Woolum v. Hillman
2010 Ky. LEXIS 262, 2010 WL 4146220, 329 S.W.3d 283 (2010)
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Rule of Law:
Under Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 403 and KRE 411, evidence of a defense expert witness's commonality of malpractice insurance with a defendant physician is admissible to show bias, subject to the trial court's discretion in balancing its probative value against its potential for undue prejudice on a case-by-case basis, rather than through a bright-line rule.
Facts:
- Lisa Ann Hillman was diagnosed with pregnancy-induced hypertension (preeclampsia) during her pregnancy.
- On July 11, 2002, an ultrasound showed a normal pregnancy, and Dr. Jerry Woolum set the due date as September 16.
- During her regularly scheduled appointment on August 7, 2002, Lisa Hillman's blood pressure reading was 140/100, prompting Dr. Woolum to diagnose her with pregnancy-induced hypertension; he instructed bed rest and biweekly visits but decided against advancing the due date before 37 weeks.
- Over the next few weeks, Lisa Hillman’s condition worsened.
- Dr. Woolum and Lisa Hillman subsequently agreed to deliver the child on September 3, 2002, almost two weeks earlier than the original due date.
- On the night of September 2, 2002, Lisa Hillman went into labor, but after she checked into the hospital, nurses could not find a heartbeat from the child.
- The child was delivered stillborn, and Dr. Woolum concluded the child had been dead for at least 24 hours, initially telling the Hillmans that the cause of death was Lisa Hillman's preeclampsia.
Procedural Posture:
- Lisa Ann and Aaron Hillman (Appellees) filed a wrongful death action against Dr. Jerry Woolum and his medical practice (Appellant) in Bell Circuit Court (trial court) for the death of their stillborn child, alleging medical malpractice.
- A Bell County jury returned a 9-3 verdict for the Hillmans, awarding them $500,600 in damages.
- The trial court ordered a new trial on a matter unrelated to the appeal, but the parties settled that matter, leading to the entry of a final judgment.
- Dr. Woolum appealed the final judgment to the Kentucky Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court).
- The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment on all issues implicating liability, including claims of evidentiary error, the denial of a directed verdict, and juror misconduct.
- Dr. Woolum sought and was granted further review by the Kentucky Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of a defense expert witness's commonality of malpractice insurance with the defendant physician to demonstrate bias, considering the balancing test under Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 403 and KRE 411, and by admitting an ultrasound video with minimal probative value?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice NOBLE
No, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of common insurance or the ultrasound, nor did it err in denying a directed verdict or finding no juror misconduct. KRE 411 explicitly permits evidence of liability insurance when offered for purposes other than implying negligence, such as proving witness bias. The Court rejects a bright-line rule, like Ohio's, for admitting common insurance, reaffirming Kentucky's flexible, case-by-case approach under KRE 403, which requires judicial discretion to balance probative value against prejudicial effect. The trial court properly exercised its discretion by considering factors like Dr. Butcher's deposition testimony revealing his belief that malpractice cases directly link to premium increases, his general hostility to medical negligence cases, and his long-term professional relationship with Dr. Woolum, concluding that these factors developed a link between the shared insurance and Dr. Butcher’s perceived bias. The fact that Dr. Butcher later denied impact at trial did not retroactively invalidate the prior KRE 403 balancing based on deposition testimony. Regarding the ultrasound, the authentication issue was not preserved for appeal. While the ultrasound had minimal probative value (showing the fetus was alive, which was undisputed), it also had similarly minimal prejudicial effect as an objective and scientific procedure, thus its admission was not an abuse of discretion. The evidence was sufficient to avoid a directed verdict on fetal viability, as expert testimony confirmed a 31-week fetus had an overwhelming chance of survival, and viability does not require a guarantee of perfect health but rather the possibility of survival outside the womb. Finally, no reversible error occurred due to juror misconduct; the six-day delay in deliberations for juror illness caused no actual prejudice, and the circumstances aligned with factors supporting the denial of a mistrial, and no bias could be discerned from jurors coincidently developing high blood pressure.
Concurring - Chief Justice MINTON
Yes, I concur with the result and most of the majority's reasoning, emphasizing that while KRE 411 generally prohibits evidence of liability insurance, the trial court's admission in this case was not an abuse of discretion due to its unique facts. Dr. Butcher's deposition testimony clearly demonstrated a perceived personal financial stake in the outcome, stemming from his experiences with increased premiums and general hostility toward malpractice lawsuits, and his long-standing professional relationship with Dr. Woolum at the same hospital. Regarding the ultrasound, despite its dubious probative value and allegations of theatrical presentation, any error in its admission was harmless because the record did not show truly overwrought emotional display, and other evidence also established the fetus's viability, meaning the judgment was not substantially swayed by this evidence.
Dissenting - Justice CUNNINGHAM
No, I respectfully dissent because the six-day delay in jury deliberations, caused by two jurors suffering traumatic physical problems requiring hospitalization, should have resulted in a mistrial. While acknowledging the hardship for the Appellees, fairness demands that such an interlude in the deliberative process, especially impacting the fact-finders themselves, warranted a mistrial. This case is distinguishable from precedents like Knuckles where the delay was due to the judge and occurred earlier in the trial, as here the delay directly affected the jury during the critical deliberation phase, violating the parties' entitlement to continuous, uninterrupted deliberation by healthy jurors.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the application of KRE 403 and KRE 411 in Kentucky, firmly rejecting a bright-line rule for admitting evidence of common insurance to show expert witness bias. It reinforces the broad discretion afforded to trial courts in balancing the probative value of such evidence against its prejudicial effect on a case-by-case basis. For future cases, attorneys seeking to introduce or exclude evidence of common insurance will need to present specific facts demonstrating the expert's perceived financial stake or general hostility to malpractice claims, rather than merely relying on the shared insurance policy. The ruling also underscores the high bar for overturning trial court decisions on evidentiary admissions, directed verdicts, and juror misconduct, particularly emphasizing the need for demonstrated prejudice and proper preservation of issues for appellate review.
