Wornick Co. v. Casas
8 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1058, 856 S.W.2d 732, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1136 (1993)
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Rule of Law:
In Texas, an employer's conduct in terminating an at-will employee does not rise to the level of 'extreme and outrageous' for an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim merely because the termination is abrupt, humiliating, and lacks a clear explanation, unless the conduct goes beyond all possible bounds of decency and is utterly intolerable in a civilized community.
Facts:
- Diana Casas was employed by Right Away Foods Corporation (RAFCO) from December 1979 until April 22, 1986, ultimately serving as Director of Human Resources.
- Casas had consistently received favorable job-performance reviews prior to her termination.
- On the day of her discharge, Casas' supervisor, Valerie Woerner, called her into a private office and fired her, citing disloyalty and poor attitude, and told her to leave the property immediately.
- Casas believed the true reason for her firing was to prevent her from revealing unethical practices by other RAFCO employees to government auditors.
- A security guard was instructed to escort Casas from the building, which was standard procedure for hourly employees but not for salaried employees like Casas.
- While being escorted out, RAFCO's president, Bill Barth, told Casas they would discuss the matter upon his return from a trip, leading her to believe she might be on a leave of absence, but he never followed up.
- While Casas was packing her personal belongings, the security supervisor informed her that Woerner wanted her off the property within five minutes.
- The security guards who escorted Casas were not rude or offensive in their conduct.
Procedural Posture:
- Diana Casas sued RAFCO and several individuals in the trial court, alleging multiple claims, including intentional infliction of emotional distress.
- The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims.
- Casas appealed to the court of appeals.
- The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment on all other claims but reversed the summary judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, sending it back for trial.
- RAFCO, the defendant-employer, appealed that reversal to the Supreme Court of Texas.
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Issue:
Does an employer's conduct, which includes abruptly terminating a salaried employee, giving vague reasons, and having her escorted off the premises by security, constitute 'extreme and outrageous' conduct sufficient to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Phillips
No. The employer's conduct did not constitute 'extreme and outrageous' conduct. To establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the conduct must go 'beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.' Because Texas is an employment-at-will state, the act of termination itself cannot be outrageous. While the manner of termination—requiring Casas to leave immediately and be escorted by security—may be humiliating, it does not meet the high threshold for outrageousness. This conduct is distinguishable from cases involving more egregious actions like false accusations of theft, ongoing harassment, or racial slurs. To hold otherwise would subject employers to a potential jury trial for nearly every discharge, effectively undermining the employment-at-will doctrine.
Concurring - Justice Doggett
No. Diana Casas failed to provide summary judgment evidence of outrageous conduct sufficient to distinguish her firing from an ordinary termination. While most terminations are upsetting, they do not automatically give rise to a legal claim. However, the majority's interpretation of 'outrageous' should not be so restrictive as to immunize all employer conduct, such as falsely and knowingly accusing an employee of criminal misconduct. Casas presented no evidence of such independent outrageous conduct in this case.
Concurring - Justice Hecht
No. The claim fails because Casas asserts no principled basis for holding the conduct was outrageous. This concurrence criticizes the 'extreme and outrageous' standard itself as being entirely subjective and lacking any guiding legal principles. Liability under this tort depends not on a rule of law, but on whether the judges or jurors are personally offended by the conduct. The court's decision is based not on legal analysis but on the fact that a majority of the justices were simply not sufficiently offended by the employer's actions.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the high threshold required for an employee to successfully sue for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the context of an at-will employment termination in Texas. By holding that actions like being abruptly fired and escorted out by security are not, as a matter of law, 'outrageous,' the court strongly protects the employment-at-will doctrine. The decision signals that courts should dismiss such claims at the summary judgment stage unless the employer's conduct involves aggravating factors far beyond the indignities of a typical termination, such as criminal accusations or a pattern of severe harassment. This precedent makes it more difficult for employees to challenge the manner of their discharge through tort law, thereby preserving employer discretion.
