Williams v. Johnson
1989 Wyo. LEXIS 219, 781 P.2d 922, 1989 WL 129900 (1989)
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Rule of Law:
Under Wyoming common law, to hold a dog owner liable under either a strict liability or negligence theory for injuries caused by their animal, the plaintiff must prove that the owner knew or had reason to know of the animal's potentially harmful propensities.
Facts:
- Thomas Williams was a mail carrier delivering mail in a Cheyenne neighborhood.
- Jennifer Johnson owned two dogs with her husband, Daniel Johnson.
- Jennifer Johnson released the two dogs from the garage into their unfenced front yard.
- The dogs ran to the porch of an adjacent house where Williams was delivering mail.
- The dogs attacked Williams on the neighbor's porch, though they did not physically touch him.
- Frightened by the attack, Williams attempted to evade the dogs and in doing so, twisted and seriously injured his knee.
Procedural Posture:
- Thomas Williams sued Daniel and Jennifer Johnson in a Wyoming district court (trial court) seeking compensation for his knee injury.
- The Johnsons filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing they were not liable because they had no knowledge of their dogs' dangerous propensities.
- The district court granted the Johnsons' motion for summary judgment.
- The court ruled that as a matter of law, Williams was required to show that the Johnsons had knowledge of the dangerous propensities of their dogs to succeed.
- Williams (appellant) appealed the summary judgment to the Supreme Court of Wyoming.
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Issue:
Does Wyoming common law require a plaintiff to show that a dog owner had knowledge of their animal's dangerous propensities to hold the owner liable for injuries caused by the dog under theories of strict liability or negligence?
Opinions:
Majority - Cardine, Chief Justice
Yes, Wyoming common law requires a plaintiff to show that a dog owner had knowledge of their animal's dangerous propensities to hold the owner liable. The court recognizes two relevant common law theories: strict liability for an animal with known vicious propensities, and negligence for failing to control an animal with other known harmful propensities. Both theories require the plaintiff to prove the owner's knowledge (scienter) of the specific propensity that created a foreseeable risk of harm. In this case, Williams failed to present any facts showing that the Johnsons knew their dogs were dangerous. His attempt to raise a new theory on appeal based on a municipal ordinance was procedurally improper because it was not raised at the trial court, where he relied solely on common law theories.
Dissenting - Urbigkit, Justice
No, a claim for ordinary negligence in controlling an animal does not require the plaintiff to show the owner had knowledge of the animal's dangerous propensities. The majority improperly conflates the scienter requirement of strict liability with the separate tort of ordinary negligence. An owner can be held liable for ordinary negligence simply by failing to exercise reasonable care in controlling their animal, regardless of any known viciousness. The dissent argues that releasing two large dogs into an unfenced front yard could constitute negligence, and whether this act created a foreseeable risk of harm is a question of fact that should have been decided by a jury, making summary judgment inappropriate.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms the traditional common law requirement of scienter (knowledge of dangerous propensity) for animal liability cases in Wyoming, drawing a sharp line between common law claims and those based on statutory or ordinance violations. The ruling solidifies the principle that absent a statute to the contrary, an owner is not liable for an animal's harmful acts without prior knowledge of its dangerousness. It also serves as a strong procedural precedent, reinforcing the rule that litigants cannot introduce new theories of recovery on appeal that were not presented to the trial court.
