No, Florida's rules were okay. The Court said making Williams share his alibi information early didn't force him to testify against himself; it just sped up a process that would happen during the trial anyway. As for the jury, the Court decided that the number 12 was just a historical accident and isn't strictly required by the Constitution. As long as the jury is big enough to have a real discussion and represent the community, six is enough.

No, and in fact, the alibi rule is a good idea. It helps the legal system work faster. If the alibi is good, the prosecutor might drop the case. If it's fake, the defendant might just plead guilty. Either way, it saves time and gets to the truth faster.

The 6-person jury is fine, but the alibi rule is not. The right to remain silent means the government has to prove its case all by itself. Forcing a defendant to give the government any information that could help convict them is totally against what the Constitution says.

The alibi rule is fine, but the 6-person jury is not. For over 70 years, courts have said the Constitution requires a 12-person jury. States should have to follow that same rule. The Court shouldn't just change the meaning of a fundamental right.

No, Florida's law can stay, but the Court's reasoning is wrong. The U.S. government should have to use 12-person juries. But we shouldn't force every state to follow the exact same rules as the federal government. States need freedom to do things their own way, so Florida's 6-person jury is okay for Florida.

No, I agree with Justice Harlan. Applying every detail of the Bill of Rights to the states is a mistake. It either handcuffs the states or, like today, weakens important rights for everyone. Florida's law is fine because states should be allowed some flexibility.

The court's decision says that the rule about sharing alibi witnesses doesn't make someone admit they're guilty, so it's not against the Constitution. Also, it's fine to have only six people in a jury to decide if someone is guilty in court, because the Constitution doesn't say it has to be 12 people. The key part of a jury is the common sense and decision-making of a group of regular people from the community. The rule helps make sure the trial is fair by letting both sides check out important facts before the trial.

Chief Justice Burger agreed with the decision and said the alibi witness rule has an extra benefit. It could help end cases without a trial sometimes. If the prosecutor looks into the alibi witnesses and finds they're truthful, they might take another look at the case and drop the charges. But if the alibi seems made up, the defense lawyer might have to rethink the case and try to make a deal instead of going to trial.

Justice Black agreed about the six-person jury but strongly disagreed about the alibi witness rule. He thought it went against the Constitution's protection that says you don't have to give evidence against yourself. Black said the rule wrongly forces a defendant to share information to help the government prove them guilty, when they should have the absolute right to stay silent unless they choose to testify.

Justice Harlan disagreed with the Court's approach of applying the Bill of Rights to the states in the same way as the federal government. He thought this would water down constitutional protections in federal courts to accommodate differences among states. Harlan would have allowed both Florida's and New York's rules, arguing that the Constitution doesn't force federal rules on states in the exact same way.

Justice Stewart says he feels mixed about the decision. He likes it because using fewer jurors can help courts work faster, but he worries because having less than 12 jurors might not protect a defendant as well. He explains his view by saying that while a smaller group can make the process quicker because there is less delay, a full 12-person jury is important because it has always been seen as a key way to keep trials fair.

Justice Marshall disagreed in part. He agreed about the alibi witness rule but thought the Constitution gave Williams the right to a jury of 12 people before he could be sent to prison for life. Marshall believed the Constitution requires juries to have 12 people, no more and no less, in both federal and state cases.

"Given the purpose, the essential feature of a jury obviously lies in the interposition between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen, and in the community participation and shared responsibility that results from that group's determination of guilt or innocence."

In Williams the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant's privilege against self-incrimination was not violated by a pretrial discovery requirement that he "give notice of an alibi defense and disclose his alibi witnesses."

—the Court indicated that trial by a jury of 12 is not the "substantial right" it earlier had been assumed to be, saying

—the United States Supreme Court held that six-person juries in state criminal trials did not violate the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Juries historically were composed of twelve individuals, but the Supreme Court has held that juries of six or more satisfy the Sixth Amendment.

—stating that juries must be selected so as "to provide a fair possibility for obtaining a representative cross-section of the community

We find ample room in that system, at least as far as "due process" is concerned, for the [alibi witness disclosure] rule, which is designed to enhance the search for truth in the criminal trial by insuring both the defendant and the State ample opportunity to investigate certain facts crucial to the determination of guilt or innocence.

Gary J. Jacobsohn, “Citizen Participation in Policy-Making: The Role of the Jury,” Journal of Politics 39 (February 1977): 73–96; and Hans and Vidmar, Judging the Jury, pp. 31–37.

And it comes not from the sort of illegitimate compulsion or economic sanctions that the Supreme Court has condemned but from "the force of historical fact [s]" related to the defendant's conduct and "the strength of the State's case built on these facts."

