Whitten v. Greeley-Shaw
1987 Me. LEXIS 637, 520 A.2d 1307 (1987)
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Rule of Law:
For a promise to constitute legally sufficient consideration, it must be bargained for by the promisor and given by the promisee in exchange for the promisor's return promise; a promise unilaterally included by the promisee for the promisor's benefit, without being sought, does not create an enforceable contract.
Facts:
- George D. Whitten and Shirley C. Greeley-Shaw were engaged in an intermittent extra-marital affair for approximately eight years.
- Whitten advanced $64,000 to Greeley-Shaw for the purchase of a home in Harpswell, Maine.
- Greeley-Shaw executed a promissory note and a mortgage deed in connection with the home purchase.
- Sometime later, while Whitten was vacationing at his Bermuda home, Greeley-Shaw arrived uninvited.
- Greeley-Shaw unilaterally drafted a one-page typewritten document that listed several 'conditions' Whitten was to fulfill, including making monthly payments, paying for repairs and medical needs, and taking trips with her.
- The document drafted by Greeley-Shaw also included a statement that she would not call Whitten's homes or offices without his prior permission, which she testified she added because she felt he 'should get something in exchange.'
- Whitten signed the document, testifying he did so under duress as Greeley-Shaw had threatened to 'raise hell' and embarrass him in front of his wife and friends.
Procedural Posture:
- George D. Whitten filed a foreclosure action against Shirley C. Greeley-Shaw in the Superior Court (Cumberland County), a trial court.
- Greeley-Shaw asserted a counterclaim against Whitten, seeking enforcement of a written document she alleged was a contract.
- The Superior Court entered judgment for Whitten on the foreclosure action and ruled against Greeley-Shaw on her counterclaim, finding the document was not a legally enforceable contract.
- Greeley-Shaw, as the Appellant, appealed the judgment of the Superior Court to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, the state's highest court.
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Issue:
Does a promise to forbear from an action constitute legally sufficient consideration to form an enforceable contract if it was not sought by the other party but was instead unilaterally included by the promisee in a written agreement?
Opinions:
Majority - Nichols, Justice
No. A promise does not constitute legally sufficient consideration if it was not bargained for and given in exchange for the return promise. While a promise to forbear from a legal right can be consideration, it is not sufficient if it was not sought by the promisor and did not motivate their own promise. Here, there was no evidence that Whitten sought Greeley-Shaw's promise not to call him; she included it on her own initiative. Because her promise was not 'bargained for' by Whitten or given in exchange for his promises, it cannot constitute the consideration necessary to support a contract.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms the foundational contract law principle that consideration must be the result of a bargained-for exchange, not just a gratuitous or unilaterally offered promise. It clarifies that the motive and negotiation process are critical; a promise inserted by one party for the other's benefit does not create an enforceable contract unless the other party actually sought that promise. This precedent strengthens the requirement of mutual inducement, ensuring that contracts are formed from genuine agreement and reciprocal promises, rather than one-sided arrangements masquerading as bargains.
