part of the same continuing act of defiance. The policy of the law is to encourage testimony, and a witness refusing testimony on one subject should not face more contempt charges than a witness who refuses to testify at all. Although the refusals constitute a single contempt, the civil contempt finding for the June 26 refusal is not a bar to criminal punishment for the continuing contempt on June 30, as the sanctions serve distinct purposes. However, because the trial court sentenced Yates under the erroneous belief that there were 11 separate contempts, the sentence must be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing based on a single contempt.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Douglas
No, the repeated refusals constituted a single contempt, but the majority's remedy is incorrect. This case is a transparent attempt to multiply offenses where only one existed. The contempt was total and complete on June 26 when Yates first stated her position and refused to answer. Her subsequent refusals on June 30 were merely an adherence to that initial position and a failure to purge herself of the first contempt, not a new act of contempt. The prosecution and judge should not have the power to create new crimes by simply repeating questions. Therefore, the contempt conviction for the June 30 refusals should be reversed entirely, not just remanded for resentencing.
Analysis:
This decision places a significant limitation on the judicial contempt power by preventing the government from 'stacking' charges against a recalcitrant witness. By establishing the 'single contempt' doctrine for a defined area of refusal, the Court protects witnesses from disproportionate punishment for a single decision to refuse testimony on a particular subject. This balances the court's need to compel testimony with principles of fairness and due process, ensuring that the punishment fits the contumacious act itself rather than the prosecutor's persistence in questioning. The case remains a key precedent in defining the boundaries of both civil and criminal contempt.
