Willden v. Washington National Insurance
557 P.2d 501, 135 Cal. Rptr. 69, 18 Cal. 3d 631 (1976)
Rule of Law:
An insured's failure to request a jury instruction on the "process of nature" rule, which allows for delayed manifestation of disability to relate back to the accident date, precludes challenging a trial court's judgment based on a literal application of a policy's time-limit provision for disability onset.
Facts:
- In 1965, Washington National Insurance Co. issued a Disability Income Policy for Realtors and Real Estate Salesmen to Willden.
- On February 11, 1966, Willden was injured in an automobile accident.
- The following day, Willden experienced tremors in his leg, and by April 1966, he had numbness in the leg.
- On October 10, 1966, Willden's condition was diagnosed as multiple sclerosis.
- Willden was unemployed from April 1966 to April 1967.
- Washington National Insurance Co. paid Willden one year of sickness benefits, which terminated on April 21, 1967.
- After April 1967, Willden obtained a business license and worked as a real estate and business opportunity broker until 1972.
- Willden's condition continued to deteriorate, and he became unable to resume any gainful employment from May 1, 1973.
Procedural Posture:
- Willden sued Washington National Insurance Co. in a trial court for accident benefits accruing after April 21, 1967.
- At trial, Willden, appearing in propria persona, presented expert testimony that his multiple sclerosis was precipitated by the automobile accident.
- A jury returned a special verdict finding Willden’s “disability resulted directly and independently of all other causes from the accident of February 11, 1966.”
- The trial court requested additional special verdicts, and the jury rendered a special verdict finding Willden was "not totally and continuously disabled within 30 days of the accident."
- In response to the court’s inquiry, the jury specified in another special verdict that Willden was totally and continuously disabled from February 25, 1969, with no ending date.
- The trial court entered judgment for Washington National Insurance Co. based on these special verdicts.
- Willden appealed the trial court's judgment.
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Issue:
Does an insured's failure to request a jury instruction on the "process of nature" rule preclude recovery of accident disability benefits under a policy requiring total disability within 30 days of an accident, even if the disability's onset arguably falls within that rule?
Opinions:
Majority - Tobriner, J.
Yes, an insured's failure to propose a jury instruction on the "process of nature" rule prevents them from complaining on appeal that the court failed to instruct the jury on that rule, thus upholding a judgment based on a literal interpretation of a policy's 30-day disability onset requirement. The policy explicitly required total and continuous disability within 30 days of the accident, and the jury's special verdict explicitly found Willden was not totally disabled within that timeframe. While the judicially recognized "process of nature" rule (established in cases like Frenzer v. Mutual Ben. H. & A. Assn. and Schilk v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co.) generally interprets such time limits to encompass the period nature takes to bring about total disability, the plaintiff bore the responsibility to propose complete and comprehensive instructions in accordance with his theory of litigation. Since Willden failed to propose an instruction concerning the "process of nature" rule, he cannot now complain that the trial court did not instruct the jury on that subject. The court also held that the 30-day provision, when correctly interpreted with the process of nature rule, is not unconscionable, and any harsh application in this case resulted from the plaintiff's procedural oversight.
Dissenting - Mosk, J.
No, the trial court had a duty to properly interpret the jury's special verdicts in light of the "process of nature" rule, which is established law, and the plaintiff, even appearing pro se, should not be penalized for the court's failure to apply existing law or reconcile ambiguous verdicts. The majority's decision unjustly penalizes Willden, who represented himself, for failing to offer adequate jury instructions despite the trial court's own failure to recognize and apply the well-established "process of nature" rule. This rule, supported by Frenzer and Schilk, interprets policy time limits (like 30 days) to allow for disability to relate back to the accident if it arises directly within the time nature consumes in bringing about total incapacity. The Schilk case, involving a similar 20-day limit and delayed manifestation, is directly controlling and established that strict, literal interpretations leading to unreasonable forfeitures should be avoided. The jury's first special verdict, finding Willden's disability directly resulted from the accident, should have entitled him to recover, making the subsequent 30-day verdict irrelevant under the process of nature rule. The trial judge should have either ignored contradictory verdicts or instructed the jury to reconcile them. The application of the 30-day provision in this case is unconscionable, and the court had a duty to apply prevailing law regardless of the plaintiff's instruction proposals.
Analysis:
This case underscores the critical importance of procedural diligence in litigation, particularly regarding jury instructions. It places a significant burden on litigants, including pro se parties, to ensure all relevant legal theories, even well-established ones like the 'process of nature' rule, are presented to the jury through requested instructions. The decision suggests that even if a policy's literal application may seem 'unconscionable,' the courts will uphold it if the procedural steps to invoke a more liberal interpretation were not followed at trial. It serves as a stark reminder that appellate courts primarily review errors preserved by proper objection or request at the trial level, thereby impacting how attorneys must strategically approach trial preparation and instruction drafting.
