Woollcott v. . Shubert
1916 N.Y. LEXIS 1304, 111 N.E. 829, 217 N.Y. 212 (1916)
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Rule of Law:
A place of public accommodation, such as a theatre, retains its common law right to exclude any person for any reason, except for reasons of race, creed, or color as explicitly prohibited by the New York Civil Rights Act. The Act's prohibition on discrimination is limited solely to those enumerated protected categories.
Facts:
- The plaintiff, Woollcott, was a dramatic critic for the New York Times.
- The defendants controlled and operated numerous theatres.
- Woollcott wrote and published a criticism of one of the defendants' theatrical productions.
- The defendants were displeased with the criticism.
- As a result, the defendants excluded Woollcott from one of their theatres and refused him entry.
- The defendants also threatened to exclude Woollcott from all their other theatres.
Procedural Posture:
- Woollcott filed a complaint in the New York Supreme Court, Special Term (the trial court of first instance), seeking an injunction against the defendants.
- The defendants answered the complaint and subsequently moved for judgment on the pleadings.
- The Special Term granted the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings.
- Woollcott, as appellant, appealed to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court (the intermediate appellate court).
- The Appellate Division affirmed the Special Term's order in favor of the defendants, as respondents.
- The Appellate Division granted Woollcott leave to appeal its decision to the New York Court of Appeals (the highest court in the state).
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Issue:
Does the New York Civil Rights Act, as amended in 1913, prohibit the proprietor of a theatre from excluding a person for reasons other than the person's race, creed, or color?
Opinions:
Majority - Collin, J.
No. The New York Civil Rights Act, as amended in 1913, does not prohibit a theatre proprietor from excluding a person for reasons other than race, creed, or color. At common law, a theatre is private property, and its proprietor has the right to decide who shall be admitted or excluded. A statute in derogation of a common law right must be strictly construed. The court found that the original 1895 Act and its 1913 amendment were intended only to prevent discrimination on the specific grounds of race, creed, or color. The amendment's purpose was not to broaden the scope of protected classes but to strengthen the existing prohibitions by also banning indirect forms of discrimination, such as advertising that patrons of a certain race or creed are unwelcome, thereby giving greater efficacy to the original statute's limited purpose.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms the strong common law property rights of owners of public accommodations. It establishes that civil rights statutes, being in derogation of common law, will be interpreted narrowly unless the legislature's intent to broaden their scope is unmistakably clear. The ruling solidifies the principle that unless a specific attribute is a protected class under an anti-discrimination statute, proprietors are free to refuse service for other reasons, even if those reasons seem arbitrary, such as disliking a critic's review. This interpretation places the burden on the legislature to explicitly enumerate all prohibited grounds for discrimination if it wishes to abrogate the common law further.
