Winters v. New York
333 U.S. 507 (1948)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A statute that limits freedom of expression is unconstitutionally vague under the Fourteenth Amendment if it fails to provide an ascertainable standard of guilt and fair notice of what conduct is punishable.
Facts:
- New York Penal Law § 1141(2) made it a misdemeanor to possess with intent to sell any publication "devoted to the publication, and principally made up of criminal news, police reports, or accounts of criminal deeds, or pictures, or stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust or crime."
- Murray Winters was a bookdealer operating in New York City.
- Winters possessed magazines, including one titled "Headquarters Detective, True Cases from the Police Blotter," with the intent to sell them in his bookstore.
- These magazines were principally composed of stories and pictures depicting criminal deeds, bloodshed, and lust, falling within the literal language of the New York statute.
- Winters was prosecuted under this statute for possessing the magazines with intent to sell.
Procedural Posture:
- Winters was charged by information and convicted of a misdemeanor in the Court of Special Sessions of the City of New York, a trial court.
- Winters, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, which affirmed the conviction.
- Winters, as appellant, then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, the state's highest court, which also affirmed the conviction.
- Winters then appealed the final judgment of the New York Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court of the United States.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a New York statute that criminalizes the possession and sale of publications "principally made up of criminal news ... or stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust or crime" violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause because it is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Reed
Yes, the New York statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment because it is unconstitutionally vague. A statute limiting freedom of expression must provide a clear and ascertainable standard of guilt. The New York Court of Appeals attempted to save the statute by interpreting it to prohibit collections of stories "so massed as to become vehicles for inciting violent and depraved crimes against the person." However, this judicial gloss does not cure the defect, as the standard of "so massed as to incite to crime" is itself too uncertain. Men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning, making it impossible for a distributor to know when a publication crosses the line from permissible to forbidden. Because the statute lacks a definite standard and fails to give fair notice of what conduct is criminal, it is void for vagueness.
Dissenting - Justice Frankfurter
No, the statute as interpreted by the New York Court of Appeals is not unconstitutionally vague and should be upheld. This law, similar to those in twenty other states, represents a reasonable legislative judgment to combat a perceived social evil—the incitement to crime through certain types of publications. The state court's interpretation, focusing on publications that mass stories of bloodshed and lust to incite violent and depraved crimes, provides a sufficient standard. The law does not target classic literature or scientific treatises but rather a specific category of exploitative material. The Due Process Clause does not require legislative precision to the point of eliminating all uncertainty in application; the law is full of instances where one's fate depends on a jury's estimation of a matter of degree. The Court's decision improperly substitutes its own abstract judgment for that of the legislature on how to address the complex problem of crime prevention.
Analysis:
This case is a cornerstone of the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine as applied to the First Amendment. It establishes that when a statute regulates speech, it must be exceptionally clear to avoid a "chilling effect" on constitutionally protected expression. The ruling forces legislatures to draft laws with narrow specificity, ensuring that individuals have fair warning of what is prohibited and preventing arbitrary enforcement. The decision demonstrates that even if the government is targeting unprotected speech (like incitement), the legal mechanism it uses cannot be so broad or unclear that it endangers protected speech in the process.
Unlock the full brief for Winters v. New York