Wisconsin v. Constantineau
400 U.S. 433 (1971)
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Rule of Law:
When a state attaches a 'badge of infamy' or a damaging label to a person that harms their good name, reputation, honor, or integrity, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the person be given notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Facts:
- A Wisconsin statute, § 176.26, authorized designated officials, including a city's chief of police, to forbid in writing the sale of intoxicating liquors to individuals who engaged in 'excessive drinking'.
- The statute specified that such a prohibition could be enacted if the person's drinking exposed their family to 'want' or made them 'dangerous to the peace' of the community.
- Pursuant to this statute, the chief of police of Hartford, Wisconsin, identified appellee Constantineau as such an individual.
- The chief of police caused a notice to be posted in all retail liquor outlets in Hartford, which forbade the sale or gift of liquors to Constantineau for a period of one year.
- Constantineau was not provided with any form of notice or a hearing before the chief of police posted the prohibition notice.
Procedural Posture:
- Appellee Constantineau filed a lawsuit against the chief of police in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
- The lawsuit sought to have the Wisconsin 'posting' statute declared unconstitutional and requested damages and injunctive relief.
- A three-judge federal district court was convened to hear the constitutional challenge.
- The State of Wisconsin intervened as a defendant to defend the statute's constitutionality.
- The three-judge district court, in a divided decision, held the statute unconstitutional on its face and issued an injunction preventing its enforcement.
- The State of Wisconsin, as the appellant, appealed the district court's decision directly to the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does a state statute that permits government officials to publicly forbid the sale of alcohol to a specific individual, thereby imposing a stigma or 'badge of infamy,' without providing that individual with prior notice and an opportunity to be heard, violate the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Douglas
Yes, the state statute violates the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause. Where a person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential. The act of 'posting' under the Wisconsin statute is not merely a denial of the ability to purchase alcohol; it is an official branding that exposes the individual to public embarrassment and ridicule, constituting a 'badge of infamy.' The Court reasoned that such a governmental act, which condemns an individual to suffer a 'grievous loss' of reputation, triggers the fundamental requirements of procedural due process. Because the Wisconsin statute provided no process at all, it is unconstitutional on its face. The Court also rejected the argument for abstention, finding it inappropriate because the state statute was unambiguous in its lack of any provision for notice and a hearing, thus presenting a clear federal constitutional question.
Dissenting - Chief Justice Burger
The Court should not have reached the constitutional question. The dissent argues that this case is a 'classic illustration' for applying the abstention doctrine, which counsels federal courts to refrain from deciding cases that involve unsettled questions of state law. The Wisconsin statute had never been interpreted by Wisconsin state courts, which might have found it invalid under the state constitution, thereby obviating the need for a federal constitutional ruling. By striking down the statute, the Court bypassed the state judicial system and acted contrary to the principles of federalism and sound judicial administration recently affirmed in cases like Reetz v. Bozanich. The Court should have remanded the case and instructed the federal court to stay its hand until the state courts had an opportunity to resolve the issue.
Dissenting - Justice Black
The Court should have abstained from deciding the case. The dissent agrees with Chief Justice Burger's reasoning, adding that the Wisconsin statute on its face grants such 'arbitrary and tyrannical power' that it is akin to a bill of attainder. It is 'impossible' to believe that the Wisconsin Supreme Court would uphold such a boundless power. Therefore, the meaning of the state law is 'wholly uncertain' because other state law principles, such as administrative procedure rules, might be interpreted by state courts to require notice and a hearing, thereby confining the statute within constitutional limits. The federal courts should not have denied the Wisconsin courts the opportunity to construe their own law.
Analysis:
This case is a foundational decision in procedural due process jurisprudence, particularly concerning reputational harm. It established the principle that a governmental action inflicting a 'stigma' or 'badge of infamy' upon an individual constitutes a deprivation of liberty sufficient to trigger due process protections, even without the loss of a more tangible property interest. Later cases, like Paul v. Davis, would narrow this holding by creating the 'stigma-plus' test, which requires both reputational harm and the deprivation of a separate, more tangible legal right. However, Constantineau remains a key precedent for the idea that the government cannot officially degrade a person's reputation without providing notice and a hearing.
