Wright v. Wright
274 S.W.2d 670, 1955 Tex. LEXIS 565, 154 Tex. 138 (1955)
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Rule of Law:
The doctrine of election under a will applies when the will is 'open to no other construction' than that the testator intended to dispose of property belonging to a beneficiary, while simultaneously granting that beneficiary a benefit, thereby requiring the beneficiary to choose between accepting the will's terms or repudiating it.
Facts:
- David C. Wright (testator) executed a will on May 1, 1950.
- David C. Wright passed away on April 30, 1952, survived by his wife, May M. Wright (respondent widow).
- At David C. Wright's death, virtually all property standing in his name, except for his diamond ring, was community property of himself and May M. Wright.
- David C. Wright's will designated May M. Wright as an executrix and beneficiary.
- The will also named David C. Wright's nephews, nieces, sisters (Cecelia Hext, Labena Beard), and a ranch employee (James Oren Price) as executors and beneficiaries.
- Paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of the will bequeathed specific tracts of land 'in fee simple to dispose of as she (or he) may wish or see proper' to his two sisters and James Oren Price.
- Paragraph 5 of the will devised a life estate in 'all of my community one-half' of the balance of his real estate to May M. Wright, with the remainder to his nephews and nieces, and granted her the power to sell both community halves of this property.
- Paragraph 7 of the will bequeathed to May M. Wright specific personal property, including life insurance, government bonds, an automobile, and household items, 'in fee simple to sell and dispose of as she may wish or see proper.'
- Paragraph 8 of the will bequeathed the 'residue of my personal property' to May M. Wright (undivided one-half interest) and his nephews and nieces (undivided one-tenth interest each).
Procedural Posture:
- David C. Wright's will was duly probated following his death on April 30, 1952.
- Petitioners (other executors and beneficiaries) filed suit seeking adjudications, including whether the will required an election, whether Mrs. Wright had already elected to reject it, and the rights of the parties under particular provisions.
- Petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment on these issues.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for petitioners on the issues of whether an election was required and the construction of certain will provisions, but denied it on the issue of whether Mrs. Wright had actually made an election.
- Both sides appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals; Mrs. Wright challenged the rulings against her, and petitioners appealed the denial of summary judgment on the actual election issue.
- The Court of Civil Appeals held that genuine fact issues were involved and remanded the entire cause for a full trial.
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Issue:
Does a will that bequeaths specific tracts of community property to third parties and provides benefits to the surviving spouse from the testator's community half, while also making other provisions for the surviving spouse, require the surviving spouse to make an election between taking under the will or taking her independent community half?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Garwood
Yes, the will requires the respondent widow, May M. Wright, to make an election because, at least as to certain items of property, the will is 'open to no other construction' than that it disposes of her community interest, while also conferring benefits upon her. The court first addresses the procedural point that a denial of a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and unappealable, thus affirming the Court of Civil Appeals' action in leaving undisturbed the trial court's refusal to grant summary judgment on the issue of actual election. The core legal question for requiring an election is whether the will 'is open to no other construction' than that the testator intended to dispose of the beneficiary's property (community interests) as well as his own; if it is ambiguous, no election is required as a matter of law. No fact question arises regarding the testator's actual intent when determining if an election is required, as any uncertainty means no election is required, and parol evidence is not needed for this determination. The will, specifically paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 (devises of specific tracts to sisters and ranch employee 'in fee simple to dispose of as she (or he) may wish or see proper'), disposes of the respondent's community interest as well as the testator's, as these provisions are 'open to no other construction.' The will also confers benefits on May M. Wright, such as the life estate in the testator's community one-half of other real estate (paragraph 5) and the bequest of life insurance, government bonds, and other personal property (paragraph 7), which are benefits if she could legally be deprived of them without her consent. The court rejects the 'testamentary partition' theory as a reason not to require election, stating that if it's a partition, the doctrine of election still applies. However, regarding other specific provisions, the court clarifies: Paragraph 1 (debt payment) is moot. Paragraph 5 (life estate in testator's community half of residual real estate) is construed as dealing only with the testator's half, so May M. Wright's half interest is not affected by this provision. Paragraph 7 (life insurance, bonds, car, household items) is also construed as dealing only with the testator's half. Paragraph 8 (residue of personal property) is construed as disposing only of the testator's interest, rejecting the argument that 'my' always means 'our,' because it is not the only construction to which the will is open. Thus, the summary judgment is affirmed as to the requirement of an election but modified regarding the construction of particular will provisions.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the stringent standard for invoking the doctrine of election in Texas, emphasizing that a will must be 'open to no other construction' than disposing of a beneficiary's property for an election to be required. It establishes that courts will not infer such an intent from ambiguous language, nor will they consider extrinsic evidence to resolve such ambiguity for the purpose of requiring an election. The ruling provides important guidance for will drafters regarding the explicit language needed to compel an election and defines what constitutes a 'benefit' sufficient to trigger the doctrine. It also reinforces the principle that denials of summary judgment are interlocutory and generally not appealable.
