Witherspoon v. Illinois
391 U.S. 510 (1968)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A sentence of death is unconstitutional if imposed by a jury from which potential jurors were excluded for cause simply because they expressed general objections to the death penalty or had conscientious or religious scruples against it, without first determining if they would be unable to consider imposing it in the specific case.
Facts:
- In 1959, William Witherspoon shot and killed a police officer in Illinois to escape arrest.
- The officer, who was searching a trailer where Witherspoon was hiding, identified Witherspoon before dying.
- At Witherspoon's trial for murder, an Illinois statute allowed the prosecution to challenge for cause any potential juror who stated they had conscientious scruples against capital punishment.
- Pursuant to this statute, the prosecution successfully challenged and removed nearly half of the prospective jurors (47 veniremen).
- Most of these jurors were removed after stating they had general objections or scruples against the death penalty, without being asked whether they would be able to vote for a death sentence in an appropriate case.
- Only five of the 47 explicitly stated they would never vote to impose capital punishment.
- The jury that was ultimately selected from the remaining veniremen convicted Witherspoon of murder and sentenced him to death.
Procedural Posture:
- William Witherspoon was tried for murder in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, which is a state trial court.
- A jury convicted Witherspoon and sentenced him to death.
- The Supreme Court of Illinois, the state's highest court, affirmed the conviction and sentence on direct appeal.
- Witherspoon then filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the state trial court, arguing for the first time that the jury selection process violated his constitutional rights.
- The state trial court dismissed his petition without a hearing.
- Witherspoon appealed the dismissal to the Supreme Court of Illinois, which affirmed the trial court's dismissal.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Illinois Supreme Court's decision.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a state statute that authorizes the exclusion for cause of all prospective jurors who have conscientious scruples against capital punishment violate a capital defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to an impartial jury and due process?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Stewart
Yes. A death sentence cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed it was chosen by excluding potential jurors for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction. The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments entitle a defendant to an impartial jury, and in a capital case, this means a jury that is not 'organized to return a verdict of death.' By removing all jurors who express any doubts about capital punishment, the state creates a 'hanging jury' that is 'uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die,' which fails to represent the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death. The state may only exclude jurors who make it unmistakably clear that they would automatically vote against the death penalty regardless of the evidence or that their views would prevent them from making an impartial decision on guilt.
Dissenting - Justice Black
No. The state's exclusion of jurors with conscientious scruples against capital punishment does not violate the Constitution; rather, it ensures an impartial jury for both the defendant and the state. A juror with strong scruples against the death penalty cannot be indifferent between the state and the accused on the issue of punishment and will seldom, if ever, vote to impose it. The state has a right to a jury that will not be biased against one of the legally available penalties. The majority's holding creates a semantic distinction that will not produce a different kind of jury but will force states to try murder cases with biased juries, effectively making it impossible to enforce the death penalty.
Dissenting - Justice White
No. The Constitution does not prohibit a state legislature from delegating the penalty decision to a specific group of citizens, in this case, those without policy doubts about one of the available punishments. Since a state could constitutionally make death the mandatory penalty for certain crimes, it is also reasonable for a state to ensure the penalty can be imposed by excluding jurors who would never apply it. The Illinois procedure is a sensible legislative act designed to implement the will of the majority while preserving the requirement of unanimous verdicts. The Court's decision is based on a dislike for the death penalty rather than reasoned constitutional analysis.
Analysis:
Witherspoon v. Illinois fundamentally altered the process of jury selection in capital cases by establishing a new constitutional standard for excluding jurors based on their views on the death penalty. It distinguished between a juror's general philosophical opposition and their actual inability to follow the law and consider all sentencing options. This decision created the concept of a 'death-qualified' jury and has since governed the voir dire process in every capital trial, ensuring that juries deciding on life or death represent a broader cross-section of community values. The ruling carefully limited its holding to the sentencing phase, leaving open the question of whether such a jury is biased with respect to determining guilt.
