Wildlife Federation v. Collier County
2002 WL 1049732, 819 So. 2d 200 (2002)
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Rule of Law:
An administrative agency's interpretation of the statute it is charged with enforcing is entitled to great deference and will not be overturned by a court unless it is 'clearly erroneous.' Under Florida law, local government comprehensive plans are not required to adopt an 'intensity of use' standard for agricultural land uses because agricultural activities are explicitly excluded from the statutory definition of 'development,' which is the primary trigger for intensity reviews.
Facts:
- Collier County, Florida, developed a comprehensive land use plan.
- The Governor and Cabinet, sitting as the Administration Commission, issued a final order directing Collier County to designate specific areas within the county as Natural Resource Protection Areas (NRPAs) to protect indigenous fauna and flora, especially the endangered Florida panther.
- The Administration Commission's order specified that within NRPAs, only agricultural and directly-related uses, and one single-family dwelling unit per parcel or lot created prior to June 22, 1999, would be allowed.
- The Administration Commission's order further provided that the NRPAs 'shall be refined as actual data and analysis is made available,' implying the initial designation was interim.
- Collier County adopted interim amendments to its comprehensive plan, which designated NRPAs but did not include an 'intensity' standard for agricultural uses within these areas.
- The Florida Wildlife Federation and the Collier County Audubon Society (appellants) sought expansion of the NRPA boundaries, citing telemetry data regarding panther movement and a 1994 report, arguing the designated boundaries were insufficient to protect wildlife.
Procedural Posture:
- In 1997, Collier County promulgated amendments to its comprehensive plan.
- The Department of Community Affairs (DCA) rejected Collier County's 1997 amendments as non-compliant with state law.
- An administrative challenge ensued, in which the Florida Wildlife Federation and the Collier County Audubon Society (appellants) intervened.
- The Governor and Cabinet, sitting as the Administration Commission, issued a final order directing Collier County to take specific remedial measures for its plan, including designating Natural Resource Protection Areas (NRPAs).
- Pursuant to this order, Collier County adopted certain interim amendments to its comprehensive plan, designating NRPAs.
- The Department of Community Affairs reviewed these interim amendments and determined they were in compliance with state law.
- Appellants challenged the DCA's compliance determination, leading to a formal hearing before the Division of Administrative Hearings.
- An administrative law judge (ALJ) issued a recommended order.
- The Department of Community Affairs issued a final order adopting the ALJ's findings of fact and conclusions of law, rejecting appellants' exceptions.
- The Florida Wildlife Federation and Collier County Audubon Society (Appellants) appealed the Department of Community Affairs' final order to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
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Issue:
Does section 163.3177(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), and associated administrative rules, require a local government's comprehensive plan to include an 'intensity of use' standard for agricultural land uses designated within Natural Resource Protection Areas?
Opinions:
Majority - Ervin, J.
No, section 163.3177(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), and associated administrative rules, do not require a local government's comprehensive plan to include an 'intensity of use' standard for agricultural land uses designated within Natural Resource Protection Areas. The court afforded great deference to the Department of Community Affairs (DCA)'s interpretation of the statute it enforces, noting that an agency's interpretation is upheld unless 'clearly erroneous.' The court reasoned that while section 163.3177(6)(a) broadly mandates 'standards for the density or intensity of use' for land use categories, a harmonious reading of the entire statute, including the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act (Chapter 163) and the Florida Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972 (Chapter 380), supports the DCA's interpretation. Both acts aim to guide and control 'future development,' and section 380.04(3)(e) explicitly excludes 'agricultural use or operation' from the definition of 'development.' Since 'development' has the same meaning under both chapters, the legislative intent was to omit agriculture from the scope of uses requiring intensity standards. The court also held that the DCA's administrative rule 9J-5.003(60), defining 'intensity' broadly, could not expand the scope of the statute, as agency rules cannot expand statutory powers. Regarding the second issue, the court affirmed the sufficiency of the NRPA boundaries, noting that they were intended to be temporary and subject to refinement as additional data became available, as contemplated by the Administration Commission's original order.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part - Van Nortwick, J.
Yes, the interim plan amendment fails to comply with section 163.3177(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), because it requires that each land use category, including agriculture, be defined by 'specific standards for the density or intensity of use.' Justice Van Nortwick concurred with the majority's finding that the NRPA boundaries were fairly debatable as interim measures but dissented on the 'intensity' standard issue for agricultural uses. The dissent argued that the plain and unambiguous language of section 163.3177(6)(a) states that '[e]ach land use category shall be defined in terms of the types of uses included and specific standards for the density or intensity of use,' and this explicitly includes agriculture. While acknowledging the statutory exclusion of agricultural use from the definition of 'development,' the dissent emphasized that 'development' and 'land use' are not synonymous; 'land use' is a broader term encompassing both. The dissent argued that the majority's interpretation, which limited 'intensity' solely to buildings and structures, rendered other general 'intensity' requirements in the statute superfluous, violating a fundamental rule of statutory construction to give effect to all statutory provisions. Furthermore, the Department's own rule 9J-5.003(60) defines 'intensity' to include 'the use of or demand upon natural resources,' which supports a broader application of 'intensity' that would include agricultural activities. The dissent argued that the DCA's non-rule interpretation conflicted with its own rules, which an agency must honor.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the principle of judicial deference to administrative agencies' interpretations of their governing statutes, especially when those interpretations are not deemed 'clearly erroneous.' It clarifies the critical distinction between 'development' and broader 'land use' within Florida's comprehensive planning legal framework, establishing that agricultural activities, despite being a land use, are statutorily exempted from the 'development' definition that triggers certain 'intensity of use' standards. The ruling highlights potential challenges when general statutory language regarding planning standards meets specific statutory exemptions and agency rules, underscoring that agency rules cannot expand powers beyond legislative grants. Future cases will likely cite this decision when evaluating regulatory requirements for agricultural operations or similar non-developmental land uses in the context of broader environmental or land-use planning statutes.
