Wood v. Board of County Commissioners of Fremont County
759 P.2d 1250 (1988)
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Rule of Law:
A conveyance of land that merely states its purpose, such as "for the purpose of constructing and maintaining thereon a County Hospital," without express words of limitation or a right of reentry, creates a fee simple absolute, not a defeasible fee.
Facts:
- In 1948, Cecil and Edna Wood conveyed a tract of land to Fremont County by warranty deed.
- The deed stated the conveyance was "for the purpose of constructing and maintaining thereon a County Hospital in memorial to the gallant men of the Armed Forces..."
- Fremont County constructed and operated a hospital on the property for several decades.
- On November 18, 1983, Fremont County sold the land and hospital facility to a private company.
- The private company continued to operate a hospital on the premises until September 1984.
- After moving its operations to a new facility, the private company put the land and original hospital building up for sale.
Procedural Posture:
- Cecil and Edna Wood filed a complaint against the Board of County Commissioners for Fremont County in the state district court (trial court), seeking the value of the land.
- After discovery, the Board of County Commissioners filed a motion for summary judgment.
- The Woods then filed their own motion for partial summary judgment.
- The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Board of County Commissioners.
- The Woods, as appellants, appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Supreme Court of Wyoming.
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Issue:
Does language in a deed conveying land "for the purpose of constructing and maintaining thereon a County Hospital" create a fee simple determinable or a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent, thereby retaining a future interest in the grantor?
Opinions:
Majority - Brown, Chief Justice
No. The language in the deed does not create a fee simple determinable or a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent. A conveyance is presumed to pass the grantor's entire estate unless an intent to pass a lesser estate expressly appears. To create a fee simple determinable, which expires automatically, the deed must contain words of special limitation such as 'so long as,' 'until,' or 'during.' The phrase 'for the purpose of' merely states the grantor's motive and does not set a condition that would automatically terminate the estate. Similarly, to create a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent, which gives the grantor a discretionary right of reentry, the deed must use clear conditional language like 'upon condition that' or 'provided that.' Because conditions subsequent are disfavored in law and strictly construed, the court will not find one unless the language unequivocally indicates such an intent. The language in the Woods' deed lacks the requisite clarity for either form of defeasible fee, thus conveying a fee simple absolute to the County.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms the strong judicial preference for interpreting conveyances as creating a fee simple absolute and the policy against restricting the free use and alienability of land. The court's strict construction of deed language serves as a crucial guide for legal drafting, emphasizing that grantors wishing to retain a future interest must use clear and unambiguous terms of limitation or condition. A mere declaration of purpose is legally insufficient to create a defeasible fee. This case solidifies the principle that courts will not imply a forfeiture of an estate where the grantor has failed to explicitly reserve one.
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