Wilkinson v. Austin
545 U.S. 209 (2005)
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Rule of Law:
Placement of an inmate in a supermax prison imposes an "atypical and significant hardship" that creates a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, but informal, non-adversarial procedures—such as notice of the reasons for placement and a fair opportunity for rebuttal—are constitutionally sufficient given the State's overriding interest in prison safety and security.
Facts:
- In 1998, Ohio opened its only supermax facility, the Ohio State Penitentiary (OSP), designed to house the most dangerous prisoners.
- Conditions at OSP are exceptionally restrictive; inmates are confined to their cells for 23 hours a day, experience extreme isolation with almost no human contact, and have a light on in their cell at all times.
- Placement at OSP is for an indefinite period of time and is reviewed only annually after an initial 30-day review.
- Inmates who are otherwise eligible for parole lose that eligibility while incarcerated at OSP.
- After initially using inconsistent procedures, Ohio adopted a 'New Policy' for OSP placements.
- Under the New Policy, an inmate considered for OSP receives written notice at least 48 hours before a hearing with a Classification Committee.
- The inmate may attend the hearing and offer pertinent information or a written statement, but is not permitted to call witnesses.
- If the Committee recommends OSP placement, the decision is reviewed by the warden and then by a central Bureau of Classification, and the inmate may submit written objections before the final decision is made.
Procedural Posture:
- A class of inmates sued Ohio prison officials in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio.
- The District Court found the inmates possessed a liberty interest in avoiding OSP placement and that Ohio's procedures violated due process.
- The District Court ordered extensive procedural modifications to Ohio's 'New Policy' for OSP placement.
- Ohio, the petitioner, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's ruling that the inmates had a liberty interest and upheld the court-ordered procedural modifications.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does Ohio's 'New Policy' for assigning inmates to its supermax facility, which provides notice and an opportunity for the inmate to be heard but does not permit calling witnesses, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Kennedy
No. Ohio's 'New Policy' for assigning inmates to its supermax facility provides sufficient procedural protections and does not violate the Due Process Clause. The Court first determined that inmates have a protected liberty interest in avoiding OSP placement. Applying the test from Sandin v. Conner, the Court found that the combined effect of OSP's harsh conditions, the indefinite duration of placement, and the loss of parole eligibility imposes an 'atypical and significant hardship' in relation to ordinary prison life. Having established a liberty interest, the Court then applied the three-factor balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge to determine what process is due. The Court weighed (1) the inmate's significant private interest in avoiding OSP, (2) the low risk of erroneous deprivation under the New Policy's procedures (which include notice, an opportunity to be heard, and multiple levels of review) and the limited value of additional safeguards like calling witnesses in a prison setting, and (3) the government's 'dominant' interest in ensuring prison security, managing dangerous inmates, and controlling scarce resources. The Court concluded that the State's interest in safety and security is paramount and that the informal, non-adversarial procedures provided by Ohio are constitutionally adequate, making the lower court's mandated modifications unnecessary.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the application of the 'atypical and significant hardship' standard from Sandin v. Conner, establishing that a combination of factors, not just a single condition, can create a protected liberty interest for prisoners. By applying the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, the Court reinforced the principle that procedural due process is flexible and highly context-dependent. The ruling gives substantial deference to the security and administrative concerns of prison officials, signaling to lower courts that they should be reluctant to impose formal, trial-like procedures for internal prison classification decisions, thereby solidifying a non-adversarial model of due process for such matters.
