Wolff v. Middlebrooks
2002 Fulton County D. Rep. 1861, 256 Ga. App. 268, 568 S.E.2d 88 (2002)
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Rule of Law:
Defamatory statements made to a general audience can constitute slander per se if they impute a crime or a debasing act, but such statements cannot form the basis of an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim unless the conduct was directly aimed at the plaintiff.
Facts:
- Anthony Middlebrooks filed an employment grievance against Todd Wolff, his former employer, for inappropriate conduct toward Middlebrooks's wife at an office party.
- Wolff fired Middlebrooks one day before the defamatory comments were made.
- On December 11, 1998, Wolff called into a popular local morning radio program on the station '99X'.
- During the broadcast, Wolff falsely stated to the program DJs that Anthony Middlebrooks was "running around the Atlanta area claiming to have a love affair" with one of the DJs, Jimmy Baron.
- Wolff specifically identified "Tony Middlebrooks" on air as the individual making these claims.
- Middlebrooks was listening to the program at the time, along with approximately 40,000 other listeners in the Atlanta area.
- Wolff knew that the statements he made during the radio broadcast were false when he made them.
Procedural Posture:
- Anthony Middlebrooks sued Todd Wolff in a trial court, asserting claims for slander per se, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages.
- After the close of Middlebrooks’s case at trial, Wolff moved for a directed verdict on all of Middlebrooks’s claims, which the trial court denied.
- A jury returned a general verdict in favor of Middlebrooks, awarding him $30,000 in damages.
- The jury also returned a verdict for punitive damages of $250,000, finding a specific intent to cause harm.
- Wolff moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (j.n.o.v.) and a new trial, and the trial court denied both motions.
- Wolff appealed the trial court's judgment to the Georgia Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
1. Does a radio broadcast falsely accusing a married person of having an illicit affair constitute slander per se under Georgia law? 2. Does a radio broadcast, not directed at the plaintiff but heard by the plaintiff, constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress?
Opinions:
Majority - Miller, Judge.
Yes, the radio comments about Middlebrooks claiming to have an illicit affair could be considered slander per se. No, the comments could not be the basis for intentional infliction of emotional distress because they were not made directly to Middlebrooks. The court reasoned that Wolff's on-air comments could be understood by a jury as imputing to Middlebrooks, a married man, the crime of adultery or fornication, or charging him with a debasing act that would exclude him from society, which satisfies the definition of slander per se under OCGA § 51-5-4 (a)(1)-(2), (b). The harmful effect of the language as understood, not its directness, makes it actionable per se (Southland Corp. v. Garren). However, the court found that the trial court erred in denying a directed verdict on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. For such a claim, the conduct must be directed toward the plaintiff (Ryckeley v. Callaway). Defamatory remarks made to the public in general, even if harmful to the plaintiff, are directed toward the hearer of the statements, not to the plaintiff, and thus are not actionable as intentional infliction of emotional distress (Lively v. McDaniel). Since the jury returned a general verdict and it was impossible to determine whether the damages were based on the valid slander per se claim or the invalid intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the judgment was reversed and remanded for a new trial solely on the slander per se and punitive damages claims.
Analysis:
This case highlights the distinct elements required for claims of slander per se versus intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). It clarifies that while public defamatory statements can constitute slander per se, IIED requires the conduct to be specifically directed at the plaintiff, not merely about them to a general audience. The ruling also underscores the critical importance of using specific verdict forms in complex cases to avoid ambiguity regarding the basis of jury awards, thereby preventing the need for costly retrials when one of multiple claims is found to be legally infirm. This distinction is crucial for future litigants in determining the appropriate cause of action based on the nature and direction of the harmful conduct.
