William P. Aubin v. Union Carbide Corporation
40 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 596, 2015 Fla. LEXIS 2417, 177 So. 3d 489 (2015)
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Rule of Law:
Florida adheres to the 'consumer expectations' test from the Restatement (Second) of Torts for strict products liability design defect claims, rejecting the 'risk-utility' test and its requirement of proving a reasonable alternative design from the Restatement (Third) of Torts. While the 'learned intermediary' defense is applicable in failure-to-warn cases involving bulk suppliers, a new trial based on its omission from jury instructions is not warranted if the defendant's proposed instructions inaccurately state the law.
Facts:
- William P. Aubin worked as a construction supervisor for his father’s company between 1972 and 1974, overseeing residential construction in Sarasota, Florida.
- While at work, Aubin was exposed to and inhaled respirable dust created by the sanding and sweeping of drywall joint compounds and spraying of ceiling texture sprays.
- Aubin did not know that these joint compounds and texture sprays contained asbestos and was unaware that he was inhaling asbestos fibers.
- In 2008, Aubin was diagnosed with malignant peritoneal mesothelioma, a fatal, incurable form of cancer in the lining of the abdomen, caused by asbestos exposure.
- Union Carbide Corporation mined short-fiber chrysotile asbestos in California, subjected it to a proprietary processing method (centrifuge) to separate fibers and increase its efficiency as a thickening agent, and sold it in bulk as SG-210 Calidria.
- Union Carbide marketed SG-210 Calidria to intermediary manufacturers (like Georgia-Pacific) for use in products such as joint compounds and texture sprays, but was not involved in the formulation, packaging, or sale of the end products.
- Conflicting evidence was presented at trial regarding whether Union Carbide properly warned its intermediary manufacturers about the then-known dangers of its product or whether it concealed the truth about asbestos dangers.
- Union Carbide’s internal toxicology reports from 1964, 1967, and 1969 acknowledged the dangers of asbestos exposure, including asbestosis and mesothelioma, leading to OSHA-mandated warnings on its asbestos bags by 1972.
Procedural Posture:
- William P. Aubin filed suit against numerous defendants, including Union Carbide Corporation, in a trial court, alleging his mesothelioma was caused by asbestos supplied by Union Carbide for use in third-party products.
- Aubin resolved claims against other defendants, proceeding to trial solely against Union Carbide Corporation on theories of strict liability design defect, strict liability failure to warn, and negligent failure to warn.
- The trial court denied Union Carbide's motion for a directed verdict at the close of evidence.
- The trial court gave a special jury instruction, as proposed by Aubin, stating that Union Carbide had a duty to warn end users and rejected Union Carbide's proposed instructions concerning the learned intermediary defense.
- The jury returned a verdict for Aubin, finding Union Carbide's negligence and product defect were legal causes of Aubin's damages, awarding $14,191,000, and attributing 46.25% of fault to Union Carbide.
- The trial court reduced the judgment to $6,624,150, reflecting Union Carbide's percentage of fault and settlements, and entered final judgment against Union Carbide.
- Union Carbide Corporation appealed to the Third District Court of Appeal, which reversed the jury verdict and judgment, holding that the trial court erred by (1) failing to apply the Restatement (Third) of Torts' 'risk-utility' test for design defect, (2) finding the design defect was not a cause of Aubin’s damages, and (3) giving misleading jury instructions on failure to warn by omitting the learned intermediary defense.
- The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction due to express and direct conflict with prior decisions of the Florida Supreme Court and other district courts of appeal regarding the appropriate test for design defects and the applicability of the learned intermediary defense in asbestos cases.
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Issue:
1. Does Florida's strict products liability law for design defects require application of the Restatement (Second) of Torts' 'consumer expectations' test, or the Restatement (Third) of Torts' 'risk-utility' test requiring proof of a reasonable alternative design? 2. Did William P. Aubin present sufficient evidence of causation for his design defect claim, such that Union Carbide Corporation was not entitled to a directed verdict? 3. Did the trial court commit reversible error by providing incomplete jury instructions on Union Carbide Corporation's duty to warn end users, specifically by failing to instruct on the learned intermediary defense?
