Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind
106 S. Ct. 748, 474 U.S. 481, 1986 U.S. LEXIS 49 (1986)
Rule of Law:
The Establishment Clause does not prohibit a state from providing neutral vocational rehabilitation aid directly to a visually handicapped student, even if the student uses that aid for religious education, when the aid flows to religious institutions only as a result of the genuinely independent and private choices of the aid recipients.
Facts:
- Larry Witters applied in 1979 to the Washington Commission for the Blind for vocational rehabilitation services.
- Witters, suffering from a progressive eye condition, was eligible for vocational rehabilitation assistance under the state statute.
- Witters was attending Inland Empire School of the Bible, a private Christian college, and studying the Bible, ethics, speech, and church administration to become a pastor, missionary, or youth director.
- The Washington Commission for the Blind denied Witters aid, relying on an earlier policy statement that the State Constitution forbids the use of public funds to assist individuals pursuing careers or degrees in theology or related areas.
Procedural Posture:
- Larry Witters applied for vocational rehabilitation services from the Washington Commission for the Blind.
- The Commission for the Blind denied Witters' aid application, relying on a state policy statement that the Washington State Constitution forbids public funds for religious instruction.
- A state hearings examiner affirmed the Commission's denial, citing the state constitution's prohibition against the state directly or indirectly supporting a religion.
- An internal administrative appeal upheld the hearings examiner's ruling.
- Witters instituted an action in State Superior Court for review of the administrative decision, which affirmed the denial on state-law grounds.
- The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's decision, but explicitly reserved judgment on the state constitutional issue and based its ruling instead on the Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution, finding that provision of aid to Witters would have the 'primary effect of advancing religion.'
- The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.
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Issue:
Does the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibit the State of Washington from providing vocational rehabilitation assistance to a visually handicapped person studying at a Christian college to become a pastor, missionary, or youth director, when the aid is provided directly to the student and flows to religious institutions only as a result of the student's independent and private choice?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Marshall
No, the Establishment Clause does not prohibit the State of Washington from extending assistance under its vocational rehabilitation program to a blind person studying at a Christian college to become a pastor, missionary, or youth director. Applying the three-part Lemon test, the Court found that the Washington program had an unmistakably secular purpose: to promote the well-being of the visually handicapped through vocational rehabilitation services. Regarding the 'principal or primary effect' prong, the Court concluded that the extension of aid was not barred. The aid is paid directly to the student, and any funds that ultimately flow to religious institutions do so only as a result of the genuinely independent and private choices of the aid recipients. The program is neutrally available 'without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefited,' and is not skewed towards religion or designed to create a financial incentive for sectarian education. Nothing in the record indicated that a significant portion of aid from the program as a whole would flow to religious education. Therefore, the link between the State and the religious school Witters wished to attend was 'highly attenuated,' and the aid did not constitute state support or endorsement of religion prohibited by the Establishment Clause. The Court declined to address the 'entanglement' issue or the Free Exercise Clause claim.
Concurring - Justice White
Agrees with the Court's opinion and judgment that the Washington Supreme Court erred in this case. Justice White states his continued belief that the Court's decisions finding constitutional violations where a State provides aid to private schools or students misconstrues the Establishment Clause and disserves the public interest, but finds that even under those precedents, the Washington Supreme Court's ruling was incorrect. He also aligns with Justice Powell's concurrence regarding the relevance of Mueller v. Allen.
Concurring - Justice Powell
No, the State's program does not have the 'principal or primary effect' of advancing religion. Justice Powell, joined by The Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist, emphasized that Mueller v. Allen strongly supports the Court's result. Mueller established that state programs that are wholly neutral in offering educational assistance to a class defined without reference to religion do not violate the 'principal or primary effect' prong of the Lemon test because any aid to religion results from the private choices of individual beneficiaries. The Washington program, like the one in Mueller, is neutral, with aid not depending on the type of institution (public/private) or career (religious/secular) a student chooses. The analysis should focus on the nature and consequences of the program 'viewed as a whole,' not just its effect in a particular case. He agreed that the program has a secular purpose and that no entanglement challenge was properly raised on the record.
Concurring - Justice O'Connor
No, both the purpose and effect of Washington’s program of aid to handicapped students are secular. Justice O'Connor joined Parts I and III of the Court’s opinion and concurred in the judgment. She specifically agreed with Justice Powell’s argument that Mueller v. Allen makes clear that neutral state programs offering educational assistance, where aid to religion results from beneficiaries’ private decisions, do not violate the 'principal or primary effect' test. She concluded that the aid to religion in this case was the result of Witters’ private choice, and no reasonable observer would infer state endorsement of religion from these facts.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the 'private choice' or 'indirect aid' doctrine in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, emphasizing that government aid programs are permissible if they are neutral, generally available, and distribute aid to individuals who then make independent choices about how to use it, even if those choices lead to religious education. It further clarifies the application of the Lemon test's 'primary effect' prong, aligning it with the principle established in Mueller v. Allen regarding indirect benefits to religious institutions through individual decisions. The decision set a precedent for validating broad-based, neutral government assistance programs that provide benefits directly to individuals, even when some recipients choose to use those benefits at religious institutions, thereby avoiding a 'direct subsidy' classification.
