No, this was fair. The expert wasn't trying to prove the Cellmark report was true. She was just saying, 'Based on the information in this report, I formed my own expert opinion that the DNA matches.' Also, the report wasn't like a witness pointing a finger at Williams. It was made to help find a mystery attacker, not to build a case against someone the police already suspected. Therefore, it wasn't 'testimony' that would require the author to show up in court.

No, this was fair. He agreed with the main opinion but added that court rules for complex science like DNA need to be practical. It's not realistic to bring every single lab tech to court for every test. As long as the lab is reliable, their reports should generally be allowed.

No, but for a different reason. He thinks the expert *was* basically saying the report was true. But, the Cellmark report wasn't 'official' enough to count as testimony. It wasn't a sworn statement or a formal certificate, so it didn't trigger the right to confront the person who wrote it.

Yes, this was totally unfair. The expert's testimony is only useful if the Cellmark report is true, so of course she was presenting it as truth. This is just a sneaky trick to get evidence into a trial without letting the defense lawyers question the person who created it. Williams should have had the right to question the Cellmark scientist to check for mistakes or problems with their work.

The way the expert talked about the DNA test in court is allowed because she wasn't using the test results to directly prove the crime. The court's decision to use her testimony is okay. The Cellmark report wasn't meant to accuse Williams directly, so it's not the kind of statement that the Sixth Amendment is worried about. Even if the report itself had been used as evidence, it would have been okay because it's not the type of statement the Sixth Amendment covers, since it was made before any suspect was identified and was meant to find an unknown rapist, not to get evidence against Williams.

Using the expert's words in court without letting Williams question the person who did the DNA test goes against his rights. The court's decision is confusing and doesn't protect these rights properly. The expert's testimony was basically the same as testimony the Court said was unconstitutional in another case. The expert relied on Cellmark's statements being true, even though she didn't personally know they were. The argument that Cellmark's statements were used only to explain the expert's opinion, not for their truth, is just a sneaky way for prosecutors to avoid the Sixth Amendment.

I agree with the concerns about the court's main decision, but I think the law should focus on whether the DNA test was done in a serious and formal way, which would make it trustworthy. Statements like Cellmark's might not be covered by the Sixth Amendment under that view. But since it's a close question and the main opinions have issues, the case should be reargued to figure out how the Sixth Amendment applies to crime lab reports.

Using Cellmark's statements in the expert's testimony didn't violate the Sixth Amendment only because those statements weren't formal and serious enough to count. The Cellmark report is different from the lab reports in some other cases because it's not a sworn or certified statement of fact. But the main opinion's reasoning is flawed and could weaken Sixth Amendment protections when experts discuss formal witness statements to explain their opinions.

The Confrontation Clause "has no application to out-of-court statements that are not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted."

A plurality of the Supreme Court held in Williams that a Confrontation Clause violation had not occurred because the expert witness' testimony had not sought to establish the truth of the facts on which she relied in forming her opinion.

Likewise, the plurality concluded that the Cellmark report was not testimonial because it "was not prepared for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual,"

Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment on the basis that the evidence was admissible "solely because [the report] lacked the requisite `formality and solemnity'to be considered `testimonial'for the purposes of the Confrontation Clause. "

The expert witness testified that a DNA profile produced by an outside laboratory (Cellmark) from a rape victim's vaginal swabs matched the defendant's DNA profile produced by a state police lab from the defendant's blood sample.

Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment in Williams and "agree [d] with the plurality that the disclosure of Cellmark's out-of-court statements through the expert testimony*** did not violate the Confrontation Clause."

—concluding that "[o] ut of court statements that are related by the expert solely for the purpose of explaining the assumptions on which that opinion rests are not offered for their truth and thus fall outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause

—the Supreme Court addressed an issue similar to one of the issues presented in this case, concerning the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.

Justice Alito, in a plurality opinion that announced the judgment of the court but was joined only by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy and Breyer

But in Smith, this Court concluded that "[e] xpert testimony that discusses reports and opinions of another is admissible under [Arizona Rule of Evidence 703] if the expert reasonably relied on these matters in reaching his own conclusion."

