Williams v. Wilson
972 S.W.2d 260 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
The Kentucky Constitution's jural rights doctrine, derived from Sections 14, 54, and 241, prohibits the state legislature from abolishing or substantially impairing common law rights of action for personal injury that were well-established prior to the adoption of the 1891 Constitution. A statute that significantly elevates the standard for recovering punitive damages from objective gross negligence to requiring proof of subjective awareness of harm constitutes an unconstitutional impairment of such a right.
Facts:
- On May 18, 1990, Patricia Lynn Herald Wilson was driving to her job as a school teacher.
- Williams, who was intoxicated, was driving another vehicle and struck Wilson's car at an intersection in Lexington.
- At the scene of the accident, Williams was arrested and charged with Driving Under the Influence (DUI).
- Williams subsequently pled guilty to the DUI charge in Fayette District Court.
Procedural Posture:
- Patricia Lynn Herald Wilson sued Williams in the Fayette Circuit Court for compensatory and punitive damages.
- At the close of evidence at trial, Williams objected to a punitive damages instruction, arguing Wilson failed to present evidence meeting the standard of KRS 411.184.
- The trial court initially agreed the statutory standard was not met but then, upon Wilson's motion, declared KRS 411.184 unconstitutional.
- The trial court instructed the jury on punitive damages using the pre-statute, common law standard of gross negligence, and the jury returned a verdict for Wilson.
- Williams, the defendant, appealed the judgment to the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling that the statute was unconstitutional but vacated the punitive damages award and remanded for a new trial on that issue.
- The Kentucky Supreme Court granted Williams' motion for discretionary review to consider the constitutionality of KRS 411.184.
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Issue:
Does Kentucky statute KRS 411.184, which raises the standard for awarding punitive damages from common law 'gross negligence' to requiring proof of 'subjective awareness' of likely harm, violate the Kentucky Constitution's jural rights doctrine by impermissibly impairing a common law right of action that existed before 1891?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Lambert
Yes. The statute violates the Kentucky Constitution because it unconstitutionally impairs a common law right of action protected by the jural rights doctrine. The right to recover punitive damages for grossly negligent conduct was a well-established common law right in Kentucky prior to the adoption of the 1891 Constitution. The new statute's requirement of proving a defendant's 'subjective awareness' that their conduct will result in harm is a 'vastly elevated standard' and a 'clear departure' from the traditional objective standard of gross negligence. The jural rights doctrine, derived from interpreting Sections 14, 54, and 241 of the Constitution together, was intended to prohibit the Legislature from abolishing or impairing such fundamental rights of recovery, and this statute effectively does so by making the standard of proof prohibitively high.
Dissenting - Justice Cooper
No. The statute does not violate the Kentucky Constitution and should be upheld. First, the statute does not abolish the right to punitive damages; it merely establishes standards for its application, which is a proper legislative function. The 'subjective awareness' standard can be inferred from circumstantial evidence, such as the act of driving while intoxicated, and does not require the defendant's direct testimony. Second, the entire jural rights doctrine is a judicial invention with no basis in the text, history, or debates of the 1891 Constitution; in fact, Section 233 of the Constitution explicitly grants the General Assembly the power to alter or repeal the common law. By striking down the statute, the court is usurping the legislature's constitutional authority to set public policy.
Concurring - Chief Justice Stephens
Yes. While reluctantly concurring with the majority's result, the concurrence expresses grave doubts about the constitutional validity of the jural rights doctrine itself. The principle of stare decisis—adherence to precedent—compels agreement with the majority for the sake of legal stability. However, the dissent's argument that the doctrine is a judicial creation with little constitutional basis is powerful and persuasive. The Court should, in the future, engage in extensive debate to reconsider this long-standing but constitutionally questionable doctrine.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms and strengthens the jural rights doctrine as a significant barrier to legislative tort reform in Kentucky. It clarifies that a right of action is unconstitutionally infringed not only by outright abolishment but also by statutory changes that substantially impair the ability to recover, such as by drastically elevating the standard of proof. The case creates a strong precedent protecting common law remedies from legislative interference. However, the forceful dissent and the reluctant concurrence reveal a deep schism within the court over the doctrine's legitimacy, signaling that its foundational principles could be vulnerable to future constitutional challenges.
