No. That kind of rule is not allowed. When you get full 'fee simple' ownership of property, one of the most important rights you get is the right to sell it to whomever you want. This deed's rule, by saying only the new owner and their family can use it as a home forever, makes it impossible for them to ever sell it. The court said that the 'rule to use it as a home' and the 'right to sell it' can't exist at the same time. Because the right to sell is so important to property ownership, the restrictive rule is thrown out and considered invalid.

No, the rule is not allowed because it basically stops the buyer from ever selling the property by saying the buyer and their family have to use it as a home forever. When you sell a property completely, you can't make a rule that says the new owner can't sell it. Even though the rule doesn't directly say the buyer can't sell, making them use it as a home forever means the same thing. So, the rule is not valid. The seller's request to take back the property because the buyer broke the rule doesn't make sense under the law. The lower court made a mistake by not agreeing with the buyer.

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<opinion type="majority">
<author id="b436-8">
 Atkinson, Presiding Justice.
 </author>

 (After stating the foregoing facts.) The granting clause in the deed under consideration was: “In consideration of the sum of one dollar to me paid, I . . do hereby sell and convey to [the grantee and,] . . his heirs, a tract or parcel of land and appurtenances in fee simple.” Then followed a description of the land, after which the grantor inserted the provision that the property was to be used as a home by the grantee, his family, and his heirs, and that upon the abandonment of the property as a residence by the grantee, his family, or his heirs, the same should revert to the grantor’s estate and go as provided in his will.
 

 Standing alone, the first clause in the deed would have conveyed an unconditional fee-simple estate, and the sole question for determination is whether or not the condition subsequent under which the forfeiture is claimed is valid and enforceable.
 

 A provision in a deed or will that a fee-simple estate may not be sold is void as being repugnant to the estate granted. Code, § 85-903;
 
 Freeman
 
 v.
 
 Phillips,
 
 113
 
 Ga.
 
 589 (38 S. E. 943);
 
 Crumpler
 
 v.
 
 Barfield &amp; Wilson Co.,
 
 114
 
 Ga.
 
 570 (40 S. E. 808);
 
 Stamey
 
 v.
 
 McGinnis,
 
 145
 
 Ga.
 
 226 (88 S. E. 935);
 
 Leach
 
 v.
 
 *419
 

 Stephens,
 
 159
 
 Ga.
 
 193 (125 S. E. 192);
 
 Farkas
 
 v.
 
 Farkas,
 
 200
 
 Ga.
 
 886 (2), (38 S. E. 2d, 924).
 

 While no express language is used in the present deed inhibiting alienation of the property, nevertheless—the condition being that the property was to be used as a home by the grantee, his family, and his heirs-—-the requirement to use as a home and the right to sell are mutually exclusive, and whether or not the case falls within the rule against perpetuities, the conclusion is inescapable that since the grantee and his heirs must use the premises as a home they cannot sell it.
 

 The instant case is distinguished by its facts from
 
 Wadley Lumber Co.
 
 v.
 
 Lott,
 
 130
 
 Ga.
 
 135 (1), (60 S. E. 836), where the condition subsequent was that the grantor reserved the right to repurchase the land, and
 
 Blevins
 
 v.
 
 Pittman,
 
 189
 
 Ga.
 
 789 (2a), (7 S. E. 2d, 662), where the the restriction against alienation was limited to one person and her children.
 

 A different question would have been presented if the condition subsequent had been that the premises should be used “as a home” or “for residential purposes” generally. See, in this connection,
 
 City of Barnesville
 
 v.
 
 Stafford,
 
 161
 
 Ga.
 
 588 (1), (131 S. E. 487, 43 A. L. R. 1045),
 
 Taylor
 
 v.
 
 Bird,
 
 150
 
 Ga.
 
 626 (104 S. E. 502),
 
 Rustin
 
 v.
 
 Butler,
 
 195
 
 Ga.
 
 389, (24 S. E. 2d, 318),
 
 Williams
 
 v.
 
 Ramey,
 
 201
 
 Ga.
 
 737 (1), (41 S. E. 2d, 159),
 
 Tabor
 
 v.
 
 Gilmer County,
 
 205
 
 Ga.
 
 439 (1), (53 S. E. 2d, 915), and similar cases, where' conditions subsequent requiring use of property generally for park, school, religious, and courthouse purposes were held valid and enforceable.
 

 Accordingly, the present petition, seeking to enforce a forfeiture for breach of a void condition subsequent, failed to set forth a cause of action, and the trial court erred in overruling the defendants’ general demurrer.
 


 Judgment reversed.
 

<judges id="AZsv">

 All the Justices concur.
 
</judges>
</opinion>

No. A condition subsequent in a fee simple deed requiring the property to be used exclusively as a home by the grantee and his heirs is an invalid and unenforceable restraint on alienation. The law voids any provision in a fee simple conveyance that prohibits the sale of the property, as it is repugnant to the estate granted. While this deed does not explicitly forbid alienation, the requirement that the property must always be used as a home by the grantee and his heirs is 'mutually exclusive' with the right to sell it. Therefore, this use restriction is an indirect but absolute restraint on alienation and is void. The court distinguished this from valid general use restrictions, such as for 'residential purposes' or 'for a park,' which do not tie ownership and use to a specific family line indefinitely.

No, the condition subsequent is not valid and enforceable because it effectively prohibits the sale of the property by requiring that the grantee and his heirs must use the premises as a home, which is mutually exclusive with the right to sell an estate granted in fee simple. A provision in a deed that a fee-simple estate may not be sold is void as being repugnant to the estate granted. While no express language inhibits alienation, the requirement to use as a home and the right to sell are mutually exclusive. Therefore, since the grantee and his heirs must use the premises as a home, they cannot sell it. The condition subsequent is void, and the petition seeking to enforce a forfeiture for its breach fails to set forth a cause of action. The trial court erred in overruling the defendants' general demurrer.

Wills v. Pierce

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