Woodward & Lothrop v. Hillary
1991 D.C. App. LEXIS 261, 598 A.2d 1142, 1991 WL 190707 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
Privately employed security guards who are commissioned as special police officers under state law act 'under color of state law' for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when they exercise their state-granted powers of arrest.
Facts:
- On the evening of May 9, 1986, Carnell Hillary entered a Woodward & Lothrop department store as it was closing.
- As Hillary turned to leave, Earl Sellers, a store security guard commissioned as a special police officer, grabbed him and struck him in the eye.
- A scuffle ensued, and Dwayne Wigfall, Sellers' supervisor and also a commissioned special police officer, joined in subduing Hillary.
- The guards wrestled Hillary to the floor, handcuffed him, and searched his pockets, from which Hillary claimed $200 was taken and not returned.
- The guards took Hillary to the store's security office and detained him before eventually releasing him without any criminal charges being filed.
- As a result of the altercation, Hillary suffered a fractured cheekbone and permanent injuries to his right eyelid and vision.
Procedural Posture:
- Carnell Hillary filed suit against Woodward & Lothrop in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, alleging several common law torts.
- Hillary later filed an amended complaint, adding security guards Dwayne Wigfall and Earl Sellers as defendants and adding a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
- At trial, the judge ruled as a matter of law that the guards had acted under color of state law for the purposes of the § 1983 claim.
- A jury returned a verdict in favor of Hillary, awarding him compensatory and punitive damages on the tort claims, and a separate award of damages on the § 1983 claim.
- The defendants' post-trial motion for a new trial or for a remittitur was denied by the trial court.
- The defendants, Woodward & Lothrop, Wigfall, and Sellers, appealed the judgment to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Do privately employed security guards, commissioned as special police officers with state-granted arrest powers, act 'under color of state law' pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when they detain, arrest, and search an individual on their employer's premises?
Opinions:
Majority - Farrell, J.
Yes. The security guards acted under color of state law because they were exercising a power to arrest that was possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because they were clothed with the authority of the state. The court reasoned that 'state action' for Fourth Amendment purposes and 'color of state law' for § 1983 purposes are coextensive concepts. Citing precedents like United States v. Lima and Alston v. United States, the court held that when a special police officer engages in an arrest and related actions, the officer is performing a public function authorized by their commission. This power distinguishes the officer from a private citizen and provides the necessary nexus with the state to trigger § 1983 liability.
Dissenting - Reilly, J.
The dissent did not directly address the 'color of state law' issue, focusing instead on two trial court errors it deemed so prejudicial as to require a new trial. First, it argued that admitting testimony about defendant Wigfall's later termination for misappropriation was reversible error, as it was inadmissible evidence of an unconvicted crime used to suggest a propensity for theft. Second, it contended that allowing the jury to award separate damages for common law torts and the § 1983 claim without proper limiting instructions created an impermissible risk of double recovery or an award based on the abstract value of constitutional rights, contrary to Supreme Court precedent in Stachura.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the principle in the District of Columbia that the actions of special police officers, even when employed by private entities, are attributable to the state when they perform law enforcement functions like arrests. It confirms that the 'state action' analysis from Fourth Amendment criminal cases applies directly to the 'color of law' requirement in § 1983 civil rights litigation. The case serves as a warning to private employers that they can be held liable under federal civil rights law for the actions of their security personnel who hold special police commissions. The court's handling of the damages issue, while upholding the verdict, highlights the procedural pitfalls of separating damage awards for overlapping state and federal claims and reinforces the need for careful jury instructions to prevent double recovery.
