Wilkerson v. Utah
1878 U.S. LEXIS 1517, 25 L. Ed. 345, 99 U.S. 130 (1879)
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Rule of Law:
When a statute prescribes the death penalty but is silent on the method of execution, the sentencing court has the authority to determine the mode of execution. A sentence of death by firing squad does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.
Facts:
- Wilkerson committed first-degree murder in the Territory of Utah.
- At the time of Wilkerson's sentencing, the Revised Penal Code of 1876 for the Utah Territory mandated the death penalty for first-degree murder.
- The 1876 code did not specify a particular method for carrying out a death sentence.
- A prior territorial statute from 1852, which had allowed for execution by shooting, hanging, or beheading, had been repealed by the 1876 code.
- The 1876 code vested the sentencing court with the duty 'to determine and impose the punishment prescribed.'
- Pursuant to this authority, the trial court sentenced Wilkerson to be publicly executed by a firing squad.
Procedural Posture:
- Wilkerson was indicted for murder in a district court of the Territory of Utah, the court of first instance.
- After a trial, a jury found Wilkerson guilty of murder in the first degree.
- The trial court sentenced Wilkerson to be executed by public shooting.
- Wilkerson, as appellant, appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah.
- The Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- Wilkerson, as plaintiff in error, then obtained a writ of error from the Supreme Court of the United States to review the decision of the territorial supreme court.
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Issue:
Does sentencing a convicted murderer to death by firing squad constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, particularly when the governing statute prescribes death but does not specify the method of execution?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Clifford
No. Sentencing a convicted murderer to death by firing squad does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments is aimed at preventing punishments of torture and unnecessary cruelty, such as those practiced in the past like disembowelment or burning at the stake. Death by shooting does not fall into this category. The Court reasoned that shooting has long been a recognized method of execution for capital offenses in military law and is not considered a method of unnecessary cruelty. Because the territorial statute mandated death but was silent on the method, the duty devolved upon the sentencing court to determine the mode of carrying out the sentence, and its choice of a firing squad was within constitutional bounds.
Analysis:
This case represents one of the Supreme Court's earliest interpretations of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. The decision establishes that the clause is not a per se ban on capital punishment, but rather on torturous and barbaric methods of execution. By looking to military custom and historical practice, the Court set a precedent for using contemporary and historical context to evaluate whether a punishment is 'unusual' or involves 'unnecessary cruelty.' This ruling affirmed the power of courts to specify methods of execution when statutes are silent and laid the groundwork for future analyses of execution methods under the Eighth Amendment.
