Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police
491 U.S. 58 (1989)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A State is not a 'person' subject to lawsuits for money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Similarly, a state official acting in their official capacity is not a 'person' for the purposes of a § 1983 suit, as such an action is functionally a suit against the State itself.
Facts:
- Ray Will was an employee of the Michigan Department of State Police.
- Will applied for a promotion to a data systems analyst position.
- He was denied the promotion.
- Will alleged the denial was not based on merit but because his brother had been a student activist and was the subject of a 'red squad' file maintained by the department.
Procedural Posture:
- Ray Will filed a § 1983 lawsuit in Michigan Circuit Court (a state trial court) against the Michigan Department of State Police and its Director.
- Will also filed a nearly identical claim in the Michigan Court of Claims.
- The state trial judge concluded that a constitutional violation had occurred and that the state defendants were 'persons' for purposes of § 1983 liability.
- On appeal by the defendants, the Michigan Court of Appeals (an intermediate appellate court) reversed in part, holding that a State is not a 'person' under § 1983.
- On further appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court (the state's highest court) affirmed the Court of Appeals and held that neither the State nor a state official acting in an official capacity is a 'person' under § 1983.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among state and federal courts on the issue.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Is a State, or a state official acting in their official capacity, a 'person' who can be sued for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice White
No, neither a State nor a state official acting in an official capacity is a 'person' under § 1983. In common usage, the term 'person' does not include the sovereign, and statutes are ordinarily construed to exclude it. For Congress to alter the constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government by subjecting States to liability, it must make its intention to do so 'unmistakably clear in the language of the statute,' which § 1983 fails to do. Since the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against States in federal court under § 1983, it would be illogical to conclude Congress intended to create a cause of action against States that could only be brought in state courts, the very forums it sought to bypass. A suit against a state official in their official capacity is not a suit against the official but against the office, and is therefore no different from a suit against the State itself.
Dissenting - Justice Brennan
Yes, a State is a 'person' under § 1983. The majority improperly relies on Eleventh Amendment principles, which are inapplicable in this state-court proceeding. Under ordinary statutory construction, the 1871 Dictionary Act, which was passed shortly before § 1983, defined 'person' to include 'bodies politic and corporate,' a phrase historically understood to encompass States. The very purpose of § 1983 was to provide a remedy for constitutional violations perpetrated by the States, making it illogical to exclude the States themselves from the statute's reach. The majority's holding illogically prevents a State from being sued under § 1983 even when it has explicitly consented to such a suit.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
Yes, a State is a 'person' under § 1983. The Court's precedents have consistently allowed suits against state officials in their official capacity for prospective injunctive relief, effectively treating the State as the real party in interest. If a State can be held liable for prospective relief, it must be considered a 'person' under the statute. The majority's decision creates an illogical 'bifurcated application' of the word 'person,' where a state official is a 'person' when sued for an injunction but not when sued for damages. Eleventh Amendment immunity doctrines should not be imported to define the scope of a federal statute in a state court action.
Analysis:
This decision significantly curtailed the scope of § 1983 by immunizing States and their agencies from suits for money damages. It solidified the principle that to abrogate state sovereign immunity or alter the federal-state balance, Congress must use exceptionally clear language. The ruling forces civil rights plaintiffs seeking damages to sue state officials only in their individual capacities, where they must overcome the formidable defense of qualified immunity. The case thus preserved a major pillar of state sovereignty against federal statutory intrusion and shaped the landscape of civil rights litigation against state actors for decades to come.