Since there has been shown to be "no discernable difference between the results reached by the two different-sized juries,"

No. A state rule that requires pre-trial notice of an alibi defense and provides for a six-person jury in a non-capital felony case does not violate the Constitution. The notice-of-alibi rule does not compel self-incrimination because it merely accelerates the disclosure of information the defendant intended to reveal at trial anyway; it does not force the defendant to choose between silence and presenting a defense. The Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a 'trial by jury' does not immutably require a 12-person panel. The number 12 is a historical accident, not a feature essential to the jury's purpose, which is to interpose a body of laymen between the accused and the state to prevent government oppression. A six-person jury is large enough to promote group deliberation, provide a representative community cross-section, and ensure the reliability of the fact-finding process.

No. The notice-of-alibi rule has the added benefit of promoting judicial efficiency. It allows the prosecutor to investigate the alibi, which may lead to a re-evaluation of the case and potentially the dismissal of charges if the alibi is credible. Conversely, if the alibi is found to be fabricated, it may encourage the defendant to enter a guilty plea, thus resolving the case without a full trial and moving away from the 'sporting contest' idea of criminal justice.

No as to the jury size, but Yes as to the alibi rule. While a six-person jury is consistent with the Sixth Amendment, the notice-of-alibi rule violates the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against compelled self-incrimination. This rule forces a defendant to disclose information to the State so that the State can use that information to convict them. The Bill of Rights places the entire burden of proving a case on the State, and a defendant has an absolute right to remain silent and not assist the prosecution in any way.

No as to the alibi rule, but Yes as to the jury size. While joining the Court's holding on the notice-of-alibi rule, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees state defendants the same trial by jury that federal defendants receive under the Sixth Amendment. The jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment is, and has historically been understood to be, a jury of twelve persons, 'neither more nor less.' The Court provides no convincing reason to overrule over 70 years of precedent establishing this requirement.

No. The Court reaches the right result in upholding Florida's law, but its reasoning is flawed because it dilutes the meaning of the Sixth Amendment for the federal system. The proper approach is not to apply the Bill of Rights 'jot-for-jot' to the states through the incorporation doctrine. The Sixth Amendment does require a 12-person jury in federal trials, but the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment should be interpreted more flexibly to allow states like Florida the 'elbow room' to experiment with their own criminal justice systems, including using six-person juries.

No. I agree with Justice Harlan that the 'incorporation' doctrine is incorrect as a matter of constitutional law. Forcing the Bill of Rights onto the states either imposes intolerable restrictions on the states or, as seen here, intolerably relaxes the explicit restrictions placed on the federal government. Florida's law should be upheld based on a flexible due process analysis, not by reinterpreting the Sixth Amendment to mean something less than it has for centuries.

The Fifth Amendment is not violated by the notice-of-alibi rule because it does not compel a defendant to testify against himself, but merely requires pretrial notice of the defense. A six-member jury satisfies the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a trial by jury, as the Constitution does not specify that a jury must consist of 12 persons. The essential feature of a jury is the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen and the community participation and shared responsibility that results from that group's determination of guilt or innocence. The Court also emphasized the importance of the alibi witness disclosure rule in enhancing the search for truth in the criminal trial by ensuring both the defendant and the State have ample opportunity to investigate facts crucial to the determination of guilt or innocence.

Chief Justice Burger concurred, seeing an added benefit to the notice-of-alibi rule in that it will serve important functions by way of disposing of cases without trial in appropriate circumstances. The prosecutor upon receiving notice will investigate prospective alibi witnesses, and if they are reliable, will likely re-examine the case and possibly dismiss charges. On the other hand, inquiry into a claimed alibi defense may reveal it to be contrived, obliging defense counsel to re-examine the case and possibly seek withdrawal or a plea deal.

Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas, concurred in part and dissented in part. Black agreed with the decision on six-person juries but strongly dissented on the notice-of-alibi rule, viewing it as a violation of the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination. Black argued that the rule impermissibly compels a defendant to disclose information to help the State convict him, and that a defendant has an absolute right to remain silent unless he chooses to testify.

Justice Harlan dissented in Baldwin and concurred in the result in Williams. Harlan criticized the Court's 'incorporation' approach to the Fourteenth Amendment, arguing it would dilute constitutional protections in federal courts in order to accommodate the diversity of state practices. Harlan would have upheld both the Florida and New York rules on the basis that the Fourteenth Amendment does not rigidly impose federal requirements on the states.

Justice Stewart, concurring in part and dissenting in part, affirms the Court’s judgment because a smaller jury can enhance administrative efficiency in overburdened courts. However, he dissents from the abandonment of the traditional 12-member jury because such a reduction undermines a time-honored safeguard ensuring a fair trial. He explains that while judicial streamlining is desirable because it accelerates proceedings, the full protection afforded by a 12-member jury is crucial because it better reflects community judgment and preserves constitutional rights. In this way, his view diverges from the majority’s approach because he insists that efficiency must not compromise fundamental historic protections.

Marshall dissented in part, agreeing with the majority on the notice-of-alibi rule but arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed Williams a jury of 12 to pass upon the question of his guilt or innocence before he could be sent to prison for the rest of his life. Marshall adhered to the decision in Thompson v. Utah that the jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment consists of 12 persons, neither more nor less, and believed this requirement should apply to the States.

Williams v. Florida

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