Wilkie v. Robbins
168 L. Ed. 2d 389, 551 U.S. 537, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 8513 (2007)
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Rule of Law:
An implied constitutional damages remedy (a Bivens action) is not available for a property owner's claim of retaliatory harassment by federal officials, especially when a patchwork of alternative remedies exists and creating a new cause of action would require courts to draw difficult lines between legitimate government hard bargaining and unconstitutional coercion. Furthermore, extortion under the Hobbs Act requires an official to seek property for private gain, not for the exclusive benefit of the government.
Facts:
- The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) obtained a nonexclusive easement over a road on the High Island Ranch from its owner, George Nelson.
- The BLM negligently failed to record the easement before Nelson sold the ranch to Frank Robbins.
- Under Wyoming law, Robbins took title to the ranch free of the unrecorded easement.
- Upon discovering the error, BLM official Joseph Vessels contacted Robbins and demanded he grant a new easement to the government for free.
- Robbins refused to grant the easement without compensation but indicated a willingness to negotiate.
- Over the next seven years, various BLM officials allegedly engaged in a campaign of harassment against Robbins, which included trespassing to conduct a survey, canceling a reciprocal right-of-way, encouraging a neighbor to file a complaint against Robbins, reducing a 5-year permit to an annual one, bringing numerous administrative charges, instigating unsuccessful federal criminal charges, revoking his permits, and videotaping his guests.
- An official from another agency, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, rejected a BLM official's request to impound Robbins's cattle.
Procedural Posture:
- Frank Robbins sued several BLM officials in the U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming, asserting claims under Bivens and RICO.
- The District Court initially granted the defendants' motion to dismiss.
- On appeal by Robbins, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the dismissal and remanded the case.
- On remand, the defendants moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, which the District Court denied for the Fifth Amendment retaliation and RICO claims.
- On interlocutory appeal by the defendants, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the District Court's denial of summary judgment.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Tenth Circuit's decision.
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Issue:
1. Does a property owner have an implied constitutional damages remedy (a Bivens action) against federal officials for an alleged campaign of harassment and intimidation aimed at coercing the owner to grant an easement to the government? 2. Does a government employee's attempt to obtain property for the sole benefit of the government constitute extortion under the Hobbs Act, thereby serving as a predicate act for a civil RICO claim?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Souter
1. No, a property owner does not have a Bivens remedy for an alleged campaign of government harassment intended to acquire property. The Court declined to create a new Bivens action due to the presence of alternative remedies and special factors counselling hesitation. Although no single remedy addressed the cumulative harm—what Robbins called "death by a thousand cuts"—Robbins had a 'patchwork' of state and federal remedies for the individual acts, such as tort claims for trespass, administrative appeals for permit revocations, and a jury trial for the criminal charges. The key 'special factor' was the difficulty of devising a workable judicial standard to distinguish legitimate 'hard bargaining' on behalf of the government from unconstitutional coercion. Creating a 'too much' liability standard would be 'endlessly knotty' and would risk chilling legitimate government conduct and inviting an 'onslaught' of litigation in any area where government action affects property interests. 2. No, a government employee's attempt to obtain property solely for the government is not extortion under the Hobbs Act. The Act incorporates the common law definition of extortion, which focused on public corruption—an official using their office for private gain, akin to taking a bribe. The Court found no precedent for applying the Hobbs Act where the government itself was the sole intended beneficiary of the official's actions. Extending the statute in this way could expose countless federal employees, from the IRS to regulatory agencies, to extortion charges for vigorously pursuing the government's property claims.
Concurring - Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, concurred in the judgment. He wrote separately to state that he would not extend Bivens under any circumstances. In his view, 'Bivens is a relic of the heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of action' and should be limited 'to the precise circumstances that they involved.'
Concurring in part and dissenting in part - Justice Ginsburg
1. Yes, a Bivens remedy should be available in this case. The majority mischaracterizes the defendants' actions as 'hard bargaining' when the record shows a seven-year campaign of 'relentless harassment and intimidation' designed to punish Robbins for exercising his Fifth Amendment right to refuse an uncompensated taking. The piecemeal remedies available were inadequate to address the cumulative harm of this 'death by a thousand cuts.' The claim is a standard retaliation claim, which courts are well-equipped to handle by asking whether the officials' actions were motivated by Robbins's protected conduct. The majority's fear of 'floodgates' is exaggerated, as shown by the lack of similar suits under § 1983 against state officials. 2. She agreed with the majority that Robbins failed to state a claim under RICO.
Analysis:
This decision significantly restricts the availability of Bivens remedies, reinforcing the Court's modern trend of viewing them as a disfavored judicial creation. By emphasizing the existence of any 'patchwork' of alternative remedies, even if they don't address the cumulative harm alleged, the Court raises the bar for creating new causes of action. The analysis signals a strong judicial deference to Congress in this area and a deep reluctance to have courts define the line between aggressive-but-lawful government negotiation and unconstitutional coercion affecting property rights, thereby granting federal officials considerable leeway in their enforcement and bargaining tactics.
