Wiggill v. Cheney
597 P.2d 1351 (1979)
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Rule of Law:
For a deed to validly transfer title to real property, the grantor must deliver it during their lifetime by relinquishing all possession, control, and the right to retain it. The grantor's mere intent to convey property upon death is insufficient to substitute for the legal requirement of lifetime delivery.
Facts:
- On June 25, 1958, Lillian W. Cheney signed a warranty deed naming Flora Cheney as the grantee for a property.
- Lillian Cheney placed the signed deed into a sealed envelope and deposited it in a safety deposit box held jointly in her name and that of Francis E. Wiggill.
- Lillian Cheney instructed Wiggill that upon her death, he was to retrieve an envelope from the box and deliver it to 'all those concerned.'
- Lillian Cheney retained the only key to the safety deposit box and maintained sole and complete control over its contents until her death; Wiggill was never given a key.
- After Lillian Cheney's death, Wiggill gained access to the safety deposit box and manually delivered the deed to Flora Cheney.
Procedural Posture:
- Francis E. Wiggill initiated an action against Flora Cheney in a Utah trial court seeking to invalidate a warranty deed.
- The trial court entered a judgment invalidating the deed, concluding there had been no valid delivery.
- The defendant, Flora Cheney, appealed the trial court's judgment to the Supreme Court of Utah.
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Issue:
Does a valid delivery of a deed occur when the grantor signs it, places it in a safety deposit box over which she retains exclusive control, and instructs a third party to deliver it to the grantee only after the grantor's death?
Opinions:
Majority - Maughan, J.
No. A valid delivery of a deed requires the grantor to part with possession and relinquish all control over the instrument during their lifetime. The court reasoned that a deed only becomes operative upon delivery, which legally requires that it pass beyond the control or dominion of the grantor. In this case, Lillian Cheney retained the only key and sole control of the safety deposit box, meaning she never parted with possession of the deed or the right to retain it. Because no valid delivery occurred during the grantor's life, the subsequent manual transfer by Wiggill after her death was a nullity and conveyed no title. The court explicitly stated that a grantor's intention to convey is irrelevant without the act of delivery.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the strict, formal requirement of delivery in property law, distinguishing a valid inter vivos conveyance from a failed testamentary transfer. It clarifies that arrangements where a grantor retains control over a deed until death are invalid, as the grantor has not irrevocably parted with the instrument. The case serves as a key precedent illustrating that a deed cannot be used as a substitute for a will if the grantor fails to relinquish dominion. This holding protects the integrity of the formal requirements for testamentary transfers and provides a clear, bright-line rule for future cases involving conditional or post-mortem delivery.
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