Woods v. Lancet
303 N.Y. 349, 27 A.L.R. 2d 1250, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951)
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Rule of Law:
A viable fetus, subsequently born alive, may maintain a cause of action for injuries sustained while in the mother's womb due to the negligence of another, overturning prior precedent that denied such recovery.
Facts:
- An infant plaintiff was in his mother's womb during the ninth month of her pregnancy.
- The infant sustained serious injuries through the alleged negligence of the defendant.
- As a result of these injuries, the infant was born permanently maimed and disabled.
Procedural Posture:
- A complaint was filed on behalf of the infant plaintiff alleging negligence and prenatal injuries against the defendant.
- The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for failing to state a cause of action.
- The Special Term (trial court) granted the defendant's motion and dismissed the suit, citing Drobner v. Peters.
- The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal, with four Justices voting to affirm and one Justice dissenting, advocating for reversal.
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Issue:
Does a child, injured while a viable fetus in its mother's womb due to another's negligence and subsequently born alive, have a cause of action to recover damages for those prenatal injuries?
Opinions:
Majority - Desmond, J.
Yes, a child injured while a viable fetus in its mother's womb due to another's negligence and subsequently born alive does have a cause of action to recover damages for those prenatal injuries. The court should bring the common law into accord with justice, overturning the 1921 precedent of Drobner v. Peters. Drobner was based primarily on a lack of precedent, which no longer exists, as numerous other courts (California, Ohio, Minnesota, Maryland, Georgia, Canada) and legal scholars have since recognized such a cause of action. The court rejected the arguments against recovery, including the supposed difficulty of proving causation, stating that such issues are common in negligence cases and uncertainty of proof cannot destroy a legal right. It also dismissed the theoretical objection that a fetus has no separate existence, emphasizing that the law should not deny the "simple and easily demonstrable fact" that a viable fetus, when injured, is alive and capable of separate life after birth. The court limited its holding to prenatal injuries to viable children. It asserted the court's duty to re-examine and adapt common law rules to present-day standards of wisdom and justice, rather than deferring exclusively to the Legislature for such changes in a "peculiarly nonstatutory" field.
Dissenting - Lewis, J.
No, while prenatal injury to a child should not go unrequited, the right to sue for such injuries should be created by legislative action, not a judicial decision. The complex issues surrounding prenatal injuries, such as determining fetal viability and tracing causation from injury to postnatal deformity, require legislative hearings and medical research. The Legislature is better equipped to establish appropriate safeguards, like time limitations for lawsuits, to prevent abuses that might arise from the difficulty of proof. The dissent noted that analogous rights, such as those permitting recovery for wrongful death, were created by legislative action in both England (Lord Campbell's Act) and New York (Decedent Estate Law).
Analysis:
This case represents a significant shift in New York tort law, demonstrating judicial willingness to overturn long-standing precedent to adapt common law to evolving notions of justice and scientific understanding. By recognizing the right of a viable, subsequently born child to sue for prenatal injuries, the court expanded the scope of duty owed by tort-feasors and affirmed the legal personhood of a viable fetus for purposes of tort recovery. This decision had a broad impact, aligning New York with a growing national trend and influencing other jurisdictions to reconsider similar restrictions, emphasizing that the common law is dynamic and courts have a duty to correct "outworn and antiquated rules."
