Wilson v. People

Supreme Court of Colorado
87 P.2d 5 (1939)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

An individual who participates in the commission of a felony lacks the requisite criminal intent to be guilty as an accomplice if they acted as a feigned accomplice with the sole purpose of detecting the crime and apprehending the principal felon.


Facts:

  • On February 19, 1938, a wrist watch belonging to Wilson disappeared while he was in the company of Dwight J. Pierce.
  • Wilson repeatedly accused Pierce of stealing the watch, leading to a heated argument.
  • During their time together, Pierce began bragging about past burglaries he had committed.
  • The idea to burglarize Hecker Brothers' Drugstore originated with Pierce.
  • Wilson physically assisted Pierce in gaining entry to the drugstore by boosting him up to a transom window.
  • Immediately after Pierce entered the store, Wilson ran to his father's office and telephoned the police, reporting a burglary in progress at the drugstore.
  • When police arrived, Wilson immediately informed them that Pierce was inside the store and admitted to helping him get in.
  • Wilson then helped the police track down Pierce and identified him as the burglar, later stating his motive was to get even for the stolen watch and catch Pierce in the act.

Procedural Posture:

  • Wilson was charged in a state trial court with unlawfully aiding and abetting Dwight J. Pierce in the commission of a burglary and larceny.
  • At the conclusion of the prosecution's evidence, the trial court denied Wilson's motion for a nonsuit.
  • At the conclusion of all evidence, the trial court denied Wilson's motion for a directed verdict of not guilty.
  • The jury returned a verdict convicting Wilson on both counts.
  • Wilson (as plaintiff in error) appealed the judgment of conviction to the state's highest court.

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Issue:

Does a person who provides physical assistance in the commission of a burglary possess the requisite felonious intent to be convicted as an accomplice if their stated purpose for participating was to act as a decoy to ensure the apprehension of the other party?


Opinions:

Majority - Mr. Justice Bock

No, a person who provides physical assistance in a burglary does not possess the requisite felonious intent if their purpose was to act as a decoy. For an individual to be guilty as an accomplice, they must share the same criminal intent as the principal perpetrator. The court reasoned that one who participates in a felony as a feigned accomplice in order to entrap the other is not criminally liable because the essential element of a malicious determination to violate the law is absent. The trial court's jury instruction, which stated that one must 'stop short of lending assistance,' was erroneous because it improperly removed the question of Wilson's felonious intent from the jury's consideration. The jury must be allowed to determine whether the assistance was given with felonious intent or for the purpose of detection.



Analysis:

This decision reinforces the foundational criminal law principle of mens rea, or a 'guilty mind,' confirming that a defendant's subjective intent is paramount to a finding of criminal liability. The court distinguishes the 'feigned accomplice' or 'decoy' defense from the defense of entrapment, clarifying that a private citizen can feign complicity to apprehend a criminal without being guilty themselves. This precedent ensures that juries must consider the defendant's motive and intent, not merely their physical actions, when determining guilt in accomplice liability cases. It protects individuals who assist law enforcement, or act on their own, to expose criminal activity.

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