Wietzke v. Chesapeake Conference Ass'n.
421 Md. 355, 2011 Md. LEXIS 520, 26 A.3d 931 (2011)
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Rule of Law:
Maryland private nuisance law requires a balancing of the offending landowner's reasonable use of their property against the substantial interference caused to a neighbor's enjoyment, with strict liability applying once a nuisance is established. A negligence claim based on a statutory violation can be established if the plaintiff belongs to the class of persons the statute intended to protect, the harm suffered is of the kind the statute intended to prevent, and the violation proximately caused the injury.
Facts:
- Douglas and Vanessa Wietzke owned a property in Silver Spring, Maryland, which was topographically situated at the bottom of a hill.
- The Chesapeake Conference Association of Seventh-Day Adventists (the Church) owned an adjacent property located at the top of the same hill.
- In 2000, the Church made a decision to construct a new parking lot on its property.
- On March 4, 2004, the Church sent correspondence to neighboring downstream property owners, including the Wietzkes, informing them of the intended development and its stormwater management concept.
- Between October 26, 2006, and mid-to-late summer 2007, the Church constructed a large stormwater pond, earth dikes, and silt fences on its property to manage runoff.
- The Wietzkes experienced three major flooding events and between forty to fifty more minor flooding events in their basement between June 2006 and June 2007, leading them to cease using their basement entirely.
- On November 28, 2006, and June 14, 2007, the Church was issued "Notices of Violation" by a County Inspector for non-compliance with Montgomery County ordinances related to stormwater and sediment control.
- During the Wietzkes' case, Devona Malcolm, a contractor hired by the Church, admitted that the Church’s construction project increased runoff from its property.
Procedural Posture:
- Douglas and Vanessa Wietzke filed a four-count complaint against the Chesapeake Conference Association of Seventh-Day Adventists and various others (collectively, the Church) in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, alleging nuisance, trespass, and negligence, seeking damages and injunctive relief for repeated flooding of their home.
- At the ensuing jury trial, after the close of the Wietzkes’ case, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County granted the Church’s motion for judgment as to the Wietzkes’ negligence claim.
- After the close of the Church’s case, but before the jury was instructed, the trial judge, over the Wietzkes’ objections, denied several of the Wietzkes’ requested jury instructions regarding nuisance claims (one on strict liability, one on County approval as a defense, and one on other contributing sources as a defense).
- The jury found in favor of the Church on the remaining nuisance and trespass counts, and judgment was entered by the Circuit Court.
- The Wietzkes noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, raising the same five issues they later presented to the highest court.
- The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court in an unreported opinion, reasoning that the nuisance instructions were correct, and the denied instructions were inapplicable.
- The Maryland Court of Appeals granted certiorari to review the case.
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Issue:
1. Does Maryland private nuisance law require a jury to balance the alleged offender's reasonable use of property against the affected landowner's right to enjoyment, or is only the level of interference to the affected landowner considered? 2. Did the trial court err in denying the Wietzkes' requested jury instructions regarding County approval as a defense or other contributing sources as a defense to nuisance, when such defenses were not explicitly raised by the Church? 3. Did the trial court err in dismissing the negligence count when there was evidence suggesting a violation of a specific county ordinance designed to prevent the type of harm the Wietzkes suffered, and that the violation was the proximate cause of their injury?
Opinions:
Majority - Battaglia, J.
1. No, Maryland private nuisance law does not solely consider the level of interference; it requires a balancing of the offending landowner's reasonable use of their property against the affected landowner's right to enjoyment. The Court affirmed that the determination of 'unreasonable conduct' in a 'nuisance in-fact' case involves a comprehensive inquiry, considering the locality, the nature of the activity, and whether the offending landowner used their property in a 'reasonable, usual, and proper manner' to avoid unnecessary injury to others. The trial court's jury instructions, which incorporated this balancing test, were therefore a correct exposition of the law, consistent with long-standing Maryland jurisprudence (e.g., Short v. Baltimore City Passenger Railway Company, Susquehanna Fertilizer Company v. Malone, Battisto v. Perkins). The Court clarified that while nuisance is a 'strict liability' cause of action in that it does not depend on proof of negligence or intent to harm once established, this does not eliminate the need to balance competing property interests when determining if a nuisance exists. 2. No, the trial court did not err in denying the Wietzkes' requested jury instructions regarding County approval as a defense or other contributing sources as a defense to nuisance. The Court found that these instructions were not 'generated by the evidence adduced at trial' because the Church did not raise them as explicit defenses. The Church introduced evidence of its approved plans and stormwater management efforts to demonstrate it had taken effective measures to control runoff, not to assert that County approval itself absolved it of liability. Similarly, the Church's expert testimony regarding other sources of water flowing onto the Wietzkes' property was intended to counter the Wietzkes' claim that the parking lot increased runoff, not to argue that other sources absolved the Church of liability. The instructions given to the jury adequately covered the Church's liability if its changes in water flow created a nuisance. 3. Yes, the trial court erred in dismissing the negligence count related to the June 14, 2007 Notice of Violation. Applying the Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc. test for negligence based on a statutory violation, the Court found that the Wietzkes had presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case for this specific violation. Section 19-16(a) of the Montgomery County Code, which was cited in the June 14, 2007 Notice, prohibits land-disturbing activity that causes materials like soil and earth to 'roll, flow, or wash upon or over the premises of another in a manner to cause damage.' This language, supported by legislative history (which excluded 'pure' liquids but included liquids with sediment), clearly encompasses the type of harm the Wietzkes complained of (sediment-laden floodwaters). Furthermore, a Church contractor testified that the 'private property' referenced in the June 14, 2007 Notice was, in fact, the Wietzkes' property. Therefore, the Wietzkes were within the class of persons protected, the harm was of the kind the statute intended to prevent, and there was a causal link, making the dismissal of this portion of the negligence claim erroneous.
Analysis:
This case offers crucial clarifications for Maryland law students regarding the complexities of private nuisance and statutory negligence. It firmly establishes that while private nuisance is a 'strict liability' tort once proven, the initial determination of its existence requires a careful balancing of competing property rights, considering the reasonableness of the alleged offender's conduct. This prevents an absolute liability standard and ensures a nuanced approach. Furthermore, the decision provides a practical guide for applying the 'negligence per se' doctrine by emphasizing the necessity of demonstrating a clear causal link between a statutory violation and a harm specifically intended to be prevented by that statute for a defined class of persons. This dual clarification helps to shape appropriate jury instructions and informs how motions for judgment should be evaluated in tort cases involving property disputes and regulatory compliance.
