Woodfield v. Providence Hospital
2001 D.C. App. LEXIS 193, 2001 WL 1011966, 779 A.2d 933 (2001)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
An employee who signs a broad release authorizing a prospective employer to conduct a background investigation and releasing former employers from all liability for furnishing information has consented to potentially defamatory statements. This consent serves as a defense to a defamation claim, regardless of whether the former employer was aware of the release at the time the statements were made.
Facts:
- Miriam Woodfield was employed as a registered nurse at Providence Hospital, where her supervisor was Denice Easterling.
- Providence Hospital's employee manual stated its policy was to release only employment dates and last position title for references.
- Woodfield resigned from Providence Hospital and subsequently received a job offer from Suburban Hospital.
- As part of Suburban Hospital's hiring process, Woodfield signed a 'Notification and Verification to Conduct Background Investigation' form.
- The form authorized Suburban Hospital to investigate her background and stated, 'I release employers and persons named in my application from all liability for any damages on account of his/her furnishing said information.'
- Woodfield had listed Providence Hospital and Easterling as her former employer and supervisor.
- An employment verification service, acting for Suburban Hospital, contacted Easterling and asked about Woodfield's promotions.
- Easterling responded that Woodfield received no promotions 'because of her poor performance' and refused to answer further questions.
- Following this exchange, Suburban Hospital retracted its offer of employment to Woodfield.
Procedural Posture:
- Miriam Woodfield filed a defamation suit against Providence Hospital and Denice Easterling in the trial court.
- Following discovery, the defendants (Providence Hospital and Easterling) filed a joint motion for summary judgment.
- The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding as a matter of law that Woodfield had consented to the statements and had failed to produce sufficient evidence of malice.
- Miriam Woodfield, as the appellant, appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the higher court.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a former employee's signed release, authorizing a background check and releasing former employers from all liability, constitute consent to an allegedly defamatory statement made during that check, thereby barring a subsequent defamation claim against the former employer?
Opinions:
Majority - Belson, Senior Judge
Yes. A former employee's signed release authorizing a background check and releasing former employers from liability constitutes valid consent, which acts as a defense to a defamation claim. The court's reasoning is threefold. First, the release is a contract, and the former employer and supervisor (Providence Hospital and Easterling) are intended third-party beneficiaries who can enforce it. Second, the validity of consent hinges on the plaintiff's action of signing the release, not on the defendant's awareness of that release at the time the statement was made; the focus is on the plaintiff's willingness to have the invasion occur (volenti non fit injuria). Third, the broad scope of the subsequently signed release supersedes any more restrictive policy found in the company's employee manual. Assuming, without deciding, that such consent creates a qualified privilege that can be overcome by malice, the plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence of malice, as the negative statements were consistent with a prior documented performance appraisal of the plaintiff.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the legal power of liability release forms in the employment context, establishing them as a formidable defense for former employers against defamation claims arising from negative references. The ruling clarifies that the consent defense focuses on the plaintiff's authorization, making the defendant's contemporaneous knowledge of the release irrelevant. It also sets a high evidentiary bar for demonstrating malice to overcome a qualified privilege, requiring evidence that is more consistent with malice than its absence, particularly when the negative statements are supported by prior performance documentation. This makes it significantly more difficult for former employees who have signed such releases to succeed in defamation suits.
