Wylie v. Gresch
191 Cal. App. 3d 412, 236 Cal. Rptr. 552, 1987 Cal. App. LEXIS 1615 (1987)
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Rule of Law:
A landlord has no legal duty to warn a prospective tenant of the presence or vicious propensities of a dangerous animal owned by neighbors on an adjacent property not under the landlord's control.
Facts:
- Joseph and Ann Gresch owned residential property at 85 Essendon Street in San Jose.
- Donald and Linda Wylie, along with their three minor children (Teresa, Sharon, and Helen), leased the premises from the Gresches and moved in approximately two months before the incident.
- Michael and Tammy Buzzell lived next door at 83 Essendon Street, which they rented from Richard Houston, and owned a pit bull dog.
- The Buzzells' dog had a history of vicious propensities, including attempting to attack persons, attacking other dogs and animals, damaging property, and breaking through the fence separating the two properties, which the Gresches had arranged to repair prior to the Wylies' tenancy.
- The Gresches had actual and constructive knowledge of the dog's vicious propensities.
- On October 19, 1981, Teresa Wylie was at or near her residence when Michael Buzzell invited her to pet the dog, which then bit off her ear and inflicted other severe injuries.
Procedural Posture:
- Donald, Linda, Teresa, Sharon, and Helen Wylie filed a complaint in trial court against Joseph and Ann Gresch (their landlords), Michael and Tammy Buzzell (the dog owners), and Richard Houston (the Buzzells' landlord) for damages resulting from a dog attack.
- The Wylies' complaint included causes of action alleging that the Gresches failed to warn them of the dog's danger and failed to take measures to have the dog removed.
- The Gresches filed a demurrer to the causes of action against them.
- The trial court sustained the Gresches' demurrer without leave to amend, leading to a judgment of dismissal of the action against the Gresches.
- The Wylies (appellants) appealed the judgment of dismissal of their action against the Gresches (appellees).
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Issue:
Does a landlord have a legal duty to warn a prospective tenant about the presence of a vicious dog owned by neighbors on an adjacent property?
Opinions:
Majority - Anderson, J.
No, a landlord does not have a duty to warn a prospective tenant of the presence of a vicious dog in the neighborhood. The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal, holding that landlords Joseph and Ann Gresch had no duty to warn the Wylies about the next-door neighbors' vicious dog. The court acknowledged the broad duty of care under California Civil Code section 1714(a) and the expansion of landlord liability under Rowland v. Christian to owners out of possession, including for dangerous latent conditions on the premises and for criminal acts of third parties in common areas. However, this expansion has not extended to dangerous conditions off the leased premises or to animals over which the landlord has no control and which come onto the property in a location or manner over which the owner has no control. The court distinguished Uccello v. Laudenslayer, where a landlord was liable for a tenant's vicious dog on the leased premises because the landlord had knowledge and the right to control the premises by removing the tenant. In this case, the dog was kept by strangers on premises over which the Gresches had no control. Regarding a common law duty to warn, such a duty arises only if a "special relationship" exists between the defendant and the dangerous person or potential victim (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California). While a landlord-tenant relationship is considered special, the court found no precedent extending this duty to warn of dangers off the leased premises. The court reasoned that requiring landlords to warn of neighborhood dangers would be an unreasonable burden, turning them into "purveyors of gossip," and that a vicious dog is an "obvious" danger one might expect anywhere, making it discoverable by the tenant. Furthermore, the Wylies did not allege that the Gresches created the dangerous situation or that they relied on the landlords for such warnings, distinguishing it from cases like O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp. The court concluded that extending the duty beyond the subject property would be unreasonable as the tenant's position regarding neighborhood dangers is no different from the general public.
Dissenting - Newsom, J.
Yes, a landlord does have a legal duty to warn a prospective tenant about the presence of a vicious dog owned by neighbors on an adjacent property. Justice Newsom disagreed with the majority's conclusion, arguing that no liability under Civil Code section 1714 or common law duty to warn was too narrow. He asserted that the Rowland v. Christian factors, which emphasize a reasonable person standard and that control and possession are only factors, not barriers to negligence, should apply more broadly. A failure to warn about a known danger can itself constitute negligence, and liability for failure to warn is based on superior knowledge, not necessarily control over common areas or misrepresentation, as seen in O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp. The dissent contended that the Gresches' knowledge of the dog's vicious propensities, including its history of trying to break through the fence, made the harm foreseeable. A simple warning would have prevented the harm, placing a minimal burden on the landlords. Applying the Rowland balancing factors (foreseeability, certainty of injury, connection, moral blame, preventing future harm, burden, insurance), the dissent found that these factors supported imposing a duty. He likened the situation to Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, where a therapist had a duty to warn based on knowledge of a patient's dangerousness, not control over the patient, and argued that the landlord-tenant relationship creates a "special relationship" justifying such a duty. The dissent rejected the notion that a vicious dog is an "obvious" danger, arguing that whether it is latent or patent is a question of fact for a jury. He believed the property itself could be considered dangerous due to the adjacent condition and concluded that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer, as the Wylies could have amended their complaint to state a cause of action.
Analysis:
This case significantly limits the scope of a landlord's duty of care, particularly concerning dangers originating from adjacent properties not under their direct control. By distinguishing between dangers on the leased premises (where liability is expanding) and dangers off-premises, the court reinforced a boundary for landlord liability. Future cases will likely cite Wylie to argue against expanding landlord duties to warn tenants of generalized neighborhood risks or dangers from third parties over whom the landlord has no direct control, unless the landlord actively creates the peril or makes specific misrepresentations that induce reliance. This decision underscores the importance of the landlord's control over the property as a key factor in determining the extent of their duty in premises liability, while implicitly placing a greater burden on tenants to investigate neighborhood conditions.
