Wolf v. . American Tract Society
58 N.E. 31, 1900 N.Y. LEXIS 856, 164 N.Y. 30 (1900)
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Rule of Law:
When an injury is caused by an object falling from a building under construction with multiple independent contractors, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not, by itself, allow for liability against a specific contractor without evidence identifying that contractor or their employee as the responsible party.
Facts:
- The American Tract Society was constructing a 23-story steel building in New York City.
- The Society had hired 19 independent contractors to perform various parts of the construction work, with about 250 men employed on the site.
- On March 25, 1895, the plaintiff, an employee of the steam fitting contractor, was on a truck on the street next to the building.
- While the plaintiff was attending to his duties, a brick fell from the building, which had reached the ninth story of construction.
- The brick struck the plaintiff on the head, inflicting a very serious injury.
- There was no proof to show from what part of the building the brick fell, who dropped it, or which contractor's employee was responsible.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiff sued the American Tract Society (owner), Downey (carpenter contractor), and the Webers (mason contractors) in a New York trial court for personal injuries.
- At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, the trial court dismissed the complaint against all defendants.
- The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Division, an intermediate appellate court.
- The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal as to the American Tract Society but reversed the trial court's judgment as to defendants Downey and the Webers, ordering a new trial against them.
- Defendants Downey and the Webers appealed the Appellate Division's reversal to the Court of Appeals of New York, the state's highest court.
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Issue:
Does the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur permit a plaintiff, injured by a falling object at a multi-contractor construction site, to recover from specific contractors without any proof identifying which contractor's negligence caused the injury?
Opinions:
Majority - O'Brien, J.
No, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not permit recovery from specific contractors without proof identifying the negligent party. Although the circumstances create a presumption of negligence under res ipsa loquitur, this presumption is not sufficient to establish liability against any particular defendant when multiple independent contractors are present. The plaintiff bears the burden of providing some proof to identify the author of the wrong. To hold one or more contractors liable without such evidence would be based on pure conjecture, unfairly grouping the innocent with the guilty. The law does not permit selecting a defendant at random and requiring them to prove their non-culpability; it is better for an injury to go without redress than for an innocent party to be held responsible.
Dissenting - Haight, J.
Yes, the case should be permitted to go to the jury to determine liability. The rule of presumed negligence under res ipsa loquitur was established precisely for cases like this, where an injured party cannot identify the specific wrongdoer, in order to protect the public from the inherent dangers of high-rise construction. The dissent argues that Downey, by contracting to take 'entire charge' and 'all proper precautions,' assumed the owner's duty to the public and should be liable. Furthermore, because the Webers were the mason contractors in charge of the bricks, the fact that a brick fell should create a presumption of negligence specifically against them, shifting the burden to them to prove they were not at fault.
Analysis:
This decision significantly limits the application of res ipsa loquitur in cases involving multiple independent actors, such as on a large construction site. It establishes that the doctrine cannot be used to shift the burden of proof to a group of defendants to exonerate themselves. The ruling heightens the plaintiff's burden, requiring them not just to show that negligence must have occurred, but to produce affirmative evidence linking that negligence to a specific defendant. This precedent makes it substantially more difficult for plaintiffs to recover for injuries in complex, multi-party environments where identifying the precise tortfeasor is nearly impossible.
