Williams v. McCoy

Appellate Court of Illinois
152 Ill. App. 3d 912, 105 Ill. Dec. 920, 505 N.E.2d 46 (1987)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

A person acting in a parental capacity (in loco parentis) has a duty to control a minor child to prevent harm to others only if they know or should have known of the child's specific propensity to cause such harm and have an opportunity to exercise control.

Facts:

Geraldine Porter was one of the baby-sitters for six-year-old Billy McCoy.
On September 27, 1978, five-year-old John Williams visited Billy McCoy after school.
The two boys eventually went to Billy McCoy's own house, not the baby-sitter's home.
Inside Billy's house, Billy took a shotgun shell from his father's dresser and loaded a shotgun.
Billy allegedly dropped the shotgun on a bed, causing it to discharge.
Pellets from the shotgun blast struck John Williams in the upper arm, causing significant injuries.
There was no evidence that Geraldine Porter had any prior knowledge that Billy McCoy had a propensity for playing with firearms or engaging in similar dangerous activities.

Procedural Posture:

John Williams, by his mother, filed a negligence lawsuit against Geraldine Porter and others in the circuit court of Bureau County (trial court).
Defendant-appellee Porter filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing she owed no legal duty to Williams.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Porter.
Plaintiff-appellant Williams appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Illinois Appellate Court.

Premium Content

Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief

You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture

Issue:

Does a person acting in loco parentis, such as a baby-sitter, owe a duty to a third party injured by the child's actions when the baby-sitter had no knowledge of any prior similar dangerous acts or propensities of the child?

Opinions:

Majority - Justice Stouder

No. A person acting in loco parentis does not owe a duty to a third party injured by a child's actions without knowledge of the child's dangerous propensities. The general rule in Illinois is that parents are not liable for the torts of their children merely due to the parent-child relationship. An exception exists, based on Section 316 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, where a duty to control a child arises if the parent knows they have the ability to control the child and knows or should know of the 'necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.' The court interpreted the 'necessity' element to require knowledge of a specific dangerous propensity. In this case, unlike in precedents such as Duncan v. Rzonca, the defendant-appellee had no notice or knowledge of any previous similar dangerous acts by the child. Therefore, the exception does not apply, and no duty was owed to the plaintiff.

Analysis:

This decision reinforces the narrow scope of parental liability for the torts of their children in Illinois, extending the same principle to those acting in loco parentis. It solidifies that for a duty to control to arise, the harm must be foreseeable in a specific way, meaning the parent or caregiver must have notice of the child's particular dangerous tendency. This precedent makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to succeed in negligent supervision claims, as they must prove not just a failure to supervise, but a failure to act on known, specific risks posed by a particular child. The ruling protects caregivers from liability for sudden, unforeseeable actions of children in their care.

Gunnerbot

AI-powered case assistant

Loaded: Williams v. McCoy (1987)

Try: "What was the holding?" or "Explain the dissent"

Premium Feature