No. An expert's testimony relying on a DNA profile prepared by a non-testifying analyst does not violate the Confrontation Clause under these circumstances. The Court provided two independent reasons for its holding. First, the out-of-court statements from the Cellmark report were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Instead, they were used by the expert, Sandra Lambatos, to explain the underlying assumptions and basis for her own expert opinion. Citing the logic of Federal Rule of Evidence 703, the Court reasoned that in a bench trial, the judge is presumed to understand this limited, non-hearsay purpose and will not consider the underlying report for its truth. Second, even if the report had been introduced for its truth, it was not 'testimonial' under the Confrontation Clause. The report's primary purpose, when viewed objectively, was not to accuse a targeted individual, but to help police catch a dangerous and unknown rapist who was still at large. This distinguishes it from the reports in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, which were prepared for the purpose of proving a fact against an already-identified defendant.

No. Justice Breyer joined the plurality opinion in full but wrote separately to reiterate his dissenting views in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming. He highlighted the significant practical challenges of applying the Confrontation Clause to modern forensic reports, which often involve the work of numerous technicians. He argued for a more flexible approach that would presumptively allow the introduction of DNA reports from accredited laboratories, with the defendant retaining the right to call technicians as witnesses if there is a specific reason to question the lab's competence or neutrality.

No. The disclosure of Cellmark's out-of-court statements did not violate the Confrontation Clause, but for a different reason than the plurality's. Justice Thomas rejected the plurality's 'not-for-the-truth' rationale, agreeing with the dissent that the statements were effectively introduced for their truth. He also rejected the plurality's 'targeted individual' test. Instead, he concluded that the Confrontation Clause only applies to 'formalized testimonial materials' bearing indicia of solemnity. Because the Cellmark report was neither sworn nor certified, it lacked the requisite formality to be considered 'testimonial' and therefore fell outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause.

Yes. This testimony violated the Confrontation Clause. This case is a straightforward application of Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, where the Court held that a defendant has the right to confront the analyst who performed the forensic testing. The State introduced the substance of Cellmark's findings through a 'surrogate' witness, Lambatos, who had no personal knowledge of the testing process. The plurality's argument that the report was not offered for its truth is a 'sheer fiction' because the expert's conclusion is meaningless unless the underlying facts from the report are true; this rationale creates a 'prosecutorial dodge' to evade the Confrontation Clause. Furthermore, the plurality's new 'targeted individual' test for what constitutes a testimonial statement is an invention without basis in precedent. The Cellmark report was clearly prepared for an evidentiary purpose—to establish the identity of the rapist for a future criminal prosecution—and was therefore testimonial.

The form of expert testimony given in this case does not violate the Confrontation Clause because the references to Cellmark in the trial record were not hearsay or were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. The judgment is affirmed. The Cellmark report was not testimonial because it was not prepared for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual. Even if the report had been admitted into evidence, there would have been no Confrontation Clause violation because it is not the kind of extrajudicial statement the Clause was designed to reach, as it was produced before any suspect was identified and was sought not for the purpose of obtaining evidence against petitioner, but for the purpose of finding a rapist who was still at large.

The introduction of testimony at Williams' trial that referenced the results of forensic testing performed by non-testifying analysts violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The majority's decision undermines the protections provided by the Confrontation Clause and creates confusion in the law. Lambatos' testimony was functionally identical to the 'surrogate testimony' that was found unconstitutional in Bullcoming v. New Mexico. Lambatos did not have personal knowledge that the DNA profile Cellmark produced came from the victim's vaginal swabs, yet the validity of her testimony relied on the truth of that fact. The argument that Cellmark's statements were offered not for their truth but only to explain the basis of Lambatos' opinion is nothing more than a prosecutorial dodge to evade the Confrontation Clause.

While agreeing with the dissent's view of the plurality's flawed analysis, the proper solution to the problem is to adopt a reading of the Confrontation Clause that respects its historically limited application to a narrow class of statements bearing indicia of solemnity. Statements like those in the Cellmark report may fall outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause under such an approach. However, because the question is close and the plurality and dissent's approaches are flawed, the case should be reargued to address how the Confrontation Clause applies to crime lab reports.

The disclosure of Cellmark's out-of-court statements through Lambatos' expert testimony did not violate the Confrontation Clause solely because Cellmark's statements lacked the requisite 'formality and solemnity' to be considered 'testimonial.' The Cellmark report is distinguishable from the laboratory reports found testimonial in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming because it is neither a sworn nor a certified declaration of fact. However, the plurality's flawed analysis, which relies on an unworkable primary purpose test, diminishes the Confrontation Clause's protections where experts convey the contents of formalized testimonial statements to explain the bases for their opinions.

Williams v. Illinois

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