Whorton v. Bockting
549 U.S. 406 (2007)
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Rule of Law:
The rule established in Crawford v. Washington, which requires that testimonial statements of an unavailable witness are admissible only if the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination, is a new procedural rule that does not apply retroactively to cases that were already final on direct review.
Facts:
- Marvin Bockting lived with his wife, Laura, and his 6-year-old stepdaughter, Autumn.
- One night, Autumn awoke crying and told her mother that Bockting had sexually assaulted her multiple times, stating she was afraid to tell because Bockting threatened her.
- A subsequent medical examination of Autumn revealed strong physical evidence consistent with sexual assault.
- Two days later, Autumn gave a detailed description of the assaults to Detective Charles Zinovitch, demonstrating the acts with anatomically correct dolls.
- At Bockting's preliminary hearing, Autumn testified briefly but became too upset to describe the assaults.
- At trial, the court determined Autumn was too distressed to be sworn in and testify.
- Consequently, the trial court, over defense objection, allowed Laura Bockting and Detective Zinovitch to testify about the out-of-court statements Autumn had made to them describing the assaults.
Procedural Posture:
- Marvin Bockting was convicted by a jury in a Nevada state trial court on three counts of sexual assault on a minor.
- Bockting (appellant) appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court, which affirmed his conviction in 1993, finding that the admission of the victim's out-of-court statements complied with the then-governing precedent of Ohio v. Roberts.
- Bockting filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada, which denied the petition.
- Bockting (appellant) appealed the denial to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- While the appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Crawford v. Washington.
- The Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court, holding that the rule from Crawford was a 'watershed rule' that applied retroactively to Bockting's case.
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Issue:
Does the rule established in Crawford v. Washington, which altered the standard for the admissibility of testimonial hearsay under the Confrontation Clause, apply retroactively to a criminal conviction that became final before the Crawford decision was issued?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Alito
No. The rule established in Crawford v. Washington does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. Under the framework from Teague v. Lane, a new rule of criminal procedure is not retroactive unless it is either substantive or a 'watershed rule' that implicates the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding. The Crawford rule is a new procedural rule because it explicitly overruled the prior precedent of Ohio v. Roberts, which had established a reliability test for hearsay. The Crawford rule does not qualify as a watershed rule because it fails both prongs of the test. First, it does not remedy an 'impermissibly large risk' of an inaccurate conviction; it is unclear whether Crawford, on the whole, improves accuracy, as it removes Confrontation Clause protections from non-testimonial hearsay that Roberts had covered. Second, it does not 'alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements' of a fair trial, as it lacks the 'primacy and centrality' of the rule in Gideon v. Wainwright (the right to counsel), which is the primary example of a watershed rule.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrows the possibility of applying new procedural rules retroactively on collateral review, thereby prioritizing the finality of criminal convictions. By holding that even a fundamental reinterpretation of the Confrontation Clause like Crawford does not qualify as a 'watershed' rule, the Court has signaled that the Teague exception is almost impossible to meet. This reinforces the high bar for inmates seeking to benefit from favorable new Supreme Court rulings after their direct appeals are exhausted and solidifies the principle that state courts' good-faith applications of the law at the time of conviction will be upheld against later changes in legal doctrine.
