Wilkerson v. Duke University
2013 WL 5184204, 229 N.C. App. 670, 748 S.E.2d 154 (2013)
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Rule of Law:
Summary judgment is improper where genuine issues of material fact exist regarding claims of false imprisonment, assault, battery, and negligent supervision/retention, requiring resolution by a jury. However, claims for emotional distress require evidence of severe emotional distress, and state constitutional claims are dismissed when an adequate state law remedy exists. Courts have discretion to deny a motion to amend a complaint due to undue delay, undue prejudice, or futility.
Facts:
- On July 15, 2008, Brian Wilkerson (plaintiff) was working as a valet attendant at a gated parking lot at Duke University Hospital.
- Wilkerson's instructions were to allow Duke University Police officers entry into the gated lot only in emergencies, and otherwise direct them to park outside.
- On July 15, 2008, Duke University Police Officer Christopher Day (Day) came to the Hospital to assist in unlocking a car parked inside the gated lot.
- Wilkerson refused to open the gate for Day, leading to a physical confrontation between them with conflicting accounts from both parties regarding who initiated physical contact and the nature of the interaction.
- Day issued Wilkerson a notice of trespass, which prohibited him from going on any Duke University property.
- As a result of the incident and trespass notice, Wilkerson lost his job as a parking attendant.
- Prior to the incident, Day's job performance evaluations noted that he could seem disrespectful, vent frustration, and needed to keep his complaints more private, though other evaluations noted professional public interactions.
Procedural Posture:
- On July 20, 2011, Brian Wilkerson filed a verified complaint in state trial court (Durham County Superior Court) against Officer Christopher Day and Duke University, asserting multiple claims including false imprisonment, assault, battery, negligent supervision and retention, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED), and state constitutional violations.
- On August 19, 2011, defendants Day and Duke University filed an answer and a motion to dismiss all of Wilkerson's claims under Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.
- On May 18, 2012, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment.
- On September 5, 2012, five days before the summary judgment hearing, Wilkerson filed a motion to amend his complaint to add claims for tortious interference with contract, tortious interference with prospective contract, and unfair and deceptive trade practices.
- On September 10, 2012, the Durham County Superior Court held a hearing on defendants' motion for summary judgment.
- The trial court denied Wilkerson's motion to amend his complaint.
- The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing all of Wilkerson's claims.
- Wilkerson appealed the trial court's order to the North Carolina Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
1. Does the trial court err in granting summary judgment on claims of false imprisonment, assault, battery, negligent supervision and retention, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED), and state constitutional violations, when there are genuine issues of material fact or insufficient evidence? 2. Does the trial court abuse its discretion in denying a plaintiff's motion to amend a complaint when the motion is filed late and the proposed amendments are futile?
Opinions:
Majority - Steelman, Judge
Yes, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment as to Brian Wilkerson's claims for false imprisonment, assault, battery, and negligent supervision and retention, but no, it did not err for the claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, or state constitutional violations. Also, no, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wilkerson's motion to amend his complaint. Regarding false imprisonment, assault, and battery claims against Officer Day (and Duke University via respondeat superior), the court found genuine issues of material fact. Wilkerson's verified complaint and deposition testimony alleged physical detention by Day, while Day's testimony offered a different account of the physical interaction. The court noted that defendants failed to provide conclusive facts demonstrating Day had reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop, which would justify a lawful restraint. Due to these conflicting accounts, the determination of whether there was an unlawful restraint or harmful/offensive contact must be decided by a jury. For claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress, the court affirmed dismissal because Wilkerson failed to present evidence of "severe emotional distress." He testified that he had not been treated by a counselor or doctor for any condition arising from the incident and had not been diagnosed with any mental health problems. The legal standard requires evidence of a recognized severe emotional or mental condition. As to the state constitutional claims, the court affirmed summary judgment, reasoning that Wilkerson had an adequate remedy in state law through his various tort claims. Precedent establishes that constitutional claims must be dismissed when an adequate state law remedy exists, providing an opportunity for relief. Concerning negligent supervision and retention against Duke University, the court reversed summary judgment. Day's performance evaluations indicated that supervisors were aware of his tendencies to be disrespectful, vent frustration, and be outspoken. This raises genuine issues of material fact as to whether Day was incompetent and whether his supervisors knew or should have known of this incompetency prior to the incident. Finally, the court affirmed the denial of Wilkerson's motion to amend his complaint. The motion was filed thirteen months after the initial complaint and only five days before the summary judgment hearing, constituting undue delay and potential undue prejudice. Additionally, the court noted the futility of the proposed new claims (tortious interference with contract, tortious interference with prospective contract, and unfair or deceptive trade practices) as there was no evidence in the record to support them.
Analysis:
This case serves as a crucial reminder that summary judgment is a high bar, especially when conflicting sworn testimonies create genuine issues of material fact that warrant a jury's determination. It highlights the specific evidentiary requirements for emotional distress claims, mandating proof of a severe and diagnosable condition, not merely subjective upset. Furthermore, the ruling reinforces the principle that state constitutional claims are often superseded by available state common law remedies and underscores the trial court's broad discretion in managing litigation timelines, particularly concerning late-stage motions to amend complaints that may cause prejudice or are inherently futile.