Opinions:
Majority - PARIENTE, J.
1. Yes, Florida's strict products liability law for design defects continues to apply the Restatement (Second) of Torts' 'consumer expectations' test, rejecting the Restatement (Third) of Torts' 'risk-utility' test and its requirement of proving a reasonable alternative design. The Court reaffirms its holding in `West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.`, which established strict products liability in Florida and used the consumer expectations test, finding this approach best serves the policy of placing the burden of costs from defective products on manufacturers. The Third Restatement's approach blurs the distinction between strict liability and negligence, imposes a higher burden on plaintiffs by requiring proof of a reasonable alternative design, and could potentially insulate manufacturers from liability for unreasonably dangerous products. While evidence of alternative designs may be presented by either party, it is not a mandatory element for the plaintiff to prove a design defect under Florida law. 2. No, William P. Aubin did present sufficient evidence of causation for his design defect claim, and Union Carbide Corporation was not entitled to a directed verdict. The Third District erroneously conflated the Third Restatement’s definition of design defect with the causation element, requiring Aubin to show SG-210 Calidria was more dangerous than raw asbestos in causing mesothelioma. The Court clarifies that causation merely requires showing the defective design 'directly and in natural and continuous sequence produces or contributes substantially' to the injury. Evidence showed Union Carbide specifically processed and designed SG-210 Calidria for products known to create respirable dust, and expert testimony confirmed exposure to these fibers caused mesothelioma. This was sufficient evidence for the jury to determine causation. 3. No, the trial court did not commit reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on the learned intermediary defense, even though the defense itself is applicable in this type of asbestos case. While the learned intermediary defense allows a manufacturer to discharge its duty to warn by reasonably relying on an intermediary to relay warnings, Union Carbide's proposed jury instructions were not an accurate statement of the law. Specifically, the proposed factors were misleading regarding the intermediary's specific knowledge and the manufacturer's access to end users, which do not accurately reflect the reasonableness inquiry for this defense. Because Union Carbide's proposed instructions were legally inaccurate, the trial court correctly rejected them, and the jury instructions, viewed as a whole, were not so misleading as to require a new trial.
Dissenting - POLSTON, J.
Yes, Union Carbide Corporation was entitled to a new trial because the jury instruction on the failure to warn was misleading as it failed to inform the jury about the learned intermediary defense. The dissent argues that the trial court improperly allowed the jury to find Union Carbide liable solely for not directly warning Aubin. It contends that Union Carbide's proposed instructions, while perhaps not perfectly worded, were sufficient to preserve the argument that the jury should consider factors relevant to the learned intermediary defense, such as the intermediary's knowledge of the dangers and their position relative to the end users. The majority's holding sets an unclear standard for proposed non-standard jury instructions. Furthermore, given that the verdict form did not separate theories of liability, it is impossible to know whether the jury's finding of liability was based on the failure to warn, making a new trial necessary to ensure a fair resolution.
Analysis:
This case significantly solidifies Florida's jurisprudence on strict products liability by expressly rejecting the Restatement (Third) of Torts' risk-utility test and affirming the long-standing consumer expectations test for design defects. This ensures that plaintiffs in Florida are not burdened with proving a reasonable alternative design, thereby maintaining a clear distinction between strict liability and negligence claims, and continuing to prioritize consumer protection. The decision also clarifies the applicability of the learned intermediary defense for bulk suppliers in failure-to-warn claims, providing guidance to manufacturers on their duty to warn through intermediaries, but places a critical emphasis on the accuracy of proposed jury instructions for such defenses to be successfully presented at trial. This will impact future product liability litigation, especially in cases involving component parts or bulk materials distributed through intermediaries.
