Wolford v. JoEllen Smith Psych. Hosp.
1997 WL 261385, 693 So.2d 1164 (1997)
Rule of Law:
In a personal injury action, surveillance videotapes are generally discoverable only after the plaintiff has been deposed regarding their physical injuries and activities, unless the plaintiff can demonstrate special circumstances necessitating earlier disclosure.
Facts:
- On October 27, 1990, Linda Wolford allegedly injured her back in the 'nitro-crossing initiative' (swinging on a rope across an imaginary pit) during a family therapy program at JoEllen Smith Psychiatric Hospital.
- Linda Wolford and her husband, Michael Wolford, brought a personal injury action against JoEllen Smith Psychiatric Hospital, claiming damages for ongoing medical injuries and physical limitations.
- During pretrial discovery, Linda and Michael Wolford requested that JoEllen Smith Psychiatric Hospital produce any surveillance videotapes in its possession.
- JoEllen Smith Psychiatric Hospital admitted it had two surveillance videotapes of Linda Wolford, one made in 1993 and another in 1995.
- JoEllen Smith Psychiatric Hospital refused to produce the tapes, arguing it was entitled to take a supplemental deposition of Linda Wolford to question her about her physical injuries and activities pictured in the surveillance videotapes before disclosing them.
- Linda Wolford's one and only deposition had taken place in January 1993, more than four years prior to the current discovery dispute regarding the 1993 and 1995 surveillance tapes.
Procedural Posture:
- Linda and Michael Wolford filed a personal injury action against JoEllen Smith Psychiatric Hospital in the trial court (court of first instance).
- Linda and Michael Wolford filed a motion to compel production of surveillance videotapes in the trial court.
- JoEllen Smith Psychiatric Hospital filed a motion to compel Linda Wolford to submit to a supplemental deposition prior to disclosing the tapes.
- The trial judge ordered JoEllen Smith Psychiatric Hospital to immediately disclose the surveillance videotapes and denied the hospital's request for a supplemental deposition prior to disclosure.
- JoEllen Smith Psychiatric Hospital filed a writ application to the intermediate appellate court (Court of Appeal), which was denied.
- JoEllen Smith Psychiatric Hospital, as the appellant, applied for certiorari to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, which was granted to review the trial judge's order.
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Issue:
Does the defense in a personal injury action have the right to depose the plaintiff regarding their physical injuries and activities before being required to produce surveillance videotapes of the plaintiff in response to a discovery request?
Opinions:
Majority - Marcus, J.
No, the defense in a personal injury action is generally not required to produce surveillance videotapes of the plaintiff before deposing the plaintiff regarding their physical injuries and activities. The court affirmed that surveillance videotape is generally discoverable under La.Code Civ.P. art. 1422, is not protected by the attorney work product exclusion (La.Code Civ.P. art. 1424, as it refers only to 'writing'), and must be produced a reasonable time before trial (citing Moak v. Illinois Central Railroad Company). However, the court modified its previous holding in Moak, which granted trial judges broad discretion over the timing of production, by concluding that surveillance videotape possesses unique impeachment value. This value would be irrevocably lost if disclosed before the plaintiff's deposition, as the plaintiff could inadvertently or deliberately tailor their testimony to correspond with the videotape's contents. Delaying production until after a full deposition best serves the search for truth by preserving the integrity of the plaintiff's testimony. Therefore, the general rule established is that the plaintiff's deposition must precede the production of surveillance videotape, unless the plaintiff can demonstrate 'special circumstances' necessitating earlier disclosure. In this case, no special circumstances were shown to justify pre-deposition disclosure, especially given that Linda Wolford's last deposition was over four years prior and she continued to claim ongoing injuries. Thus, JoEllen Smith Psychiatric Hospital was entitled to a supplemental deposition of Mrs. Wolford prior to releasing the videotapes.
Dissenting - Calogero, C.J.
Yes, the trial judge has broad discretion to determine the appropriate timing for the pre-trial discovery of surveillance materials, and the majority's new rule abandons this trust in trial judges. Chief Justice Calogero argued that the court's previous decision in Moak v. Illinois Railroad correctly established the broad discretion of trial judges in regulating discovery. This discretion is vital for safeguarding the interests of the parties and preserving the goals of discovery. The majority's new rule, by mandating delayed disclosure, inappropriately removes this trust from the competent and impartial trial judges who are best positioned to make such determinations based on the specific facts of each case.
Dissenting - Kimball, J.
Yes, the trial judge has broad discretion to determine the timing of surveillance videotape production, and there is no legislative basis for the majority's new general rule. Justice Kimball asserted that Louisiana trial courts are well-established to have broad discretion in pre-trial discovery, and their decisions should only be overturned for a clear abuse of that discretion. The trial judge is in the best position to evaluate the factual situation and circumstances to decide when production will best assist in the search for truth. There is no legislative requirement to craft a general rule giving preference to post-deposition disclosure. Justice Kimball believed the trial judge in this particular case did not abuse her discretion by ordering immediate disclosure, citing La.C.C.P. art. 1422, which grants trial judges power to control the scope of discovery.
Analysis:
This case significantly alters discovery practice in Louisiana regarding surveillance materials, shifting from a discretionary standard to a presumptive rule favoring delayed production. The ruling prioritizes the adversarial value of impeachment evidence over the principles of liberal discovery, aiming to prevent 'tailored' testimony by plaintiffs. While establishing a clear default rule, the inclusion of a 'special circumstances' exception maintains some flexibility, though it places the burden on the plaintiff to demonstrate necessity for earlier disclosure. This decision reflects a judicial acknowledgment of the unique nature and potential manipulability of video evidence, balancing a defendant's right to a defense with a plaintiff's right to examine evidence for authenticity before trial.
