Wiggins v. City of Burton
291 Mich.App. 532, 805 N.W.2d 517 (2011)
Rule of Law:
An easement for 'storm detention' that is limited to retaining naturally flowing surface waters does not authorize the installation of a physical drain to artificially increase and concentrate water flow, and such an unauthorized installation or increased flow constitutes a trespass. Governmental immunity does not bar inverse condemnation claims for physical takings by a governmental entity, but its applicability to tort claims seeking equitable relief requires further assessment by the trial court.
Facts:
- The Heckmans and Mahlers lived on neighboring parcels of real property on Maple Avenue in the City of Burton.
- A subdivision called Maplewood Meadows No. 1 was platted, lying east of the Heckman and Mahler parcels and abutting them.
- Charles and Susan Wiggins purchased Lot 51 in Maplewood Meadows No. 1 in December 2003, aware that a large section of their parcel was encumbered by a "PRIVATE EASEMENT FOR STORM DETENTION" as shown on the final plat.
- The Heckmans and Mahlers contended that the construction of Maplewood Meadows No. 1 reversed the historical surface water flow, causing water to accumulate on their properties.
- Thomas Heckman lodged several complaints with the City of Burton concerning surface water drainage problems on his property, dating back to June 1995.
- In May 2007, the Burton City Council approved a "relief drain project" for the Heckman and Mahler parcels.
- The Heckmans and Mahlers signed documents with the City acknowledging that the City would install drains, which would subsequently "belong solely to the [Heckmans and Mahlers] and will be the [Heckmans’ and Mahlers’] responsibility to maintain/repair."
- In late 2007, the City, through its contractor Doan Enterprises, excavated a ditch, installed drains on the Heckman and Mahler parcels, and laid a 180-foot pipe connecting these drains to the storm-detention easement area on the Wiggins' property, depositing water in their backyard.
Procedural Posture:
- In March 2008, Charles and Susan Wiggins filed a five-count complaint in the Genesee Circuit Court, alleging quiet title, declaratory relief, trespass, nuisance, and inverse condemnation against the City of Burton, William and Paula Mahler, Thomas and Margaret Heckman, Doan Enterprises, and certain City agents.
- In December 2008, the circuit court granted the Wiggins leave to file a "Supplemental Complaint," clarifying their trespass claim against the Heckmans and Mahlers for authorizing water diversion.
- In April 2009, the Mahlers filed a "MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY DISPOSITION AS TO MONEY DAMAGES," and the Heckmans subsequently filed their own motion adopting the Mahlers' arguments.
- Also in April 2009, the City of Burton filed its own motion for summary disposition, asserting governmental immunity and that the drainage project was within the scope of the easement and approved by the drain commissioner.
- The Wiggins responded to the defendants' motions and requested summary disposition in their favor.
- The circuit court held a hearing on the parties' motions for summary disposition.
- On June 29, 2009, the circuit court issued an opinion and order, (1) granting summary disposition in favor of the Mahlers and Heckmans, (2) denying the Wiggins’ motion for summary disposition, and (3) dismissing all claims against the City "without prejudice so that the [Wiggins] and the City... can follow the procedure ... laid out in MCL 280.75."
- The Wiggins timely filed a claim of appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals (as appellants).
- The City of Burton filed a claim of cross-appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals (as cross-appellant).
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Issue:
1. Does the installation of a physical drain that channels water onto a private property, exceeding the scope of an express storm-detention easement, constitute a trespass for which the upstream property owners who authorized its construction are liable? 2. Does an artificial increase in the amount and concentration of surface water flowing onto a lower property, beyond what would naturally occur, constitute an independent trespass? 3. Did the circuit court err by dismissing claims against the City based on Drain Code procedures (MCL 280.75) that apply only to proposed drains and not to an already existing drain? 4. Can the City be held liable for inverse condemnation due to the physical installation of a drain on private property, and is it also liable for inverse condemnation due to the subsequent increased flow of water through a privately owned drain? 5. Is the City entitled to governmental immunity for tort claims, including those seeking injunctive or declaratory relief, arising from its actions in constructing the drain?
Opinions:
Majority - Per curiam
Yes, the installation of the physical drain on the Wiggins' parcel exceeded the scope of the "PRIVATE EASEMENT FOR STORM DETENTION" and constituted a trespass for which the Heckmans and Mahlers are liable. The language of the easement clearly and unambiguously limits its scope to storm detention, meaning the retention of waters that naturally flow to it as a result of storms, and does not include the installation of pipes or drains. The unauthorized direct intrusion of a physical, tangible object (the drainpipe) onto the Wiggins' land constituted a trespass, not a nuisance, as Michigan law distinguishes between these torts based on the nature of the intrusion. The Heckmans and Mahlers are liable as cotrespassers because they instigated, commanded, encouraged, advised, ratified, or condoned the City's installation of the drain, which ultimately became their property and responsibility. Yes, an artificial increase in the amount and concentration of surface water flowing onto the Wiggins' property, beyond what would naturally flow, would constitute an independent trespass. While a lower estate must accept natural surface water flow from an upper estate, the owner of the upper estate cannot artificially increase or concentrate this flow. The court found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the drain increased the water flow beyond natural historical amounts, necessitating further proceedings on remand. No, the circuit court erred by dismissing claims against the City based on MCL 280.75 of the Drain Code. This statute's procedures apply only to proposed drains and require specific prerequisites (like the establishment of a drainage district and a determination of necessity) that were not met in this case concerning an already existing drain. Applying these procedures to an existing drain would be illogical. Yes, the City can be held liable for inverse condemnation due to the physical installation of the drain itself. The installation was an affirmative act specifically directed toward the Wiggins' property, potentially limiting its use. A genuine issue of material fact remained regarding whether this constituted a 'de facto taking' (i.e., whether it substantially caused a decline in the property's value). However, no, the City cannot be held liable for inverse condemnation related to any increased flow of water through the drain after its completion, because ownership and responsibility for the drainage system were transferred to the Heckmans and Mahlers, and inverse condemnation requires state action against private property. The issue of the City's entitlement to governmental immunity for the Wiggins' remaining tort claims (trespass, nuisance), including those seeking injunctive or declaratory relief, was not decided by the circuit court and thus was unpreserved for appellate review. This issue is remanded for the circuit court to consider, taking into account that Michigan's Supreme Court abolished the common-law trespass-nuisance exception to governmental immunity, and to clarify whether immunity bars all tort claims or only those seeking money damages, considering recent Supreme Court guidance.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the strict interpretation of express easements, particularly in distinguishing between passive 'detention' and active 'drainage' mechanisms. It reinforces Michigan's adherence to separate causes of action for trespass (physical intrusion of tangible objects, even water) and nuisance (interference with use/enjoyment by intangible forces). The ruling also highlights the potential for joint and several liability among cotrespassers, even when one party (the City) performs the physical act but others (the Mahlers and Heckmans) instigate and own the infringing structure. Furthermore, the decision provides critical guidance on the proper application of the Drain Code and the boundaries of inverse condemnation claims against governmental entities, while leaving open for further determination the nuances of governmental immunity concerning equitable relief.
